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Executive summary
In recent decades,  unemployment has become a serious problem in many parts  of the world,
and the task of helping the unemployed  has gained  increased  importance  and the interest of
policymakers.  The  purpose  of  this  report  is  to  provide  guidelines  for  developing  and
transition  countries  wishing  to  introduce  or  improve  their  income  support  systems  for  the
unemployed.
The report builds  on the fact  that public income  support  systems  for the  unemployed  are  a
subset of forrnal  and  informal  mechanisms  of social  risk  management.  Participation  in  a
public  income  support  program,  for example,  may  reduce  the  amount  of private  transfers
received  by  participants  and/or  their  incentives  to  save  and  to  take  training.  Viewing  the
system in  its entirety  and  considering  links  among various  components  brings  an important
advantage,  as  it  enables  to  strike  the  right  balance  between  public  programs  and  private
mechanisms of risk management.
To derive guidelines about income  support programs  for the unemployed, the report develops
two sets of criteria.  One set consists of the following performance criteria  of the programs:
*  how they affect distribution of income;
*  how they affect efficiency;
*  how suitable they are to confront different types of economic shocks,  and
*  how resistant they are to political interference.
To  "find  what  fits"  developing  and transition  countries,  their  specific  features  have  to  be
appropriately  recognized.  In  obtaining  the  guidelines,  besides  performance  criteria,  the
report also uses the following design and implementation criteria:
*  interactions of income programs with labor market institutions and shocks,
*  administrative  capacity for program implementation,
*  the characteristics  of the unemployed,
*  the size of the informal  sector,
*  the prevalence  and pattern of inter-household transfers,
*  the ability to self-insure and self-protect,
*  the nature of shocks, and
*  cultural  and political factors.
Based on the above criteria,  the report evaluates  the strengths  and weaknesses  of alternative
income support programs  for the unemployed,  as well as their suitability for developing and
transition countries.  This procedure produced the following guidelines:
*  Unemployment insurance, thanks  to  its  wide  risk-pooling,  enables  a  high  degree  of
consumption smoothing for all categories  of workers, performs well under idiosyncratic,
sectoral, and regional shocks,  and acts as an automatic  macroeconomic  stabilizer.  But italso  creates  reemployment  disincentives  and  wage  pressures  which  increase  the
equilibrium  unemployment  rate,  and it  contributes  to the  persistence  of unemployment.
Because  its  smooth  and successful  performance  relies  on  strong  administrative  capacity
to  monitor  program  eligibility,  conducive  labor market  conditions,  modest  size  of the
informal  sector,  and  an  environment  of low  political  risk  - the  conditions  which  are
typically lacking  in developing and transition countries - the case  for the introduction  of
unemployment  insurance  in  these  countries  is  less  compelling  than  it  is  in  developed
countries.  Its  existence  may  also  reduce  incentives  for  self-protection  and break  down
the  habit  of  self-help  among  local  communities,  which  may  be  welfare-reducing.
Introducing  unemployment  insurance  is thus  viewed  as  a  longer-term  goal  for  many of
these countries.
Unemployment  assistance,  while  enabling  more  effective  targeting,  may  not  bring
savings  in  comparison  to  unemployment  insurance  - and  in  fact  may  prove  fiscally
unsustainable,  due  to the  increased  pool of potential  applicants created  by the programs
failure  to  base  eligibility  on  contribution  payments.  In  addition,  in  comparison  to
unemployment  insurance,  it offers  a lower level  of protection  for high income workers,
imposes  larger  administrative  costs,  and  suffers  from  similar employment  disincentives.
Its  applicability  is  thus  limited,  perhaps  to  countries  with  relatively  developed
administrative  capacity  and a small  informal  sector - a rare breed  among developing  and
transition countries.
*  Unemployment insurance savings accounts are  recognized  as  a  promising  option.  By
internalizing the  costs of unemployment  benefits,  the program  avoids  the moral  hazard
inherent  in  unemployment  insurance  program  and  thus  improves  reemployment
incentives  - given  the weak  monitoring  capacity  of developing  countries,  an  important
advantage.  In  its  integrated  version  with  public  insurance  - thus  avoiding  its  main
weakness of the absence of risk pooling among individuals  - the program promises both
superior protection and improved incentives,  and also has the potential to attract informal
sector workers.  By allowing  individuals  to  borrow from his or her savings account,  this
version  of the program  creates  problems  of its  own - it  creates  incentives  to  withdraw
from  a formal  sector so  as  to avoid  the repayment  of the  debt, and reduces  the gains  in
terms of reemployment  incentives.  Because the system has been largely untested,  further
investigation  of its  effects  and  design parameters,  including  piloting of the program,  is
needed.
*  Public works program is effective in reaching the poor, has good targeting properties and
substantial  capacity  to  redistribute  income  from  the  rich  to  the  poor,  is able  to  attract
informal  sector  workers  and  to  provide  flexible  and  fast  response  to  shocks,  and  is
administratively  less demanding than other public income  support programs.  Despite  its
weaknesses - high non-wage costs, the likely counter-cyclical  pattern of funding,  and,  in
some  countries,  stigmatization  of  participants  - it  is  found  suitable  for  developing
countries,  particularly as a complementary  program.
a  Severance pay offers few advantages.  Because  it adversely  affects  efficiency, produces
high litigation costs and offers limited risk-pooling, severance pay is recognized as one of
the least appropriate options.Among the  future research  needs, the report identifies  several  key areas which  need further
investigation, with the knowledge  gap about developing countries being particularly  large:
*  Feasibility, incentive effects, and design of unemployment  insurance savings accounts.
*  Incentive  effects  and effects on  equilibrium  unemployment  of unemployment  insurance
and other income  support systems for the unemployed.
*  Consumption smoothing effects of income support programs in developing countries.
*  Political economy of income support systems.
*  The  interaction  of  various  income  support  systems,  and  detennination  of  optimal
combinations of various programs.INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEMS  FOR THE UNEMPLOYED:
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1.  INTRODUCTION
In recent decades,  unemployment has become  a serious problem in many parts of the
world.  Macroeconomic  crises and increased  globalization  have  put more workers  at risk  of
job loss  in Latin America  and, more recently,  in East Asia as well.  In an effort to transform
themselves  into  market economies,  former socialist countries  have faced  the  enormous task
of efficiently  reallocating  workers  and jobs across  sectors  and firns, which  has  led to the
emergence  of unemployment  and poverty of large proportions.  Moreover,  since the  1  970s,
Europe  has  witnessed  a  reduction  in  economic  growth  and  an  increase  in  unemployment,
most worrying of which is the rise in the share of long-term  unemployed.
Given  the  above  trends,  the  task  of helping  the  unemployed  has  gained  increased
importance  and  the  interest  of  policymakers.  Several  aspects  of  this  task  must  be
emphasized.  Because job loss entails the loss of income, providing effective  income support
is obviously a prime concern and a necessary component of assistance to the unemployed  (be
it  in  a  form  of a  pure  transfer,  or  through jobs  created  by  public  programs).'  But  other
aspects  must  also  be  considered.  In  conjunction  with  income  support,  it  is  important  to
consider how to increase  the "employability"  of the unemployed,  that is,  the capacity of the
unemployed  to  search  for  a job  and  to  match  skills  with  existing  vacancies.  Moreover,
adverse labor supply incentives created by income transfers need to be carefully studied and
addressed.  And  last  but  not  least,  reducing  the  risk  of unemployment,  by  both  designing
appropriate  income  support  programs  as  well  as by  increasing  employment  opportunities,
should figure prominently.
While  the  task  of increasing  employment  opportunities  reaches  far  beyond  labor
market  policies  and  programs,  important  link-s  between  job  creation  capacities  of  the
economy  and  income  support programs  - and social  protection  systems in  general - should
not be overlooked.  Indeed, income support systems for the unemployed should be developed
in  line  with  a  broader  conceptual  frameworkc  that  lays  out  complex  inter-linkages  of
*We are  grateful to Gordon Betcherman,  Peter Fredriksson,  Indermit Gill, Bertil Holmlund,  Robert
Holzmann,  and Jan  van Ours for valuable  written comments  on the earlier version of the report,  and
to Wendy  Cunningham,  Jude  Esguerra,  Luis Guaschi,  John  Haltiwanger,  Hugo Hopenhayn,  William
Maloney,  Carmen  Pages, Robert  Palacios,  Martin  Rama,  Michelle Ribaud,  Elizabeth  Ruppert,  Hong
Tan, Wayne Vroman, and our colleagues from the labor team in HDNSP for fruitful  consultations and
other inputs to the report.  The usual caveat applies.
I An  important  recent  contribution  to  the  analysis of policy  options  for income  support  for the  unemployed,
focusing particularly on the Latin American  context, is provided by de Ferranti et al (2000).institutions and policies in the area of social protection and labor markets in a systematic and
comprehensive  way.  This report relies  on such  a comprehensive  framework  developed  by
the Human Development Network (World Bank, 2001).  By formulating  various strategies to
manage  social risk,  the  framework  sets  analytical  foundations  for the  formulation of social
protection approaches  and policies.
The purpose of this report is to provide guidelines for developing countries  wishing to
introduce  or  improve  income  support  systems  for  the  unemployed.  To  arrive  at  such
guidelines,  the report summarizes  the results  in the  literature  on the performance  of various
income  support  systems  viewed  from  four  aspects:  how  desirable  are  their  distributive
effects;  how  they  affect  efficiency;  how  suitable  they  are  to  confront  different  types  of
shocks;  and  how resistant  they are  to political  interference.  Based  on this  evaluation,  and
taking  account  of countries'  specific  circumstances  - chief among them being  labor market
and other  institutions,  the  administrative  capacity  needed  for administering  income  support
programs, the prevalence  of private transfers,  cultural  factors,  the types  of shocks  typically
faced,  and the size of informal  sector - the  suitability of individual  programs  for developing
and transition countries is then evaluated.
The main conclusions  can be summarized as follows:
*  Unemployment insurance enables a high degree of consumption  smoothing, performs
well  under  various  types  of  shocks,  and  acts  as  an  automatic  macroeconomic
stabilizer  - but  it  found to  create  reemployment  disincentives  and  wage  pressures,
which  increase  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate  and  make  unemployment
persistent.  Because  its  successful  performance  relies  on  conditions  which  are
typically  lacking  in  developing  and transition  countries,  the case for the introduction
of unemployment  insurance  in  these  countries  is  less  compelling  than  it  is  in
developed countries.
*  Unemployment  assistance  is  found  to  enable  more  effective  targeting,  but  in
comparison to unemployment insurance may not bring savings,  offers a lower level of
protection for high income workers,  imposes  larger  administrative  costs,  and suffers
from similar employment  disincentives.  Its  applicability  is thus limited,  perhaps  to
countries  with  relatively  developed  administrative  capacity  and  a  small  informal
sector.
*  Unemployment insurance  savings accounts are  recognized as  a promising option.  By
internalizing  the  costs  of  unemployment  benefits,  the  program  avoids  the  moral
hazard  inherent  in  the  traditional  unemployment  insurance  program  and  thus
improves  reemployment  incentives  - given  the  weak  monitoring  capacity  of
developing  countries,  an  important  advantage.  In its  integrated  version  with public
insurance  - thus  avoiding  its  main  weakness  of  not  pooling  the  risk  among
individuals  - the  program  promises  to  yield  both  superior  protection  and  improved
incentives,  and also has the potential  to attract  informal  sector  workers.  By allowing
individuals  to  borrow  from  his  or  her UISA  account,  this  version  of the  program
creates  problems of its own - it creates  incentives  to withdraw  from a formal  sector
so  as  to  avoid  the  repayment  of  the  debt,  and  reduces  the  gains  in  terms  of
reemployment  incentives.  Because  the  system  has  been  largely  untested,  further
2investigation  of its effects  and design  parameters,  including piloting of the program,
is needed.
*  Public works program  is effective  in reaching the poor, has good targeting properties
and  substantial  capacity to  redistribute  income  from  the rich  to  the poor,  is  able to
attract  informal  sector workers  and provide  flexible  and fast response to shocks, and
is  administratively  less  demanding  than  other  public  income  support  programs.
Despite its weaknesses  - high non-wage  costs,  the  likely counter-cyclical  pattern  of
funding,  and,  in some  countries,  stigmatization  of participants  - it is found  suitable
for developing countries,  particularly as a complementary  program.
*  Severance pay  offers  few  advantages.  Because  it  adversely  affects  efficiency,
produces  high  litigation  costs  and  offers  limited  risk-pooling,  severance  pay  is
recognized  as one of the least appropriate options.
The report proceeds  as follows.  We first discuss the conceptual  issues that arise  in
evaluating and designing income support systems for the unemployed (Chapter 2).  The need
to  evaluate  these  systems  in  a  broader  framework  and  to  allow  for  various  interactions
(within the  labor market,  for example)  is particularly  emphasized.  We then review existing
income support  systems for the unemployed  in different parts of the world  and present their
stylized  design  features  (Chapter  3).  The  presentation  emphasizes  the  richness  of the
approaches  and  the complexity of the  programs,  highlighting important  features that  should
be  considered  when  improving  such  systems  or  introducing  new  ones.  In  Chapter  4,  we
evaluate the performance  of various income support systems, based on a review of theoretical
predictions  and  empirical  evidence.  Distributive  and  efficiency  effects  are  taken  into
account,  as  well  as  how  well  are  different  systems  suited  to  confront  various  types  of
economic  shocks and  to resist the political  risk.  Because  the review of the performance  of
these  systems  is  derived  under  typical  conditions  prevailing  in  developed  economies,  we
devote  Chapter  5  to the  discussion  of the  most  important  country-specific  features  which
affect  the  choice  and  design  of income  support  programs.  The  two  concluding  chapters
present  the  findings  of  the  report.  Combining  both  performance  and  design  and
implementation  criteria  developed  earlier,  Chapter  6  provides  tentative  guidelines  for
improving  incomes  support  systems  in  developing  and  transition  economies.  The  last
chapter describes the main areas for future research.
2.  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Faced  with  the  risk of unemployment,  individuals  choose  among  a  variety  of risk
management  mechanisms.  Some try to get a good education or enter jobs that are known to
be stable,  so  as to  reduce  the risk of becoming  unemployed;  others  may accumulate  real  or
financial assets,  or participate  in unemployment  insurance  programs,  so as to have financial
means  at  hand  if unemployment  occurs;  yet  others  may  rely  on private  transfers  of cash,
food, and clothing,  draw down financial  and real assets, participate in public  works or public
training,  or receive  social assistance,  so as to cushion the loss of earnings associated with job
loss.
3How  to judge the  desirability  of such  mechanisms  from  the  viewpoint  of society?
Successful  smoothing  of consumption  is important,  but there are  other  considerations.  Do
public systems  displace  other mechanisms,  formal  or  informal?  Do  they affect job  search
effort and the type of post-unemployment job?  How successful  are they in reaching the most
hard-hit segments of the population  and the very poor?  What are the tradeoffs  between pure
income transfers  compared with programs  which combine  transfers with other requirements
- and  opportunities  - such as  public  works or training?  How to prevent  the loss of human
capital associated with prolonged  unemployment  spells?
In  this  chapter,  we  present  conceptual  issues  in  evaluating  various  mechanisms
available to workers  in dealing with the risk of unemployment.  The  starting point - and the
recurrent  theme  of this  report  - is  the  recognition  that  public  income  support  programs
available  to  the  unemployed  are just  a  subset  of risk  management  mechanisms.  It  is  of
utmost importance,  therefore,  to look  at the  system of social risk management  in its entirety,
so  as to  consider links among  its various  components,  and  the repercussions  of introducing
new  public  programs  on  other  mechanisms.  The  richness  of mechanisms  and  strategies
available  to individuals,  families  and  communities  is  staggering  - implying,  among others,
that  theoretical  models  of necessity  focus  on  specific  aspects  of  income  support,  and
therefore  the  validity  of their  conclusions  has  to  be  checked  against  the  circumstances
prevailing in  a specific  country.  The same  is true  for empirical  findings obtained  from the
experience of developed  countries when applied to developing  and transition countries.
The  complexity  of  interactions  and  the  lack  of generality  of theoretical  results,
coupled  with the  dearth of empirical  studies on income support programs  in developing and
transition  countries,  led  us  to  develop  the  following  two  sets  of criteria  to  judge  the
desirability  of income  support  programs  in  a particular  country.  The  first  set  consists  of
performance  criteria,  and the  second set of design and implementation criteria.  Performance
criteria  relate  to  various  effects  of income  support  programs  and  their  other  features  as
established  by  theoretical  models  and  validated  by  empirical  studies.  This  set  includes
programs'  effects  on  distribution  of income  and  efficiency,  as  well  as  their  suitability  to
confront different  types of shocks  and resiliency  to political  risk.  But when transferring  the
experience  of other countries,  the "initial  conditions"  - particular  features  of the  country  in
question - also  have  to be taken into  account,  both to check  the implications  of the  lack of
generality  of theoretical  models  as  well  as  to  address  the  lack  of empirical  studies  on
developing  countries.  Therefore,  we  also  propose  a  second  set of criteria,  which  we call
design  and implementation criteria.  They include country-specific  features such as the nature
of labor  market  institutions,  the  administrative  capacity  of the  country  to  deliver  specific
programs,  the  characteristics  of  the  unemployed,  the  size  of  the  informal  sector,  the
prevalence  and pattern of inter-household  transfers, the  ability of individuals  to self-protect,
the nature  of shocks typically  faced  by the country,  and  cultural  and political  factors.  For
example,  the  degree  of informality  of the  economy  determines  how many  individuals  can
take  advantage  of formal  sector programs  (such  as unemployment  insurance  and  severance
pay), and the  administrative  capacity of the economy  is a strong predictor  of the success of
programs which require strong monitoring or information  capacity.
4In  the  continuation  of this  chapter,  we  first  place  income  support  programs  in  the
context  of  social  risk  management.  The  interaction  with  other  formal  and  informal
mechanisms  has an important bearing  on the  success  of these  programs  and hence  on  their
desirability.  We  also  discuss  the  arguments  that  speak  in  favor  of the  public  nature  of
programs to help the unemployed.  We then develop  criteria that we use for the evaluation of
the  suitability  of  alternative  income  support  programs.  As  mentioned,  we  propose
performance  evaluation  criteria  (stressing  distributive  and  efficiency  aspects,  as  well  as
suitability  to  confront  shocks  and  resistance  to  political  interference),  and  design  and
implementation  criteria  (stressing  a  country's  specific  conditions  as  factors  for  selection).
Using the  above  analytical  instruments,  in  subsequent  chapters we evaluate  various income
support  programs  and judge their  desirability  for developing  and  transition  countries.  We
conclude  the  chapter  by  discussing  the  weaknesses  of the  standard  ILO  definition  of the
unemployed when applied  to developing countries.
2.1 Public income support in the context  of social  risk management
Public  income  support  programs  for  the  unemployed  are  just  a  subset  of  risk
management  mechanisms  available  to them.  These  mechanisms  can  be  divided  into three
categories:  (i) those that reduce the risk of unemployment  (that is, reduce the probability  of
becoming  unemployed  and/or  increase  the  probability  of  leaving  unemployment  if
unemployed);  (ii)  those that mitigate that risk  (reduce the impact of a future unemployment
spell  if it  happens),  and  (iii) those  applied  in  response  to  the undesirable  event  - coping
mechanisms.  Within  all three categories, both  informal  and formal mechanisms  are usually
available, with formal ones further divided into rnarket-based and public (see table 2. 1).
2  For a comprehensive  framework of social protection based on social risk management,  see World Bank
(2001).
5Table 2.1:  Income support systems  for the unemployed  in the context of
social  risk management*
Arrangement  Informal  Formal
Strategies
Market Based  Public
Risk reduction  Less risky production.  Training.  Sound  macroeconomic
Migration.  Financial  market  policies.
Proper feeding and  literacy.  Public health policy.
weaning practices.  Company-based  and  Labor market policies
Maintaining good  market-driven  labor  (including employment
health.  standards.  protection  policies - severance
pay, for example).
Risk mitigation
(a) Portfolio  Multiple jobs.  Investment in  multiple  Multi-pillar pension systems.
diversification  Investment  in human,  financial assets.  Asset transfers.
physical and real  assets.  Microfinance  Protection of property rights.
Investment  in social  schemes.  Support for extending financial
capital (rituals,  markets to the poor.
reciprocal  gift-giving).
(b) Insurance  Marriage/family.  Old-age  annuities.  Unemployment
Community  Disability, accident  and  insurance/assistance.
arrangements.  other personal  Individual savings  accounts.
Sharecrop  tenancy.  insurance.  Pensions (including  early
Crop, fire and other  retirement),  disability,  and
damage insurance.  sickness insurance.
Risk coping  Selling of real assets.  Sale of financial  assets.  Social assistance.
Borrowing  from  Commercial  loans.  General subsidies.
neighbors.  Active  labor market programs
Intra-community  (job-search  assistance,
transfers/charity.  training, employment
Child labor.  subsidies,  public works).
Dis-saving  in human  Social  funds.
capital.
Source:  Adapted  from World Bank (2000).
*Major mechanisms used to manage the risk of unemployment  are shown  in bold
The  interaction  of  risk management  mechanisms.  The  above  risk  management
framework enables one to position income  support systems for the unemployed  in the context
of other - informal  and formal - mechanisms which may also  be used to manage  the risk of
unemployment.  Viewing  the  system  in  its  entirety  and  considering  links  among  various
components  brings  an  important  advantage  when  evaluating  the  effects  of  individual
programs or assessing  the effects of introducing public programs  on other mechanisms.  For
example,  the  introduction  of unemployment  insurance  may  encourage  the  emergence  or
expansion  of more risky industries  - which  may or may not increase  efficiency.  Similarly,
participation  in a public  income support program may reduce the amount of private transfers
received by participants,  and their incentives to save and to take training.
But  links  are  even  more  complicated.  The financing  of social  insurance  typically
requires contributions of both employers  and  employees,  thus creating  a wedge  between the
wage received  and the labor costs and possibly reducing labor demand.  Similarly, increasing
6the generosity  of severance  pay may slow down  labor market  flows - from employment  to
unemployment,  and  from  unemployment  and  inactivity  to  employment.  Thus,  the
introduction  of a  risk  mitigation mechanism  (such  as  social  insurance)  or a risk reduction
mechanism (such as severance pay) may increase the unemployment rate or negatively affect
the job creation  capacity  of an  economy  - and  thus worsens  the  effectiveness  of other  risk
reducing  mechanisms.  Income  support  programs  may  also  have  dynamic  effects,  for
example,  they may interact with  adverse shocks  to the economy,  typically  slowing down the
reduction  of  unemployment  to  the  shock  and  thus  contributing  to  the  persistence  of
unemployment.
The  social  risk  management  framework  thus  makes  clear  not  only  that  there  are
multiple  mechanisms  for  dealing  with  the  risk  of unemployment,  but  also  that  there  are
complex links and interactions  among them.  Recognizing - and appropriately  accounting for
- such  interactions  is a must for the  successfuil  choice  and design of public  income support
programs.  For example,  when a low-income  country  is trying to improve  its income support
systems  for the unemployed,  diverse  and  far-reaching  implications of public  actions should
be  taken  into  account.  These  implications  range  from  the  impact  on  self-protection
mechanisms  of  individuals  (for  example,  changes  in  the  intensity  of job  search  and
propensity  to take  training),  to the  effects  on  labor  market  outcomes  (for example,  on the
unemployment  rate  and  the  intensity  of labor  market  flows),  to  the  appropriateness  of a
certain program  from the standpoint  of the  existing capacity to administer the program  (see
box 2.1).
Box 2.1: Recognizing interactions among different risk management mechanisms
In  dealing  with  the  risk  of  unemployment,  Filipino  workers  employed  in  the  formal  sector  rely  on
severance  pay,  although  it may  be  difficult  to  obtain.  Even  then,  such  workers  are  better  off than  the
informal  sector workers  for whom there  is little or no protection.  It is therefore not surprising that Filipino
workers  have relied greatly  on  informal mechanisms  to manage  the unemployment  risk  - many  of which
are costly, inefficient,  and above all,  inadequate.
How  to improve public policy to better assist Filipino workers to deal with unemployment?  The social risk
management  framework  suggests  that  the  answer  should  rest,  among  others,  on  the  following
considerations:
*  How well does the program fit into existing-  mechanisms of risk management?  For example,  would its
introduction  disrupt  existing  self-protection  mechanisms,  or  displace  existing  coping  mechanisms
(such  as an existing  system of private transfers,  especially  for the non-poor population) that may have
superior efficiency properties to public programs?  Is the program well attuned to the prevailing norms
and culture?  Are  there  existing  institutions that can  be  "upgraded"  to  provide  better protection  and
increased  coverage?
*  How  do the likely beneficiaries compare  with other population  groups?  What are the likely effects of
the program on income redistribution and poverty reduction?
*  Is  the  program  compatible  with  other public  support  mechanisms  and  policies?  Above  all,  does  it
promote labor reallocation and job creation as sources of productivity  growth?
*  How  well  does  the  program  respond  to  a  country's  income  shocks,  such  as  economic  recessions,
structural  imbalances  caused  by  liberalization  and  globalization,  and  shocks  arising  from  natural
calamities?
*  And last and certainly not least,  is the program well attuned to local circumstances  so that the program
itself functions  well?  For example, can  it be supported with the existing administrative  capacity of the
country?  Are there mechanisms  that allow effective  ways of program  selection?
Source:  Esguerra et al (2001).
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support  systems  and  their  implications  for  economic  policies.  For  example,  by  using  a
comprehensive  insurance  approach  pioneered  by  Ehrlic  and  Becker  (1972),  important
implications  about the relative use of different risk management  instruments  are obtained  by
Gill  and  Ilahi  (2000).  Their results  are summarized  in box  2.2.  Furthermore,  pursuing  the
optimal  unemployment insurance  approach,  Hopenhayn and Nicolini  (1997) and Hopenhayn
(2001)  model  the tradeoff between  insurance  and  incentives,  created  by the moral  hazard
problem  which is present  in social  insurance  when it is  difficult to monitor job-search effort
of benefit recipients,  and derive implications  for the time pattern  of the optimal replacement
rate (see Chapter 6).
Box 2.2: A theory of "comprehensive  insurance"
A  conceptual  framework  for dealing with  unemployment risk in  a comprehensive  way  is provided by Gill
and Ilahi  (2000).  It is based  on a utility maximization  model  where the  individual  decides how much to
spend on three different risk management instruments:  market insurance,  self-insurance  and self-protection
(individuals insure by transferring income from the good to the bad state,  and self-protect by taking actions
which reduce the probability of the bad state).
Among the important  insights produced by the study are the following ones:
*  Market  insurance  and  self-insurance  are  substitutes,  and  so  are  self-insurance  and  self-protection;
market insurance  and self-protection may be substitutes or complements.  An important implication of
the latter finding is that  the existence  of market  or social  insurance may  not necessarily  reduce  self-
protection  and  thus  produce  a  moral  hazard  problem.  For  example,  if more  intense  job  search  is
rewarded  by  subsequent  lowering  of the  unemployment  insurance  premium,  moral  hazard  is  not
inevitable (note that this assumes that self-protection behavior  is detectable).
*  Relatively  rare  and  large  losses  are  better  insured through  market  insurance,  and relatively  frequent
and moderate  losses  though  self-insurance.  This follows  from the fact that while the price of market
insurance is lower if the probability  of loss is  lower,  the (shadow) price of self-insurance  (for example,
the cost of precautionary saving) does not vary with  the likelihood of loss.
*  Individuals  enjoy higher welfare  when  all  three  instruments are  available  than when  one  of them  is
missing.
*  Introducing a social safety net will reduce self-protection, but not necessarily self-insurance measures.
Gill and Ilahi also offer important insights about the rationale for social policies:
*  One rationale  for publicly provided  insurance is the non-existence  of market insurance.  An important
example is public  unemployment insurance.
*  Private agents may self-insure using "bad"  instruments (for example, using cattle or land as a medium
of precautionary  saving)  because  "good"  instruments  (such  as  diversified  financial  assets)  are  not
available.
*  The  government  can  step  in  to  foster  the  development  of  insurance  and  financial  markets.  In
particular,  financial market  strengthening  should  be a central  component  of social  policy,  because  it
can  foster  self-insurance,  market  insurance,  and  self-protection  (for  example,  through  prudential
regulation of capital markets).
*  One of the best ways of self-protection  is investment in human capital, but this investment  offers poor
collateral.  By subsidizing the  acquisition of human capital, the government  can  mitigate the resulting
tendency to underinvest.
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the context of social risk management is the limited ability of formal  modeling to capture  all
relevant  aspects.  Thus  theoretical  modeling  often  fails  to include  all relevant  labor market
features,  and/or  disregards  important  features  of programs  themselves.  While  advances  in
theoretical  modeling  offer increasingly  complex  insights  into the working of public  income
support  systems,  often  models  cannot  be  solved  analytically.  For  example,  theoretical
models of labor reallocation which explicitly treat job creation  and destruction  processes are
often  analytically  intractable,  forcing  researchers  to  use  calibration  models  which  yield
solutions  under  less  general  conditions.3 Similarly,  as  Atkinson  and  Micklewright  (1991,
p. 1706)  complain,  "the  great  generality  of  research  reaching  conclusions  about
unemployment  compensation  has paid  scant  attention  to  the  institutional  details,  and some
elements  have  been  almost totally  ignored.  ...  The  importance  of the  institutional  features
aspects is a matter on which we would like to insist."
To  summarize,  the  above considerations  suggest that there  is a host of issues which
countries  should  take  into  account  when  changing  public  income  support  programs  or
considering  the introduction  of new  ones.  Besides  considering  direct  effects  of programs,
they  should  also  worry  about  the  interactions  of proposed  income  support  programs  with
many other  mechanisms  and  institutions.  In this  study,  we have  therefore  devoted  a lot of
attention  to  country-specific  conditions  which  influence  the  functioning  of public  income
support programs and thus affect their choice and design (see Chapter 5).  This is even more
important because  theoretical modeling,  while producing increasingly  complex  insights, fails
to provide general solutions.
Why  public  income  support  programs?  The  above  social  risk  management
framework  is  also  useful  when  considering  whether  or  not there  should  be  formal,  public
income  support  programs  for  the  unemployed.  Indeed,  some  studies  cast  doubt  on  the
welfare benefits of public programs,  because such programs may displace old mechanisms of
dealing  with  unemployment  risk.  For example,  Cox  and  Jimenez  (1995)  estimate  that the
introduction  of unemployment  insurance  in  the  Philippines  would  displace  a  striking  91
percent of private transfers to the unemployed,  and Attanasio  and Rios-Rull  (2000) show that
such an introduction  can be welfare reducing.
While  precise  conditions  for  the  introduction  of formal  programs  are  difficult  to
pinpoint,  experience  shows  that  these  can  offer  important  advantages.  Informal  insurance
mechanisms may often be ineffective, because  the loss of employment  is too large a shock -
and  may  occur  too  frequently.  As  Murdoch  (1999)  points  out,  informal  insurance  (for
example, reciprocal  transfers, but also other forms) tends to be least effective  when insurance
is  most  needed.  Moreover,  he  shows  that  in poor  countries  the  beneficiaries  of private
transfers are the elderly,  and keeping more incorne for themselves would enable the young  -
who are often  also poor - to obtain  more education.  Another  advantage of formal  systems is
the ability to pool resources  across  larger groups  and across time.  Providing  formal  income
3  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  (1999),  Hopenhayn  and  Rogerson  (1993),  and  Mortensen  (1994)  provide
calibrations/simulations  of the distortions  in  the magnitude  of reallocation  that can  occur  from  various  labor
market interventions.
9support  may  also  improve  fairness;  for  example,  many  informal  insurance  mechanisms
militate against women.
If informal insurance mechanisms  are not satisfactory and unemployment insurance  is
a  desirable  benefit,  why  cannot  the  market  itself  provide  insurance  against  the  risk  of
unemployment?  There are compelling arguments for public programs:
*  There  are  strong  informational  problems  (leading  to  adverse  selection)  as  well  as
incentive  problems  (leading  to  moral  hazard)  involved  in  the  provision  of
unemployment  insurance  (Barr,  1992).  Market  insurance  may  fail  if  low  risk
individuals  are  allowed  to  opt  out;  compulsory  membership  enables  widespread
membership  and  thus  a  wide  pooling  of resources.  Moreover,  the  state  has  an
advantage  in providing  mechanisms  to deal  with the moral  hazard  problem as  well;
that is, it can more effectively  monitor and penalize behavior that aggravates the risk
of unemployment.
*  Unemployment  risks  are  covariant  and  thus  cannot  be  diversified  by  private
insurance.  A severe recession may dramatically increase the number of claimants and
jeopardize the existence  of private insurers.
2.2 Performance evaluation criteria
In  judging  the  desirability  of  income  support  programs  for  the  unemployed,  one
important  measuring  rod is how successful  are the  programs  in achieving  their objectives  -
and what are their other intended and unintended effects and features.  From the standpoint of
individuals,  the most important effects  relate to the replacement  of income  in the case of job
loss,  thereby  contributing  to  consumption  smoothing  and  possibly  to  the  prevention  of
poverty.  Moreover,  countering  psychological  effects of unemployment  and maintaining  and
acquiring  human  capital  may  also  be  important  individual  level  objectives.  From  the
standpoint  of society, the objectives  are wider and also include promoting distributive justice
(reducing  income  inequalities,  helping  the  poor  and  long-term  unemployed),  as  well  as
efficiency aspects.
We therefore  propose  four subsets  of criteria  which we use in Chapter  4 to evaluate
income support programs for the unemployed:
*  distributive criteria,
*  efficiency  criteria,
*  suitability to confront shocks, and
*  resistance to political risk.
Distributive  and  efficiency  effects  are  natural  measuring  rods,  the  ones  that  follow
closely  from the objectives of income  support programs  for the unemployed.  To determine
distributive  effects,  we will look at the coverage  and the adequacy of support  as well  as the
redistribution  of  income  implied  by  the  program.  To  determine  efficiency  effects,  a
multitude  of aspects  will  be  examined,  including  the  intensity  of job-search  effort,  post-
unemployment  wages,  equilibrium  labor  market  outcomes,  and  effects  on  programs  on
output and growth.
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criteria.  The first is the programs' suitability to confront economic shocks:  for example, how
suitable  are  different  programs  for  a  country  which  is  frequently  plagued  by  sudden,
regionally  concentrated  shocks  due  to  natural  disasters?  Or  with  long-lasting,  covariant
shocks?  The  other criterion  is the programs'  resistance  to political risk the criterion  which
emphasizes  political  economy  considerations  in  providing  income  support  - that  is,  what
particular  circumstances  are  conducive  to  the  introduction  of programs  that  benefit  the
unemployed,  and how to raise support for reforms to improve  such systems.  (These  last two
evaluation criteria of income support programs  could also  be considered under the rubric of
efficiency, but we discuss them separately to emphasize their importance.)
2.3 Design  and implementation criteria
Programs  do not  operate  in  a vacuum  - country-specific  circumstances  affect  their
performance.  They  also  determine  suitability  of alternative  programs  to meet  the  specific
needs of a country.  Beside  performance  criteria,  which  evaluate  income  support programs
based  on their  performance  under typical  conditions  (at  that,  due  to  the bias  in empirical
research,  conditions  that  usually  prevail  in  developed  economies),  we  therefore  also
introduce  another set of criteria - design and implementation  criteria - which reflect specific
features of the country  under investigation.
To illustrate: in a country where certain r  egions are often affected by natural disasters,
it  is  important  to  have  income  support  programs  in  store  which  are  flexible  and  can  be
quickly  deployed  in  affected  areas.  Moreover,  a  large  informal  sector  calls  for a stronger
representation of programs which are also accessible to the self-employed  and other informal
sector workers.  Furthermore,  when choosing a program, a country's administrative capacity
has  to  be  taken  into  account.  For  example,  unemployment  insurance/assistance  requires
monitoring  of recipients  (to ensure  compliance  to  continuing  eligibility  rules);  in addition,
unemployment  assistance  relies  on  means  testing.  The  performance  of such  programs
depends  crucially  on the  administrative  capacity  to provide  quality monitoring  and  testing.
And interactions  with other programs and policies are also important.  For example, to avoid
incentive  incompatibility,  unemployment  insurance  savings accounts need to be harmonized
with old-age income support programs to preclude  scenarios where unemployment  insurance
savings accounts  are depleted.in  anticipation of forbearance  and generosity  on the part of the
pension  system.  Moreover,  introducing  or  increasing  the  generosity  of unemployment
benefits may have different effects in an economy  with different levels of centralization  and
coordination  of  wage  bargaining  - under  uncoordinated  and  fragmented  bargaining,
unemployment benefits are more likely to increase wage pressures  and hence the equilibrium
unemployment  rate than under alternative arrangements  (see Chapter 4).
Because  we  believe  that  the  above  aspects  have  to  be  taken  very  seriously,  we  devote
Chapter  5 to  specific  features  of countries  which  - coupled  with the performance  criteria
discussed  in  Chapter  4  - are  important  when  considering  policy  changes  in  the  area  of
income support for the unemployed.  We discuss the following features:*  interactions with labor market institutions and shocks,
*  administrative  capacity for program implementation,
*  the characteristics of the unemployed,
*  the size of the informal  sector,
*  the prevalence  and pattern of inter-household  transfers,
*  ability of individuals to self-insure and self-protect,
*  the nature of shocks,  and
*  cultural  and political factors.
2.4  Who is unemployed:  definitional problems
According to the International  Labor Organization (ILO)  definition of unemployment
(Resolution  I of the  13th  International  Conference  of Labour  Statisticians,  Geneva,  October
1982),  the  "unemployed"  comprise  all  persons above  a  specified  age  who,  over  a specified
reference period, are:
(a)  "without work," that is, are not in paid employment or self-employment,
(b)  "currently  available  for work," that  is,  are  available  for paid  employment  or self-
employment during the reference period; and
(c)  "seeking work,"  that is, are taking specific  steps in a specified  recent period to seek
paid employment or self-employment.  The specified steps may include registration
at a public or private employment exchange;  application to employers; checking  at
work  sites,  farms,  factory  gates,  market  or  other  assembly  places;  placing  or
answering  newspaper  advertisements;  seeking  assistance  of friends  or  relatives;
looking  for  land,  building,  machinery  or equipment  to  establish  own  enterprise;
arranging for financial resources; applying for permits and licenses, etc.
The  above definitions  have  severe limitations  when applied to developing  countries.
First,  many  workers  in  developing  countries  who  qualify  as  employed  under  the  ILO
definition  are  in  fact  not  fully  employed  or  "underemployed"  (especially  in  rural  areas).4
These  workers  may work  less hours  than they would  like or work in low productivity jobs,
and earn low wages.  But they are so poor that they cannot afford to be without a job, and  so
open  unemployment  is  rare.  Edwards  and  Manning  (2000)  note that  "the  transition  from
underemployment  to  open unemployment  can  be  partly  explained  as  an  income  effect:  as
economies  grow  and  household  incomes  rise,  it  becomes  possible  to  go  through  periods
without work while waiting for a job to open."
Second,  some  unemployed  may  be  classified  as  inactive.  Individuals  who  have  a
marginal  attachment  to the labor force, that is,  those who  are available  for and  desire work,
but are not actively  seeking work  because they perceive, rightly or wrongly, that no jobs are
available,  are  often  considered  economically  inactive  when  they  should  be  more
4According  to  the  ILO,  "underemployment  exists  when  a person's  employment  is  inadequate  in relation  to
specified  norns of alternative employment account  being taken of his or her occupational  skill" (Resolution I of
the  1  3'h International Conference of Labour Statisticians,  Geneva, October  1982).
12appropriately  classified  as  unemployed  (sometimes  they  are  called  discouraged  workers),
Moreover,  the  conventional  application  of the  term "actively  seeking  work"  also  falters  in
light  of  a  fair  share  of  economic  activity  occurring  through  informal  employment
arrangements  or where self-employment  is the norm.
Third,  some employed workers  may be  classified as inactive.  Per ILO  guidelines,  an
individual  who works  at  least one hour  in a week, or who  is temporarily  absent  from work
(for example, on vacation or due to illness) is in employment.  Those who are out of work but
do  not  meet  the  criteria  of  ILO  unemployment  are  classified  as  economically  inactive.
However,  some  forms  of  informal  economic  activity  may  escape  this  definition  of
employment  (for example, home-based  work, typically undertaken  by women).  And because
such workers are not available  for work, they do not qualify as unemployed  either.
As  a consequence,  it is sometimes  advisable  to complement  the unemployment  rate
with  other  measures  of  labor  market  slack  (for  example,  with  measures  of
underemployment).  The ILO  acknowledges  the possible  restrictiveness  and  "industrialized
country"  bias of the definition, advising the relaxation of these clauses and the formulation of
criteria suitable to the labor market characteristics  of the  particular developing  country.  For
the purpose at hand, the above  discussion implies that besides those counted  as unemployed,
unemployment  support  programs  may  also  include  the  underemployed  - and  that  the
unemployed may not be the most underprivileged  group in the labor market.
2.5 Summary of conceptual issues
The above discussion pointed  out that there is a multitude of mechanisms  available to
individuals,  families,  and  communities  in  dealing  with  the  risk  of unemployment.  When
changing  public  income  support  programs  or  considering  the  introduction  of new  ones,
countries  should  worry about the interactions  of these  programs with other mechanisms  and
institutions.  Theoretical  models  offer  increasingly  refined  and  in-depth  insights  into  the
working  of income  support programs  for  the  unemployed;  numerous  aspects,  however,  do
not  lend  themselves  to  formal  modeling  as  the  underlying  theoretical  models  cannot  be
solved  analytically.  Empirical  evidence  to test  the  generality  of the  theoretical  models,  as
well as to determine the effects which are theoretically ambiguous,  is therefore called for.
Realizing  a  need  for  a  holistic  approach  and  given  the  state  of theoretical  and
empirical research of the field, our approach to evaluate  alternative income support programs
for the unemployed  thus relies on two sets of criteria.  One  set evaluates the performance  of
these programs,  stressing,  among others, distributive and efficiency  effects.  The other  set -
design  and implementation  criteria - recognizes  the wide  differences  among  countries  and
builds  on  their  specific  features  to  arrive  at the  desirability  of alternative  programs  in  a
specific developing or transition country.  We also used this introductory chapter to point out
weaknesses  in  the  standard  ILO  definition  of unemployment  when  applied  to  developing
countries,  and  describe  the  arguments  that  speak  in  favor  of a  public  nature  for  income
support programs  for the unemployed.
133.  REVIEW OF INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED
Countries  differ widely  in the way they provide  income support for the unemployed.
For example,  the  social  insurance  program  for  the unemployed  with the richest  tradition  -
unemployment  insurance  - exists  predominately  in  developed  countries.  In  developing
countries,  aside from transition countries where  it was introduced widely about a decade  ago,
unemployment  insurance  is  uncommon.  The  prevalence  of  unemployment  assistance
programs  across  the  world  shows  a  similar  pattern.  Legislated  severance  pay  as  well  as
voluntary  indemnity  provisions  as  part  of collective  agreements  are  also  most common  in
developed  countries.  Mandatory  severance  pay,  however,  is  also  found  widely  in  Latin
America and  East  Asia,  often serving  as the primary if not sole  form of income  support  for
unemployed  workers  there.  In  Latin  America,  some  countries  also  use  unemployment
insurance  savings accounts  (UISAs),  a relatively new program of income  support.  As with
unemployment  insurance  and  assistance,  there  is  a  paucity  of legislated  severance  pay
programs  in the rest of Asia and in Africa.  By and large, developing  countries rely more on
other  public  programs,  such  as  public  works,  training,  and  other  active  labor  market
programs,  if at  all - and the  proportion  of the  labor  force  covered  by these programs  is  in
general considerably  lower than in developed countries.
This chapter presents a typology and describes the prevalence and stylized  features of
existing programs  in developing  countries.  In a limited way,  it also  examines what  kind of
factors  contribute  to the  existence  of social  insurance  type  of programs,  and  discusses  the
reasons for the diversity of approaches  in income support.
3.1  Typology  and description of main income  support programs
As  proposed  in table  3.1,  we  distinguish  two main  types  of public  income support
programs for the unemployed:  income maintenance  programs and active programs.  The first
group  of programs  are  based on  program  participation  rules  - including  the payment  of a
premium  under  unemployment  insurance  - which  entitle  the  qualifying  individuals  to
benefits.  There  are  no  offsetting  services to  be performed  in  exchange  for these transfers,
although  certain  actions  on  the  part  of  recipients  may  be  required  such  as  job  search.
According to the nature of the link between  contributions and benefits, we further distinguish
three  subgroups:  defined  benefit,  defined  contribution,  and  means-tested  programs.  The
second  broad  type  of income  support  programs  are  active  programs,  which require  certain
services  or activities  to be performed  by the unemployed in exchange for income support  or
subsidy  (for  example,  public  works  and  training).  We  include  such  programs  under  the
heading  of income  support  because  they  do  provide  income  to  their  participants  - and,
sometimes,  this goal is quite explicit in the design of the program.  Both groups of programs
differ further in regards  to their benefit levels  and durations, eligibility conditions,  financing,
and sometimes also in their main objectives (see table 3.1).
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Benefit  level  Duration  Eligibility  Financing  Main objective
1. Income  maintenance programs
A.  Defined  benefit programs
Unemployment  Benefits are  usually a  Limited.  Conditional on past  Contributions of  Social insurance for
insurance  percentage  of past wage,  contributions, no-  employers and/or  the unemployed -
sometimes  declining  fault dismissal,  employees,  often  consumption
over period.  availability and  additional  financing  smoothing.
willingness to work,  from general tax
and job search.  revenues.
Severance  pay  Lump-sum payment,  One-time payment.  Laid-off workers.  Paid by the employer  Links income  support
generally based on years  (could be either  with human resource
of service.  unfunded  or funded  management
via book reserves or  objectives of the
insurance contracts).  employer
Early retirement  Special program that  Not applicable.  Any worker.  Paid by other social  Human
grants  retirement rights  security contributors  resource/political
several  years earlier  as  (sometimes partly  objectives - reducing
stipulated  by law.  financed  also by the  overstaffing without
Pensions are reduced,  employer and state  directly increasing
but typically at less-than-  revenues,  if pension  unemployment.
actuarially-fair  rate.  credits have to be
purchased).
Public sector  Special program that  Limited.  Any worker.  Employer/government  Reducing overstaffing:
retrenchment (may  sheds redundant  labor in  subsidy.  human resource include some type of  the public sector through  /efficiency/political
active  involvement  mass  layoffs.  objectives.
of workers)
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Benefit  level  Duration  Eligibility  Financing  Main Objective
-B. Defined contribution programs
Unemployment  Replacement  rate as  Limited  Conditional  on the  Contributions of  Providing  insurance insurance savings  under Ul.  availability  of funds in  employers  and/or  without distorting accounts  the individual's savings  employees deposited  incentives (strong  link
account (with optional,  on  individual  accounts  between benefits  and
limited borrowing).  (funded scheme).  contributions).
C. Means  tested programs
Unemployment  Topping the income to  Unlimited (if instead of  Means-Tested  From general revenues  Social insurance  for the assistance (UA)  reach a specific  Ul) or limited (or  (or contributions,  if  unemployed - threshold in terms of  afterUl has expired).  . after the expiration of  consumption
average  family income,  UI).  smoothing
or flat.
Social  assistance  (SA)  Topping the  income to  Unlimited.  Means-tested.  General revenues.  General  means-tested reach a specific  income support scheme threshold in terms of  for population.
average family  income,
or flat.
H.  Active  programs
Public  works (PW)  Typically a below-  Typically limited.  Anyone  (self-selection  General  revenues.  Links the benefit market wage.  based on the wage).  receipt with  labor
supply, typically  for
community.
Training  A stipend  (and  a  Limited.  If deemed appropriate  General  revenues.  Links  income  support
service).  by program officials.  with  investment in
human resources.
Wage  subsidies  Wage-related  or flat.  Typically  limited.  Selected categories  of  General revenues.  Links  income support
unemployed.  with job creation.
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rest of the  study, we concentrate  on the following  five programs  where income  support is  a
key if not their primary function:
*  unemployment insurance,
*  unemployment  assistance,
*  severance pay,
*  unemployment  insurance savings accoumts,  and
*  public works.
In addition,  for the  sake of completeness,  we will describe  some other programs that
are  important  in  the  context  of providing  income  support  to  unemployed  workers  and
reducing  the risk  of unemployment.  For each program,  we  describe  qualifying  conditions,
the structure of benefits, and financing.
(a) Unemployment  insurance.  Unemployment  insurance is typically mandatory.  The
few voluntary programs  that exist (for example,  Finland,  Sweden,  Denmnark)  are subsidized
by the  state,  but  essentially  resemble  the compulsory  systems of developed  economies  in
both function and form (Holmlund,  1998).  Most mandatory  programs cover the majority of
employed  persons,  irrespective  of  occupation  or  industry.  Non-insured  persons  such  as
university graduates  and the self-employed  are sometimes eligible,  while casual  workers and
domestics  are most often not (see table  3.2 for  stylized features  of unemployment  insurance
by  groups of countries).  A few programs,  particularly  in developing  countries,  only cover
workers  in industry  and  commerce.  In order to  qualify  for  unemployment  insurance,  the
individual must  satisfy the  minimum  covered  employment  or contribution  requirement,  the
most common length being  6 months in the past year.  The cause of dismissal  may affect  if
and  when the individual  is entitled  to benefits,  especially  in developing  countries.  A usual
condition for maintaining  entitlement to unemployment benefits  is that applicants are capable
of,  searching  for,  and  available  for  work.  Non-compliance  with  other  labor  market
requirements can also result in the permanent or temporary suspension of benefits.
Benefits are usually  a proportion of average  earnings over some  stipulated period  of
the most recent employment  spell.  Generally, the initial replacement  rate  is between  40 and
75  percent  of average  earnings.  In  some  countries,  particularly  transition  countries,  the
benefit  level may be  some  function  of official  minimum  wage  rather  than  the individual's
past earnings.  Wage  or benefit  ceilings  are  used to limit  the range  of the  benefits;  benefit
floors,  typically  at minimum  wage,  are  also  sometimes  present.  In  addition  to  the basic
benefit,  dependent  supplements  (either  flat-rate  benefits  or  an  extra percentage  of average
earnings) are  sometimes  provided.  Benefits commonly  decline over time and  are limited  in
duration.  However,  extensions  are  sometimes  given  to  those  with  long,  continuous
employment  records  or to those  near  early  or regular retirement  age.  It  is also possible  in
many  countries  to  move  into  means-tested  unemployment  assistance  after  exhaustion  of
unemployment insurance benefits.
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employers and/or  employees.  The contribution  rates are often commensurate  for employers
and  employees  or  higher  for  the  former  group.  Sometimes,  employees  are  altogether
excluded from this obligation.  The converse  (employee contributions only), however,  is very
rare.  In  the  U.S.,  employer  contributions  depend  on the  employer's  layoff experience  -
employers  who layoff workers more frequently and thus impose heavier financial  burden  on
the system are assigned a higher rate (this is called experience rating). In some countries,  the
state provides subsidies or finances any program deficits that arise.
(b)  Unemployment  assistance.  Unemployment  assistance  is  means-tested  minimum
income  granted  to  working  age  individuals  who  are  unemployed  and do  not  have  the
necessary financial  resources  to maintain  a minimum  standard  of living  for themselves  and
their families.  Australia,  for example, provides means-tested unemployment  benefits through
two  back-to-back  programs:  the  Job  Search  Allowance  which  is  offered  initially  for  a
maximum  duration of 12  months  followed,  if needed,  by the NewStart Allowance  which  is
offered  indefinitely.  Self-standing  unemployment  programs  currently  exist  in  only  four
countries,  namely,  Australia,  Estonia,  Hong  Kong  (China),  and New  Zealand.  In all  other
countries  where  present,  unemployment  assistance  exists  in  tandem  with  unemployment
insurance (Vroman, 2001).
Like unemployment  insurance,  unemployment  assistance programs  require applicants
to be capable  of, looking for,  and available  for work  (see table  3.3).  Claims are  reviewed  at
regular  intervals  to  assess  job-seeking  intensity  and  to  determine  changes  in  household
circumstances  that  may require  a change  in the  benefit  level.  In  some countries,  eligibility
for  unemployment  assistance  is  not  conditional  on  previous  employment  or  contribution
history.  However,  in  most  countries,  particularly  those  with  dual  unemployment
insurance/assistance  programs,  unemployment  assistance  is an  extension  to unemployment
insurance  offered to the  long-term unemployed  who have satisfied some minimum  length of
employment  and  do  not  have  the  economic  means  to  support  their  households.  The  two
primary groups that enter  unemployment  assistance  are:  (I) those  that have  exhausted  their
unemployment  insurance  entitlement  and  (2)  those  that  are  ineligible  for  unemployment
insurance due to insufficient  employment records.  Some countries penalize applicants  whose
unemployment  was voluntary by limiting the length of unemployment  assistance entitlement
or extending the waiting period.
Benefits  are usually  in cash,  but can be in kind as well.  Cash benefits  are typically
flat-rate  at some  officially  stipulated  level  (usually  guaranteed  minimum  income at uniform
rates).  Means- or income-testing  is conducted not only on the personal  financial resources of
the  applicant  but  also  on  that  of  his/her  spouse  and  other  adult  members  within  the
household.
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Coverage  Level of benefit  Benefit duration  Eligibility  Conditions  for  Source of financing
conditions  keeping benefits
OECD  Countries
Most countries  offer  Generally,  initial  Most countries  limit  General  minimum  Almost all programs  Most Ul programs  financed Ul.  replacements rates  vary  length  of UI  employment  require the recipient to be  by contributions from Majority of programs  between 40 and 75% of  entitlement.  Belgium:  requirement:  6 months  in  capable,  available, and  employers and  employees; cover  all employed  recent average  earnings.  benefit duration  is  the past year.  Range:  10  willing to work.  in cases where both individuals irrespective  Exceptions on high side  indefinite.  Maximum  weeks  in last 52 weeks  in  Exceptions are Finland,  employees and employers of type of industry or  include Sweden (80%)  and  entitlement  period  Iceland  to 540 days  in  Iceland, and  Spain.  contribute  to the Ul  fund, sector.  Austria,  Denmark (90%).  However,  usually  is between  8 to  last 24 months in  Disqualification if failure  the rates are equal  or higher Germany,  and  ceilings on wages and  36 weeks.  Ul  Portugal.  All countries  to undergo  training,  for the latter.  There are Luxembourg:  coverage  maximum benefit  entitlement duration  is  require  registration at the  unjustified  refusal  of  only a few cases where extended  to  provisions limit range.  Flat  also sometimes  related  employment  office.  suitable job offer, or non-  only employers or apprentices  and  rate benefits,  independent  to length of  the  most  Residency  required  in  compliance  with job  employees contribute training graduates.  or in combination,  offered  recent period of  Iceland  and France.  search requirements.  (Employer:  Iceland,  Italy, Many exclude the self-  in Ireland,  France,  and  the  contributions,  Benefits denied in cases  Degree  of offense  U.S.A;  employee: employed,  whether  U.K.  Waiting period:  employment and/or age.  of voluntary  quit,  determines period of  Luxembourg) generally,  special  between 3 to 7 days.  In  misconduct, work  disqualification;  however  Typically the state  covers occupation groups, or  some countries,  in cases of  stoppage, or refusal of  usually between  1-4  any deficits that arise.  In based  on other  voluntary quit or dismissal  suitable  offer in almost  months.  Regularly  both Italy and  Spain, the conditions.  due to misconduct, waiting  all countries.  reporting  to employment  state provides  subsidies.  In Public sector  period is extended (range: 6  office  is required  in a  the U.S., Japan,  and  Italy employees excluded  in  weeks to 6 months).  number of countries.  the state covers Austria and Canada  Additional  flat rate benefits  administrative costs. (voluntary  provisions  or additional percentage of  Although,  very atypical,  the exist for provincial  average  earnings for  State also contributes  to Ul. government  workers  with spouses or  Contribution  rates vary employees).  Few  children (e.g.,  Belgium,  significantly between exclude domestic  Germany,  U.K.).  Most  countries.  The majority of and/or  casual  workers  countries tax benefits  (e.g.,  countries however have (e.g.,  Ireland, Japan,  Belgium, Canada,  contribution  rates below Portugal,  Spain,  U.S.).  Netherlands,  U.S.,  U.K.,  3%.  Most of the remainder, Denmark,  Finland, and  Denmark,  France).  In some  have contributions rates in Sweden: voluntary Ul.  countries,  long-term Ul  the range of 3-8%. recipients transit into
unemployment assistance.
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Coverage  Level  of benefit  Benefit duration  Eligibility conditions  Conditions for  Sources  of
keeping  benefits  financing
East Europe and Central Asia (Transition countries)
Majority of programs cover  Initial income replacement rates  In  most countries,  the  Minimum  past  About half, require the  Almost all  countries employed workers  generally  vary between 50 and  maximum entitlement  employment  requirement  recipient  to be able and  require  employer (citizenship or residency  75%.  Level  range  limited  by  duration is 6 months (26  ranges from  4 months  willingness to work.  contributions.  9 (out of required).  Coverage  by age:  wage floors (usually the min.  weeks).  High end:  (Armenia,  Russia) to 4  Benefits are reduced,  21)  require  employee usually 16-59  for men  and  wage) and ceilings (usually the  Hungary, 2 years.  In  some  years (Bulgaria).  postponed,  or  contributions.  Only 16-54 for women.  Croatia,  local, regional,  or national  avg.  countries, entitlement  Commonly, countries  terminated  if recipient  exception:  Estonia,  Ul Romania: discharged  wage,  or double the min. wage).  duration varies depending  require employment  does not comply with  state financed  entirely military personnel eligible  Benefits level  can sometimes  be  on  length of employment,  between  6 months in the  labor market  Employee contribution for Ul. University  or training  dependent on cause of job loss.  contribution  period, and/or  last year to 12 months in  requirements (job  rates generally vary graduates  eligible.  Some countries  provide flat rate  age (Azerbaijan,  Bulgaria,  the  last 2 years.  search, training, etc.)  between 0.06% Usually domestic  and casual  benefits  (usually f(minimum  Croatia, Poland.  Russia,  Registration  at  or files fraudulent  (Slovenia)  and  1% workers are excluded.  wage or average  wage))  instead  Slovenia,  Slovak  employment offices  claim.  (Slovak Republic). or in  addition  to the earnings-  Republic).  University  and  required  by all countries.  Employcr related  benefits (e.g., Albania,  training graduates  usually  Income level  in Latvia,  contributions vary Croatia,  Estonia,  Georgia).  have shorter entitlement  Romania  and  Ukraine  between  0.06% Earnings-related  or flat-rate  periods.  Some countries  must be below minimum  (Slovenia) and 6% benefits  can be graduated  over  provide  extensions for  wage.  In  Serbia and  (Albania).  State time. Typically,  new  those near early retirement  Montenegro,  household  subsidies  (when unemployed  labor market  age.  income  must be below  needed) or deficit entrants  receive flat-rate  benefits  stipulated  income.  financing is common, 5 min.  wage. Albania,  In  few  countries (e.g.,  Latvia:  state finances Azerbaijan,  Kyrgyz Republic,  Armenia,  Belarus,  Ul  for special groups. Russia,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan:  Bulgaria,  Georgia,  Slovak Republic:  state provide dependent  supplements;  Moldova),  workers not  finances  special usually a percentage  of the  eligible if dismissal due to  programs. minimum wage or benefit level  misconduct  In  Bulgaria
for  each dependent (ceiling  and Hungary,  workers  not
present).  eligible  if unemployment
due to refusal of suitable
offer
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Coverage  Level of benefit  Benefit duration  Eligibility conditions  Conditions for  Sources of
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  keeping benefits  financing
Latin America  and the Caribbealn,.
Argentina,  Barbados,  Income replacement  rate varies  All countries, maximum  Generally,  must have been  In Argentina,  Chile,  Contribution  rates vary Brazil,  Chile, Ecuador,  between 50 and 60% of average  entitlement period S I  employed for 6-12 months  and Venezuela,  between  0.75-2%.  In 517 Mexico,  Uruguay,  and  earnings.  Chile:  graduated flat-  year (range:  3-12  in some stipulated  period of  recipients  must be  countries  both employers Venezuela.  rate benefits.  Ecuador:  lump-  months). Argentina,  recent employment,  able and willing to  and employees
sum benefits (based on earnings  Brazil: entitlement  Argentina  and Chile require  work.  contribute.  Except  for Most provide coverage to  and service  length).  period dependent  on  registration  at employment  Ecuador (employees,  2%; all employed  workers.  Argentina,  Brazil,  Uruguay:  employment  length.  offices.  Brazil,  Chile,  employers,  1%), Exceptions:  Uruguay  minimum and maximum benefit  Brazil:  in special  Uruguay:  applicants  employers contribute an (excludes  workers outside  limits are proportional functions  cases/circumstances,  ineligible if dismissal due to  equal  or higher industry and commerce),  of the minimum  wage.  entitlement durations  misconduct. Argentina:  percentage  of payroll Venezuela (excludes  Uruguay: 20% dependent  are increased.  applicants cannot be  (N=4). domestics and casual  supplement  Waiting period:  recipients of  other social  Uruguay:  contributions workers), and  Barbados  Barbados  (3 days),  Brazil (60  security benefits.  Brazil:  (employees,  15%; (excludes public sector  days), Venezuela (30 days).  claimant must  lack other  employers.  12.5%)  for employees  and the self-  means to support self or  social security  including employed).  household.  Ul (state finances
deficits).
Chile:  state  finances total
cost
Brazil: employer
financed  through various
ear-marked  taxes, but
mainly through a
business sales  tax  of
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Coverage  Level  of benefit  Benefit  duration  Eligibility conditions  Conditions for  Sources of
keeping  benefits  financing
Asia
Bangladesh, China,  Iran  Iran, Taiwan:  initial  Bangladesh:  30-120  Insured employment  China,  Iran, South  Bangladesh,  employers: South Korea,  Taiwan  replacement  rate  is 55% of  days,  based on type  of  requirement:  Iran: 6  Korea,  and Taiwan:  total cost.  China, average earnings.  employment;  China:  1-2  months;  China:  I year;  must  be capable,  employers: 0.6-1% (rate Coverage differs  Bangladesh:  50% of basic  years,  South Korea:  90-  South  Korea:  6 months;  and  available,  and willing  dependent on local  govt. significantly.  Iran:  excludes  wages + lump sum benefits  240 days, based on  age  Taiwan: 2 years.  South  to work.  provisions);  state: the self-employed,  based on  length and nature  of claimant  and length  Korea, Taiwan:  subsidies.  Iran, voluntarily  insured  persons;  (permanent/casual)  of  of previous employment  unemployment  must  be  employers: 3%;  state: and those covered under  employment.  China:  flat  (benefits extended in  involuntary.  In Iran,  finances deficit.  South other  provisions.  rate  below minimum  wage.  special  cases);  Taiwan:  unemployment  also  cannot  Korea:  employers:  0.5%; Bangladesh:  only  Iran:  10%  benefit  3-16  months, based on  be due to misconduct or  employees: 0.5%. commerce and industry.  supplement per dependent  employment  length; and  refusal to accept suitable  Taiwan, employees: China:  permanent and  up to 4 dependents.  South  Iran:  6-50 months,  offer.  Registration  at  0.2%; employers: 0.7%; contract  workers in public  Korea:  50% of"basic  daily  based on employment  employment office  state:  cost of sector enterprises,  and  some  wage"  (minimum:  90  length and marital  required.  administration, 0.1%  of collective enterprises.  percent of minimum wage,  status.  employee wages,  and South Korea:  all  firms.  maximum:  30,000  Won per  allocations  from other Taiwan:  excludes the self-  day).  A reemployment  social insurance  funds. employed  and firms with  bonus  is offered  if claimant
less than  5 workers.  leaves before half the
duration period.
Waiting  period:  South
Korea and Taiwan,  14
days.
22Table 3.2: Stylized  features of unemployment  insurance programs, by groups of countries (cont.)
Coverage  Level  of benefit  Benefit duration  Eligibility conditions  Conditions for  Sources of
keeping  benefits  financing
Africa-
Algeria,  Egypt, South Africa, and  Egypt: 60%;  South Africa,  Algeria:  duration varies  Algeria: 3 years of covered  Egypt, Tunisia,  and  Algeria, employees:
Tunisia.  45%.  Tunisia:  minimum  based on length of  employment;  employer  South Africa: must be  1.5%;  employers: 2.5%.
wage of industrial and  employment  (12-36  must be current with  able, available, and  Egypt, employees: 2.%,
Coverage  differs between  commerce sectors.  months).  Egypt:  contributions.  Egypt:  6  willing to work,  state: finances  deficit.
countries.  Algeria: laid-off salaried  Algeria:  mean of average  maximum entitlement  months;  Tunisia:  12  South Africa, employees: workers from economic sector.  earnings and national  duration varies between  quarters;  South Africa:  13  1%;  employers:  1%.
Egypt: excludes public sector  minimum earnings with a  16-28, based  on  weeks in  last 52 weeks.  Tunisia,  state: total cost.
employees,  casual and agricultural  floor of 75% of the latter;  contribution  length.  Algeria and Tunisia require
workers.  South Africa:  excludes  graduated benefits; spousal  Tunisia:  3 months.  that applicants have no
domestics and highly paid  allowances provided.  South Africa: 26 weeks  other sources of income.
employees (>76,752  Rand/year).  Waiting period:  South  Algeria  also requires 3
Tunisia: excludes agricultural  Africa and Egypt: 7 days.  months of active search




due to voluntary quit
(Egypt, Tunisia)
misconduct (Egypt), refusal
of suitable job offer (Egypt,
South Africa)  or
participation in strike
(South  Africa).
Sources:  Tzannatos,  Z.,  and S. Roddis (1998).  Unemployment Benefits. Social Protection  Discussion Paper No. 9813.  Washington, D.C.:  World Bank.
United  States.  Social Security Administration.  (1999). Social Security Programs Throughout the World 1999. Washington,  D.C.: SSA.
OECD (2000). Pushing ahead  with reform in Korea: Labour market and social  safety net policies. Paris:  OECD.
23Table 3.3: Stylized  features of unemployment  assistance programs, by groups of countries
Coverage  Level  of benefit  Benefit  Eligibility conditions  Conditions for  Sources  of
duration  keeping  benefits  financing
OECD countries
Present in about half of  Generally,  means-  Indefinite,  as long  Typically,  must satisfy  Many programs require  Government member countries  tested minimum  as conditions are  means-test (household  the claimant to be fully  financed  through (complement  Ul systems).  income  at uniform  rates  fulfilled.  income  and  assets test;  unemployed,  capable  general  tax Only Australia and New  to meet the basic needs  Exceptions include  excludes state assistance  such  and available for work;  revenues. Zealand  have self-standing  of unemployed  Netherlands  (I  as family and  housing  and actively seeking UA systems.  individuals and  their  year); Spain (6  benefits).  work.
families.  Typically,  months;  30 months  Generally,  offered  Eligibility conditions Available  for all  benefit  level depends  for those  with  irrespective of employment  must be satisfied unemployed workers,  on  marital  status and  dependents);  or contribution  history.  Some  throughout the period irrespective  of sector,  presence  or number of  Sweden (I 50 days;  exceptions: Netherlands  (4  of receipt (periodic industry, or occupation.  dependents.  Benefits  5 day week basis)  years of employment in 5  checks conducted).
are flat-rate over time.  In  Portugal,  ycars  preceding
Some countries  have  duration depends  unemployment);  Portugal (6
threshold  income  on age and if  months of contributory
levels, above which  claimant is  an Ul  employment in the year
benefits are reduced  exhaustee or not  preceding unemployment);
and/or completely  (longer duration  France (5 years of
eliminated.  Usually,  for the  latter).  employment in 10  years
special  provisions exist  preceding  unemployment).
for the older  In  some countries,
unemployed.  employment  or contribution
Sometimes,  special  conditions only  applicable for
provisions also granted  UA applicants  ineligible for
to  younger  persons.  Ul  (e.g., Germany,  6
Generally,  no waiting  months). In  some countries:
periods.  However,  UA only available  for Ul
waiting  period  exhaustees (e.g.,  Austria). In
sometimes  applied to  Australia: if unemployment  is
applicants  not transiting  voluntary, due  to labor
from Ul  (e.g.,  Ireland, 3  dispute,  or refusal of suitable
days;  Sweden, 5 days).  job offer, then benefits  are
reduced and limited or
waiting  period is extended to
8 weeks.
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Coverage  Level  of benefit  Benefit duration  Eligibility  Conditions  for  Sources  of
_  _  _  _  _  conditions  keeping  benefits  financing
East Europeand Centtal Asia (Transition countries)
Bulgaria, Czech  Republic,  Means-tested minimum  In some countries,  Provided  irrespective  Most programs  Government Estonia,  Hungary, Poland,  assistance at flat rates.  entitlement length is  of employment or  require  the claimant  financed through Romania,  Russia, Slovak  Generally, benefit level  indefinite,  so long as  contribution history.  to be capable,  general  tax revenues. Republic, Slovenia.  depends on marital status,  eligibility conditions  are  Must be registered  as  available, and  willing
number of dependents,  fulfilled.  Exceptions  include  unemployed.  Regular  to  work.  Refusal of Dual systems of  household  size, and age of  Estonia (  180 days), Hungary  visits to the  training or acceptable unemployment insurance  children.  Usually, the receipt  (2  years),  Romania (18  Labor/Employment  job offer results in and assistance in most  of other social assistance  months, renewal possible),  office required.  benefit cancellation. countries.  Estonia has an  does not affect benefit  level.  Russia (6 months for the  Generally, must satisfy  Eligibility conditions UA system only.  However,  any eamings,  unemployed;  12  months for  household  income (and  must be satisfied
either full or above a certain  dependents of unemployed),  assets) test.  Capable  throughout  the period All salaried  workers.  stipulated amount are fully  Slovenia (6 months).  and willing to work.  of UA receipt. Special  provisiorns for recer,t  deducted from UA b'enefits  Entitleiment  is sometimcs
graduates and  discharged  (e.g., Czech Republic,  limited  for certain groups
military officers.  Hungary).  Poland: benefits  such  as recent graduates
can  be in cash or in kind.  (e.g.,  Bulgaria,  3 months).  In
Poland, entitlement duration
decided  by social workers.
In Estonia, duration extended
if claimant  is near retirement,
has 3 or more children,  or if
income  is below poverty
level.
25Table 3.3:  Stylized  features of unemployment  assistance programs, by groups of countries (cont.)
Coverage  Level  of benefit  Benefit duration  Eligibility  Conditions for  Sources of I  conditions  keeping benefits  financing
Asia
Hong Kong (China)  Means-tested,  flat rate  Government
benefits based  on marital  financed through
status and  presence of  general  tax revenues.
dependents.
Africa
Tunisia,  Mauritius  Mauritius:  means-tested  Tunisia: 3 months  Tunisia:  12 quarters of  Government
income to households after  contributions to  the  financed through Tunisia:  all non-agricultural  30 days of registered  Fund, registered as  general  tax revenues. salaried  workers  covered  unemployment.  Tunisia:  unemployed,  and
under National Social  minimum wage in industry  capable of work.
Security  Fund.  and commerce.  Worker must be
involuntarily
unemployed,  have
dependents,  and have
no other source of
income.
Sources:  United  States Social  Security Administration  (1999). Social Security ProgramsAround  the  World /999.  Washington, DC.:  SSA.
Boeri, T., and S.  Edwards.  Unemployment and Social  Assistance Benefit Schemes in Central and  East European Countries. (incomplete  ref.) OECD.  Benefit Systems and WVork Incentives in OECD Countries: Country Chapters 1995. http://www.oecd.org/els/socpol/BenefitsCompendium/index.htm.
26Aside  from  incomes,  the  level  of benefits  can  vary  according  to  factors  such  as
marital  status,  the presence  or number of dependents,  and the ages  of children.  Benefits are
periodically adjusted for inflation.  Unemployment assistance  benefits are sometimes offered
indefinitely,  so  long as the  recipient  satisfies  the eligibility  conditions.  Benefit  duration  is
sometimes  limited for  recent graduates  and  other groups while  extended  for  claimants  near
early or regular retirement age.
Unemployment  assistance  is typically  financed  by  governments  through  general  tax
revenues.  In countries with dual unemployment insurance/assistance  programs, the source of
financing can be the same as for unemployment insurance.
(c)  Severance  pay.  Severance  pay  are  lump-sum  payments  made  to  discharged
workers  either voluntarily  by employers  (through  collective  agreements  or  as part  of firm
policy) or as mandated by governments.  They are offered  for both individual  and collective
dismissals, usually with no special  dispensations  for the latter.  Coverage is generally broad,
encompassing  both  white-  and  blue-collar  workers  (see  table  3.4).  However,  in  some
countries,  severance pay is provided  only in sorne  sectors,  industries, or  firms above certain
sizes (these practices are more common in developing countries).  Severance pay is typically
provided  to individuals who are discharged due to redundancy;  those who are dismissed due
to gross misconduct  lose the  entitlement.  Minimum  years  of service  requirements  are  also
sometimes  used to limit eligibility.
As a rule, severance  benefits depend on the years of service.  The standard formula is
one  month's  pay  for  each  year  of  service.  More  complex  formulae  exist  wherein
compensation  is adjusted according to years of service  and/or age tiers; under such structures,
individuals  with  long  records  of  service  and/or  older  age  are  usually  entitled  to  more
generous  severance  pay.  In  some countries,  the  generosity of severance benefits  may  differ
based on whether the individual was a white- or blue-collar  worker, permanent or fixed-term,
and whether s/he was covered by a collective agreement or not.
27Table 3.4:  Stylized  features of severance pay programs, by groups of countries
Coverage  Level  of benefit  Eligibility Conditions  Sources of financing
OECD Countries
Scandinavia
Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  Sweden  Denmark (white collar):  Separation  due to personal reasons  Employer financed.  Firms sometimes
12+ years of service:  I month's pay  or economic redundancy.  Minimum  receive state assistance. Except  for white  collar workers in  15+  years:  2 months'  pay  years of service:  Denmark:  12; Denmark and long-serving,  older  18+  years: 3 months'  pay  Finland: 5.
employees  affected by  restructuring in  Finland:  (age:  45+; years of service:  5+):
Finland, no legislated severance  pay for  1-2 months'  pay.
individual or collective  dismissal.
Severance  pay sometimes provided
through collective  agreements  in private
sector.
Western  Europe
Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Benefit formula varies significantly.  Separation  due to personal  reasons  Employer financed.  Firms sometimes Ireland,  Netherlands,  Switzerland,  U.K.  Belgium:  V/ 2(net  earnings-UI  benefits)  or economic redundancy.  Minimum  receive state assistance
over 4 months; France:  0.10 month's  pay  years of service:  Austria:  3; Ireland:
All workers covered. Germany,  per year of service + an additional  0.067  2; U.K.: 2.
Netherlands,  and Switzerland:  no  month's pay aftcr  10 years.
legislated  severance pay for individual or  Ireland: I week's  pay + half week pay per
collective  dismissals (exceptions  for  year of service  under age  41 + week's
special cases), but severance  pay often  pay per year of service over age 41
part  collective  agreements or social  (maximum  amount: Irf  15,600).
compensation  plans.  Except for  U.K:
Belgium, where  severance  pay  only for  0.5 week's pay/year  of service  (age:  18-
collective dismissal,  no special  21)
regulations for collective dismissals.  1.0 week's pay/year (age 22-44)
1.5 week's pay/year (age 41-65).
28Table 3.4:  Stylized features of severance pay programs, by groups of countries (cont.)
Coverage  Level of benefit  Eligibility Conditions  Sources of financing
OE;ifouitVies'.-t 
Southern  Europe
Greece,  Italy,  Portugal, Spain,  Turkey  Standard  formula:  I  month  per  year  of  Minimum  years of service:  Greece:  Employer  financed.  Firms sometimes
service.  Collective  agreements  in Italy  5; Turkey:  1. Separation  not due  to  receive  state assistance. All  countries:  legislated  severance  pay  and  Turkey  can  increase  generosity.  own fault.
for  both  individual  and  collective  Greece: severance  pay reduced  if advance
dismissals;  no  special  regulations  for  notice  given.  Greece:  more  generous
collective  dismissal.  All  workers  severance  pay  for  white  collar  workers.
covered.  Spain:  less  generous  severance  pay  for
fixed-term contract workers.
Non-Europe
Australia, Canada,  Japan, New Zealand,  Benefits vary significantly  across  Separation due to personal reasons  Employer  financed.  State assistance USA  Australia (for redundant workers):  4  or economic redundancy.  Minimum  possible.
weeks for less than 2 years of services to  years of service:  Australia & Canada Australia (only  for redundant  workers).  8 weeks for more than  4 years of service.  (federal):  I.
Certain areas of Canada possess  Japan (common  firm practice):  I month's
legislated  severance  pay for individual  pay per year of service;  lower for
and collective dismissals;  no special  voluntary quits and higher for lay-offs.
regulations for collective  dismissal.  New-Zealand  (for redundant workers;
In some countries,  severance pay  common firm practice):  6 weeks'  pay for
provided  as part of collective agreements  first year of service then 2 weeks'  pay for
or as firm  practice.  each additional year.  Canada  (federal):  2
days'  pay per year of service with
minimum of 5 days.
29Table 3.4:  Stylized  features of severance  pay programs, by groups of countries (cont.)
Coverage  |Level of benefit  Eligibility Conditions  | Sources of financing
East Europe and Central Asia (Transition countries)  ;Ve  ,  .:  :  :  - 797 
,< Czech Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  Czech Republic:  redundant workers  Dismissal due to personal  reasons or  Employer financed.  Firms sometimes obtain 3 months'  pay. Hungary:  I  economic redundancy.  Minimum  receive  state assistance. All workers  covered.  Czech  Republic,  month's pay for less than 5 years of  years of service:  Hungary: 3. Hungary:  legislated  benefits  for  service  to 6 months for 25+ years of individual and collective  dismissal;  no  service.  Poland:  I month's pay for less special regulations for collective  than  10 years of service to 3 months'  for dismissal.  Poland:  legislated  benefits  20+ years of service. only for collective  dismissal.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina,  Barbados,  Belize,  Bolivia,  Argentina, Colombia:  I month's pay per  Venezuela:  only for dismissal  Employer  financed. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,  Mexico,  year of service.  Mexico: 3 months'  pay +  without due notice,  for unjustified Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru, Venezuela,  20 days'  pay per year of service.  Peru:  dismissal, or retirement  for justified Uruguay  1.5 months'  pay per year of service  cause. In  Latin  America, only in Belize:  I month's pay per year of service  Argentina and  Chile are dismissals Coverage is usually all workers  (public  after 5 years of service.  Barbados:  2.5-  for economic  causes allowed.  In  the and private  sectors).  3.5  weeks'  pay per year of service,  Caribbean,  severance  pay is offered depending  on length of service.  to workers made redundant due to In some countries,  employers are required  labor adjustment.
to make an additional  payment as  In Belize,  Bolivia, Chile,  and seniority premium, regardless of the  Nicaragua,  severance  pay is offered cause of  job termination.  In Ecuador,  for voluntary quits. Colombia, Panama,  Peru, and Venezuela,
this benefit is  provided to the worker in
the case of unjustified  dismissal (in
addition  to the regular indemnity)  and/or
voluntary quit.  Upper limits  are
sometimes placed on compensation
packages:  Chile:  II  months of wages;
Peru:  12; Nicaragua, Panama, and
Venezuela:  5; Uruguay:  6.
30Table 3.4:  Stylized  features of severance  pay programs, by groups of countries (cont.)
Coverage  Level  of benefit  Eligibility Conditions  | Sources of financing
Asia
Bangladesh,  India,  Indonesia, Malaysia,  Bangladesh: casual  workers:  14  days'  pay  Malaysia:  at least  12 months of  Employer financed.
Pakistan  per year of service;  permanent workers:  I  continuous service.
month's pay per year of service.  India:  15
Covers formal sector workers.  Pakistan:  days'  avg. pay per year of service.
firms must have more than 20  Indonesia:  I month's pay per year of
employees.  service;  double if redundancy  is due to
economic reasons or dismissal is due to
unjust cause.  Merit allowances also may
double severance pay.  Malaysia:  10-20
days'  pay per year of service,  depending
on length of service.  Pakistan: 30 days'
pay per year of service.
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service: Botswana:  60; Tanzania:  3.
Sources:  Edwards,  A.  C.,  and  C.  Manning  (2001).  "The  Economics  of Employment  Protection  and  Unemployment  Insurance  Schemes:  Policy  Options  for  Indonesia,
Malaysia,  the Philippines, and Thailand."  In
G. Betcherman  and R.  Islam (eds), East Asian Labor Markets and  the Economic Crisis: Impacts, Responses, and  Lessons. Washington,  DC: World Bank.
Islam,  R.  et al (2001).  "The Economic  Crisis:  Labor Market Challenges and  Policies of Indonesia."  In  G. Betcherman  and  R.  Islam (eds), East Asian Labor Markets
and the Economic Crisis: Impacts, Responses, and  Lessons. Washington,  DC: World  Bank.
Mansor, N.  et al (2001).  "Malaysia:  Protecting  Workers and  Fostering Growth."  In G.  Betcherman  and R.  Islam (eds),  East Asian Labor Markets and the Economic
Crisis:  Impacts, Responses, and Lessons. Washington,  DC: World  Bank.
Mazza, J. Unemployment Insurance:  Case Studies and  Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean. IDB Technical  Study,  1999.
Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development. Employment Outlook 1999. Paris: OECD,  1999.
United States. Social Security  Administration.  Social Security Programs  Throughout the World 1999. Washington, D.C.: SSA,  1999.
31In general, severance pay is financed by employers.  However,  in some countries, the
government provides  financial assistance,  particularly for large-scale restructuring  operations
which involve worker retrenchment en masse.
(d)  Unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts.  Unemployment  insurance  savings
accounts  (UISAs)  are relatively  new  (and  less  known as  a result),  although  the system  has
been  in  place  in  Brazil  since  the  1960s.  More  recently,  several  other  Latin  American
countries  (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,  Panama, Peru,  and Venezuela)  have introduced savings
accounts in some form as well.
The system  functions as follows.  Employers deposit for each worker some specified
fraction of his or her earnings into a special  individual savings account on a regular basis (see
table 3.5).  In some countries (Chile),  workers are also required to make regular contributions
into their accounts.  Upon separation  and regardless of the reason for separation,  workers can
make withdrawals  from their savings accounts as they deem fit.  However,  in Brazil, workers
can only access their accounts in the case of involuntary  separation.  Furthermore,  employers
are  required  to  make  an  additional  payment  of 40  percent  of the  account  balance  (plus
interest)  to  the  individual  as  penalty.  In  Panama  and  Venezuela,  the  penalty  is  set  as  a
multiple  of previous  wages,  and  offered  regardless  of the  reason  for  separation.  In  all
countries,  at  retirement,  positive  account  balances  are  added  to  old-age  pensions.  Some
programs  allow  workers  to  access  their  savings  accounts  for  reasons  other  than
unemployment,  such health and education.
According  to  some  proposals  (see,  for  example,  Cortazar,  1996,  and  Feldstein  and
Altman,  1998),  unemployed  workers  would  be  able  draw  benefits  monthly  as  under  the
traditional  unemployment  insurance,  and  the  government  would  lend  money  to  accounts
where  the  balance  falls  below  zero.  A  close variant  of this  arrangement  has  recently  been
introduced  in Chile.  In the Chilean  system, employers  and workers make contributions  into
individual  savings  accounts.  At  the  same  time,  workers  and  the  government  make
contributions  into  a  separate  fund  called  the  "Solidarity  Fund."  After  separation,  if the
unemployed  worker's  account  balance  falls  below  a  stipulated  minimum,  the  difference  is
made up via transfers  from the  Solidarity Fund (Heckman and Pages, 2000).
32Table 3.5:  Stylized  features of unemployment  insurance savings  accounts programs, Latin America
Coverage  Level  of benefit  Eligibility  Conditions  Sources or financing
In Brazil  (Fundo de Garantia  de  Amount accumulated  in the  Upon  separation (regardless  of the reason  Brazil, Ecuador,  Columbia:  8 % Tempo do Servicio - FGTS,  individual savings account (deposits  of separation).  Exception: Brazil, only if  contribution  rate;  Peru: one half of a established  in  1967), Chile,  plus  interest earned).  worker  is dismissed.  Some programs  monthly salary each  six months; Colombia,  Ecuador,  Columbia,  In Brazil, if dismissed, employer  allow access for other reasons as well  contributions are paid by employers Panama, Peru,  Venezuela,  must pay an additional  40 percent  (e.g.,  health and education  expenditures).  in workers'  individual  savings (plus interest) as penalty.  In  accounts. All formal sector workers.  Panama and Venezuela,  penalty set
a multiple of previous wages.  In Uruguay employees contribute  15
percent of earnings: the first 7.47
new pesos goes to social insurance
and the balance,  less a 3 percent
administrative fee, goes  to an
individual  account. Employers
contribute a further  12.5 percent of
payroll to the system and the
govemment,  if necessary,  finances
deficits (this is a dual social/ private
insurance  system which covers oid
age,  disability, death,  sickncss and
maternity  benefits,  family
_________________________________  _  ________________________________  .__________________________  _  allow  ances and unem  ploym ent). Sources:  Lipsett (1999), Heckman and Pages (2000), Mazza (2000)
33(e) Public works.  Generally  introduced  in response to economic and natural shocks as
a temporary  measure,  public  works  programs  (also  known  as  workfare)  provides  low-wage
employment  to  individuals  suffering  from  economic  deprivation  or  distress.  In  India  and
Bangladesh,  for example,  public  works  programs  have  been  introduced  in order  to provide
relief during famines and droughts  as well as to attenuate seasonal dips in income (Ravallion,
1991).  In  general,  programs  are  highly  labor-intensive;  the  use  of non-labor  inputs  are
limited.  These  programs  also  allow  for significant  control  of participation.  For  example,
program  rules  may  favor  certain  groups  such  as  discouraged  workers  or  the  long-term
unemployed.  Although  the  rationale  for  public  works  programs  vary  somewhat,  these
programs  are  motivated  primarily  by  one  or  more  of  the  following  objectives:  poverty
alleviation  (transfers  to the poor), consumption-smoothing  or income  stabilization,  local and
community  development,  construction  and  maintenance  of basic  rural  infrastructure  (asset
creation),  and food  security.  Among these, the income  support function is usually the most
stressed.  Public works  programs  are found  mainly  in the developing  world,  particularly  in
sub-Saharan  Africa (for example,  in Senegal  and Kenya),  South Asia (for example,  in India
and  Bangladesh),  and  Latin  America  (for  example,  in  Chile  and  Argentina).  Transition
countries  (for example,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  and Poland) have also introduced  them in recent
years to help address their growing unemployment  problem.
Typically  paid  on  a  piece-rate  or  time-rate  basis,  remuneration  for  public  works
participation can be in cash,  in kind (usually in the form of food aid), or some combination of
both.  Program  wages  are  usually  set  at  a  low  level  - around  prevailing  market  wages  or
statutory minimum  wages  for unskilled  labor - so  as to attract only the  poor to participate.
This  also  lowers  the  likelihood  that  the  program  displaces  alternative  low-wage  local
employment,  and encourages participants to seek more remunerative  employment outside the
program.  Subbarao  (1997)  reports  cross-country  evidence  which reveals  that the  statutory
minimum  wage  usually  plays a more important role  in the  determination  of program  wages
than the prevailing  market wage.  With  few exceptions  (for example,  Chile and  Botswana),
due to political  and legal  constraints, program  wages are  usually not  set below the  statutory
minimum wage.  If the prevailing  market wage is lower, this creates  perverse  incentives  for
program  participation.  Such  an example  is the Philippines,  where  Subbarao  (2001)  reports
that the pay consists of cash wages equal to the minimum wage plus some food aid.
In principle, participation  in public works programs  is open to anyone.  In practice,  a
strong  self-selection  mechanism  is  self-selection  based  on  program  wages.  In  programs
where the wage  rate fails to limit participation  to a  sustainable  level,  administrators  have to
ration the jobs.  This  has  occurred,  for  instance,  in programs  in  Botswana,  Tanzania,  and
India (Subbarao,  1997).
Public works programs are generally  financed by the government through general tax
revenues.  They  are  also  sometimes  funded  by  non-governmental  organizations  or  the
international  donor  community.  The Maharashtra  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  in India
has a somewhat unique financing mechanism  - the program  is  financed primarily by special
taxes  which  fall  disproportionately  on  the  non-poor  and  partly  by  general  tax  revenues
(Ravallion,  1991).
34(f)  Other  programs.  We  also  describe  here  some  other  programs  which  help
unemployed  workers  to reduce  the  risk of unemployment  (such  as  work  sharing  and  early
retirement),  or  cope  with  the  risk  of  unemployment  (social  assistance  and  short-time
compensation),  or  combine  various  risk  management  mechanisms  (public  sector
retrenchment programs).
Social  assistance.  Social  assistance  benefits  are  not  targeted  directly  at  the
unemployed  but at the poor generally.  They are available  mostly in developed countries  (in
1990,  the  social  assistance  expenditures  of OECD  countries  ranged  from  0.3  percent  in
Finland to  4.3 percent  in  Ireland).  The programn  provides  a range of benefits  (cash  and  in-
kind)  on  a  means-tested  basis  to  applicants  with  insufficient  resources  to  maintain  a
minimum  standard  of  living  as  officially  determined.  Benefits  are  typically  provided
indefinitely,  subject to periodic  checks  to determine  continuation  in  the eligibility  status  of
the claimant.  In countries  where  unemployment  assistance  is unavailable,  social  assistance
programs  are often  the  next  destination  for  the  poor unemployed  who  lose  unemployment
insurance  eligibility (for example,  in Denmark and the Netherlands).  As with unemployment
insurance  and unemployment  assistance,  the majority  of social  assistance  programs  require
that  the  unemployed  are  capable  of,  searching  for,  and  available  for  work,  and  that  they
comply with other applicable labor market requirements  (training, public works participation,
etc.).  Non-compliance  is generally  met with a temporary or permanent termination  in social
assistance  benefits  (see  box  3.1  for  recent  changes  in  the  U.S.  social  assistance  program
geared towards promoting employment).
Box 3.1: Temporary assistance for needy families in the U.S.
Enacted in 1996 to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Job Opportunities  and
Basic Skills Training (JOBS) programs, the Temporary Assistance  for Needy Families (TANF) program
provides means-tested cash assistance to families in economic need.  Under TANF, states are allotted a block
grant  from the federal government and are responsible  for the design and administration of their programs.  Two
key features of the TANF program are its stringent work requirements  and the limited duration of benefits.
Work requirement:  Under the TANF block grant, with a few exceptions (for example,  persons who are ill or
incapacitated,  60 years of age or above, pregnant; caring for young child),  claimants must work or participate in
some work-related  activity (vocational training,  community service,  etc.)  as soon as they are able to, or after 24
months of benefit receipt, which ever comes first.  In fact, some states require TANF applicants to begin job
search prior to application.  -In  most states, the minimum work hours requirement for single adult families is 25
hours per week.  Up to 6 weeks ofjob search (4 weeks if consecutive) count towards the work requirement.
Failure to meet program work requirements  can result in either a reduction or termination of benefits.
Duration  limit: In most states, claimants can receive TANF for a maximum  lifetime duration of 60 months.
Some states have adopted shorter durations  (e.g., Georgia: 48 months; Idaho: 24 months).  States are allowed to
relax their time limits for up to 20 percent of claimants  for various reasons as determined by them.  Furthermore,
states intermittently disturb benefit receipt such as through temporary  or permanent reductions  in benefits,  limits
on the duration of benefits over some specified period of time, as well as waiting periods between benefit receipt
spells.
Source: Rowe (2000)
35In most  countries,  social  assistance benefits  are flat-rate  at a low level (for example,
below the average earnings of unskilled industrial  workers), so as to encourage  employment.
The composition and type of household, the number of income-earners  in the household,  and
housing  costs  as well  as other  characteristics  are  also  sometimes  taken  into  account  in the
determination of benefit amounts.
Social  assistance  is  generally  financed  by  the  government  through  general  tax
revenues.  These programs  are  sometimes administered  at the national  level,  but more often
at the local level.
Early  retirement  programs.  In  contrast  to  programs  which  compensate  the
unemployed  for  temporary  income  loss,  early  retirement  programs  facilitate  the  early
withdrawal  of older  workers  from  the  labor  force.  These  programs  were  introduced  in
developed  countries  in  the  late  1960s  in  response  to  increasing  unemployment  and  the
deterioration  of reemployment  prospects of the older unemployed.  More recently,  they have
also been introduced  by some transition countries.
There  are several  types of early retirement  programs.  As described  by Bldndal  and
Scarpetta  (1997),  under some  programs,  the older unemployed  are entitled  to early pension
benefits at full, or more  often, reduced  value.  Other programs  enable older workers to avoid
unemployment  altogether  - under these programs,  workers  with sufficiently long periods of
contributions  into  the  pension  fund can  retire early  and receive pensions  at  full  or reduced
value.  In  the  U.S.  and  Canada,  for  example,  individuals  can  retire  early,  but  with  their
pensions actuarially  reduced.  In many  countries,  early  retirement  pensions  at full value are
offered to those employed  in hazardous workplaces  or arduous work.
Other  early  retirement  schemes  include  'job release schemes"  which  allow  older
workers  to  retire  early and  receive  pension  benefits  at  full  value  (or a special  allowance),
conditional  on  employers  replacing  the  "early  retiree"  with  a  younger  unemployed
individual.  Although  less  common  today,  some  countries  have  also  resorted  to  disability
pensions to encourage  early retirement.  The  older unemployed  with even  minor infirmities
were  entitled  to  full  disability  pensions  if suitable jobs  were  hard to  find  (e.g.,  Germany,
Denmark,  Netherlands)  until  they retire.  Likewise,  in  several  OECD  countries,  the older
unemployed  are allowed to draw unemployment  insurance benefits at relaxed conditions and
for extended periods until they retire.
In addition to public schemes,  employers use private pension plans to facilitate early
retirement.  Moreover,  in  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  for  example,  under  negotiated
"social"  plans,  employers  are  required  to  top  up  the  unemployment  insurance  benefits
received by older redundant  workers up to the level of previous net earnings.
Work sharing. This program is aimed at enabling employers to retain skilled workers,
and workers  to avoid  layoffs  associated  with  temporary  economic  downturns.  Under  such
arrangements,  workers  agree  to  a  reduction  in  working  time  accompanied  with  a  cut  or
proportional  reduction  in  wages.  Usually  undertaken  at  the  firm  or  sectoral  level  on  a
voluntary  basis,  the  primary  objective  of work-sharing  is to  preserve jobs during  difficult
36economic  times.  With recovery,  normal  working  hours and  wages  are  usually restored.  In
addition,  there  are  instances  of mandatory  work-sharing  imposed  by governments  for  the
purpose  of job  creation.  These  take  the  form  of  reductions  in  working  time,  limits  on
overtime,  increases  in the  duration  of leave,  as  well  as  other  strategies.  Some  mandated
work-sharing programs  (for example,  in Canada) have also been undertaken in the context of
public  sector  downsizing.  Work-sharing  programs  are  most prevalent  in  Western  Europe,
followed by, in a limited scale, in North America.  They are uncommon  elsewhere.
Short-time compensation. This program permits  employers  to reduce  the number  of
work hours of workers  with proportional cuts  in wages; however,  here,  the lost wages (as  a
result  of  the  reduction  of hours)  of  affected  workers  are  partially  compensated  using
unemployment  insurance  benefits.  In other  words,  short-time  compensation  programs  are a
form  of compensation  for  lost  working  time  as  part  of work-sharing  agreements.  These
programs  are  well-established  and  widespread  in  Western  Europe  (for  example,  Germany,
the  U.K.,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  etc).  The  first  such programs  appeared  in  the  United
States  and Canada  in the mid-1970s.  As of the  mid-1990s,  17  U.S.  states  have  introduced
short-time  compensation  programs.  These  programs  are  non-existent  in  developing
countries.
The  structure  of short-time  compensation  benefits,  eligibility  conditions,  financing,
and administration  varies greatly  between  countries.  In the  U.S.,  for example, under these
programs,  workers  who observe a reduction  in  work hours receive unemployment  insurance
benefits pro-rated  for the  hours lost due to work-sharing.  Benefit duration  is usually  limited
to  20-30  weeks,  depending  on  the  state.  In  order  to  become  eligible  for  short-time
compensation,  the  work-sharing  (hours  reduction)  plan  must  be  agreed  by  the  employer,
relevant  union(s)  if  present,  and  the  state.  Furthermore,  to  qualify  for  short-time
compensation,  employers  are  required  to  show  that  at  least  some  10-20  percent  of the
workforce  to  be  affected.  However,  some  states  limit  benefit  receipt  to  between  40-50
percent of the work force (Abraham and Houseman,  1993).
Public  sector  retrenchment programs.  Overstaffing,  excessively  high  wages,
generous  benefits,  and  gross  inefficiencies  may  be  present  in the  public  sectors  of many
countries.  In addressing these issues, labor retrenchment programs have increasingly  become
an integral part of public sector reforms.  These programs can take various forms: they can be
voluntary  or  involuntary;  compensation  packages  can  be  standard or  tailor-made,  and they
may or may not include active labor market programs.
In  a review  of 41  public  sector  retrenchment  programs  in  37  countries  worldwide,
Haltiwanger  and  Singh  (1999)  find  that  program  design  is  closely  associated  with  the
underlying causes for retrenchment.  When retrenchment was perceived as an one-time event
to address issues such as "ghost workers" or low worker productivity,  compensation typically
consisted  of  severance  and  enhanced  pensions,  and  the  retrenchment  programs  were
voluntary  in  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  if  retrenchment  was  perceived  as  part  of  a
fundamental,  radical transformation  of the public sector including a restructuring of the labor
market,  such as in transition countries, these programs were richer - provisions for severance
and  enhanced  pensions  were  accompanied  by  worker  safety  net  measures  such  as
37unemployment  benefits, job  placement  services,  and  worker  retraining.  In  addition,  these
programs  more  often  included  a  mandatory  component.  Severance  pay  was  the  most
common  instrument  (used  in  68  percent  of projects),  followed,  in  turn,  by enhanced  safety
nets  (63  percent)  and enhanced  pensions  (29 percent).  The authors also find that  for  every
dollar spent on severance pay, additional  1.2 dollars were  spent on enhancing safety nets, and
2.2 dollars on enhancing pensions.
For  political  reasons,  voluntary  retrenchment  programs  have  been  increasingly
popular  (Rama,  1999).  However,  standard  voluntary  retrenchment  programs,  offering
benefits  primarily  based  on  years  of  experience,  may  lead  to  severe  adverse  selection
problems,  because  the  most  productive  workers  often  have  superior  labor  market
opportunities  outside  the  public  sector.  Special  tailor-made  programs  may  increase  the
efficiency  of downsizing  by  disclosing  worker  characteristics.  For  example,  the  use  of
confidential  individual  bids for  exit compensation  with  safeguards  to prevent  collusion  can
be  one  procedure  that  leads  to  such  a disclosure  (Jeon  and  Laffont,  1999).  Unproductive
workers tend to be those with the highest bids as they stand to lose the most from separation.
Because  determining the right menu may be difficult  in practice,  Rama (1999) recommends
the use of other, simpler procedures  as well.
One  such  procedure  that  is  considered  more  cost-effective  is  determining
("indexing")  severance  pay  by  welfare  losses  arising  from  the  worker's  separation.
Severance  pay can be indexed  to a wide  selection of observable worker  attributes  including
present  wages,  job  security,  gender,  years  of  past  service,  expected  duration  of  the
unemployment  spell, and prevailing wages  which the separating  worker can expect to earn in
the  private  sector.  For state-owned  enterprises  in Egypt,  Asaad  (1999)  finds that  a tailor-
made  program  could  reduce  total compensation  by  31  percent  in comparison  to a standard
program,  and that  a severance  pay program  that provides  higher  payments  to  long-tenured
workers are likely to overpay them.
When is the decision to downsize justified?  One can look at the financial return - the
impact  of downsizing  on  the  consolidated  government  budget  (positive  financial  returns
occurs when the net present value of reduced wage and benefit expenditures  exceeds  the net
present  value of the retrenchment costs).  But one should also consider economic  returns, the
increase  of output  and  welfare  arising  from  improved  allocation  of labor,  and  from  the
reduced  level of taxes, although many of the relevant private and social costs and benefits are
difficult to quantify.
3.2  Determinants of the incidence of unemployment benefit systems
Is  it possible  to identify  common factors which  contribute to the existence of income
support programs?  Below we try to do so by examining the determinants  of the incidence  of
unemployment insurance and/or unemployment assistance programs.
Out of 163 countries for which we have information,  65 of them (or 40 percent)  have
unemployment  insurance  or  assistance  systems.  Most  of them  are  developed  or transition
countries.  Other countries  with such systems are  scattered across the developing  world with
Africa  and Asia exhibiting  a clear dearth of such systems, the exceptions  being Bangladesh,
38South  Africa,  South Korea, China, and  Taiwan  (see Figure  3.1).  (The acronyms  for regions
are: ECA - Europe and Central Asia;  LAC  - Latin  America and Caribbean;  MNA - Middle
East and North Africa, EAP - East Asia and Pacific;  SA - South Asia, and AFR - Africa.)
It seems that the incidence of unemployment  benefit is correlated with GDP per capita.
Over 60 percent  of the countries with unemployment  benefit systems are in the top two GDP
per capita quintiles, or more markedly, over 80 percent are in the top three quintiles (see
Figure  3.2).  Of
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side).  Of course,  both the vulnerability to unemployment  risk and the ability of citizenry to
affect decision-making  do not lend themselves  to easy measurement.  We therefore  rely  on
the  use of proxy variables.  On the demand side, we use the size  of the urban population  as a
proxy for the level of a country's  vulnerability.  Urban populaces'  capacity to absorb  shocks
is  lower,  because  its  ability to self-protect  and  to cope  with unemployment  is  likely to  be
limited,  due  to  the  covariant  nature  of unemployment  shocks  (for  example,  Horton  and
39Mazumdar  (2001)  report  that during the  recent  crisis in  Thailand,  many  recent migrants  to
urban areas returned to their regions of origin and agriculture).  On the supply side, to proxy
the  ability  of citizenry  to affect  the political  decision-making  process,  we  use  the  variable
indicating  whether  or not a  country has  ratified the  ILO  freedom of association  convention
(the  right  of workers  and  employers  to  freely  establish  associations  or  organizations).
Moreover,  we  also  include  in  the  regressions  the  level  of  per  capita  GDP,  as  simple
correlations of the incidence of benefit systems suggest.  Among other things, the level of per
capita  GDP  reflects  the  capacity  of an  economy  to  redistribute  income,  as  unemployment
benefit programs may entail redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Table 3.6:  Determinants of the incidence of unemployment  benefit systems
(probit estimates, standard errors in parentheses)
Specifications
Independent Variables  Equation  I  Equation 2
GDP per capita, PPP  0.052*  0.081 **
(in  1000 current US$)  (0.023)  (0.028)
Urban population  (percent of  0.021 **  0.011
total)  (0.007)  (0.009)
Signed  the ILO Freedom of  1.05**
Association Convention  (0.314)
Constant  -1.791**  -2.12**
(0.333)  (0.506)
Sample Size  160  114
Log Likelihood  -82.7  -56.5
**  Significant at the 1%  level
*  Significant  at the 5% level
Data sources:
Presence  of unemployment benefits:  US  Social  Security Administration, Social security  programs  around  the
world-  1999, http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/ssptw99.html.
Signed ILO  Freedom of Association  Convention:  Martin  Rama and  Raquel  Artecona,  "A Database  of Labor
Market Indicators across Countries",  unpublished,  The World Bank,  Washington  DC, 2000.
All  other data:  World  Bank Statisitical  Information  Management  and Analysis  (SIMA),  World Development
Indicators  and Global  Development Finance  Central  database, http://sima.
Our empirical  results offer support to the above reasoning.5 On the supply  side,  the
results  in  table  3.6  confirm  that the  likelihood  of a country  possessing  an  unemployment
benefit system is indeed positively and significantly related  to the ratification of the freedom
of association  convention;  density  of trade  unions  (the  percent  of organized  labor  force)
produced  similar results  (they  are  not reported).  These  results  shows that  the existence  of
trade unions indeed increases the likelihood that a country possesses a formal unemployment
benefit  system  (see  boxes  3.2  and  3.3  for  the  role  of trade  unions  in  the  emergence  of
unemployment  insurance  in Algeria and Brazil,  respectively).  On the  demand side, there is
5  As common with cross-country  analysis, the results may suffer from the problem of reversed causality and
thus should be taken as preliminary.
40some support that the percent of urban population  is also related to the incidence of benefits,
but the variable lost significance once the ratification variable was included in the regression.
And  as expected,  the  results  also  confirm  the  link  of GNP per  capita  to the  existence  of
benefits - perhaps reflecting the overall capacity of the country for income redistribution.
Box 3.2: Facilitating downsizing by introducing unemployment insurance in Algeria
Algeria  has  historically  followed  a  planned  economy  model  with  large,  woefully  inefficient  public
enterprises  dominating  the  economy.  These  enterprises  survived  on  sizable  government  subsidies  and
infusions  of credit  from  state-owned  banks.  Prior to  1990,  several  attempts  at economic  reforms  were
made  but strong  resistance  from  trade  unions against the  accompanying  displacement  of labor coupled
with periodic episodes of political and social upheaval led to their prompt abandonment.
During the early  1990s, Algeria  was in a difficult  economic  situation brought  about by depressed  world
prices for oil, its principal export.  In 1994, the govermnuent was,  as a result, forced to initiate broad-based
structural  reforms which included  the restructuring of public enterprises.  Efforts to revitalize enterprises
involved shedding large numbers of redundant workers.
As part of the public enterprise privatization  program,  a retrenchment program  was designed to facilitate
restructuring through mass layoffs from  distended industries.  Instead of relying only on severance pay as
previously,  laid-off workers were  also  eligible  to  a newly  introduced  unemployment  insurance.  While
under the old system unions had to approve layoffs  for economic reasons on a case by case basis, the new
system  does  not  have  this  requirement,  taking  unions  out  of  the  decision-making  on  individual
downsizing cases.  Unions were however consulted over the design of  the new system.
Source:  Ruppert (1999).
Box 3.3  Reasons for introduction of the unemployment  insurance in Brazil
The  1986  Cruzado Plan  introduced a universal unemployment  insurance  program in Brazil.  There  is no
consensus regarding  the forces that contributed to its emergence.  One theory states that it was provided in
response  to  increased  union  pressure,  demanding  the  implementation  of the  program  which  had  been
promised  earlier.  An  alternative  theory identifies  as  the primary  motivating  factor  the growing  public
dissatisfaction  arising  from  urban  population  pressures  and  economic  instability.  Yet  a  third  theory
suggests  that unemployment  insurance  was  included  in  the  Cruzado Plan  merely as  a trade-off for less
favorable labor clauses.
Source:  Cunningham  (2000)..
3.3 Concluding remarks
The  above  review  shows  that  countries  use  widely  different  approaches  when
providing  income  support  to  the  unemployed.  While  developed  countries  have  multiple
programs, many  developing countries  do not have any special  programs for the unemployed.
Moreover, parameters of a particular income support program differ sharply across countries,
contributing  to differences  in  coverage  and  the  degree  of protection  provided.  And  even
countries  which  are  geographically  proximate  and  at  a  similar  level  of  economic
41development  may  choose quite different  welfare regimes,  as the diversity of regimes across
European countries suggests (Gough, 2000).
How  can  we  explain  such  a  diversity  of approaches?  There  are  many  possible
explanations  why  the  "one  size  fits  all"  rule  does  not  apply.  Countries  have  chosen  and
designed  programs  to  fit  their  specific  circumstances  and  needs  (for  example,  cultural,
administrative,  nature of shocks).  Moreover,  special  interest  groups  and political  economy
considerations  also  seem to be important.  And different programs have different distributive
and  efficiency  objectives  - and  effects.  For  example,  reaching  the  chronic  poor requires
different programs than providing income smoothing for skilled workers.
The analysis of the determinants of the incidence  of unemployment  benefits revealed
that there  are also common factors  which contribute to the emergence  of income  support  for
the  unemployed.  In  addition to  the  level  of economic  development,  it seems  that  country
specific  circumstances  - most strongly connected with  the existence of trade  unions - affect
the introduction  of unemployment  insurance and assistance programs.
One  implication  of the  above  findings  is that  in reforming  their  systems,  countries
may well follow different transition paths - and that these  systems may never converge.  For
example,  as  claimed  by  Edwards  and  Manning  (2001),  Latin  American  countries  may be
amenable  to  replacing  their  severance  pay systems with  UISAs,  while such an  introduction
may be just  a remote  possibility in  transition countries.  And  even  economies  with similar
technologies  and preferences can reach very different,  stable equilibria regarding the level of
unemployment  insurance.  For  example,  in  explaining  differences  in  unemployment
insurance  systems in Western  Europe and the United  States,  Hassler et al  (1999)  argue that
the  interaction  of  skill  specificity  and  preferences  reinforces  differences  in  initial  skill
distributions  of the  society  to  generate  one  equilibrium  with  high  unemployment,  low
turnover,  and  a  high  level  of insurance,  and  another  one  with  low  unemployment,  high
turnover, and a low level of insurance.
4.  PERFORMANCE  OF INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEMS - THEORETICAL
ASPECTS  AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This  chapter  reviews  the  evidence  on  the  performance  of various  income  support
systems  for the  unemployed.  It  evaluates  the  distributive  and  efficiency  effects  of these
systems,  and  examines  how suitable  they are to  confront  various  types  of shocks  and how
resistant they are to political risk.  The discussion  focuses on programs whose main objective
is  to provide  compensation  for  the  loss of earnings  due to  unemployment:  unemployment
insurance,  unemployment  assistance,  severance  pay,  unemployment  insurance  savings
accounts  (UISAs),  and  public  works.  Selective  outcomes  of some  other programs  (social
assistance and early retirement) are also reviewed.
Before  proceeding with the  evaluation,  three caveats about the  pitfalls of such  a task
should be mentioned.  First, as the above review of existing income support programs shows,
many  of  the  programs  tend  to  be  very  complex,  because  they  rely  on  various  design
parameters that interact in numerous ways.  In evaluating  the performance  of these programs,
it is  of utmost  importance  to  appropriately account  for their design  parameters (the
42program's "architecture"), as  well  as for the degree  of enforcement  of the programs'
rules,  that  is,  whether  or  not  laws  on  the  books  are  actually  implemented  (Atkinson  and
Micklewright,  1991).  Differences  in  the  design  of income  support  programs  may help  to
explain  not only variations  in their coverage,  but also other effects  these programs have  on
different labor market outcomes (the incidence of part-time workers,  the share of women and
long-term unemployed among the unemployed,  the duration of unemployment,  to name just a
few).  For example,  long periods of insured  unemployment  may  be attributable  not  only  to
low labor demand,  but also to a generous  replacement  rate, long maximum duration  periods
for benefit  collection,  lax monitoring  of job search,  ineffective job-search  assistance, as well
as eligibility rules that attract workers with weak labor-force attachment  and poor motivation
(for example,  when Poland introduced  its unemployment  benefit program  in early  1  990s, no
prior work experience  was needed  to qualify for benefits).  Similarly,  a high share of women
among benefit recipients may be attributable to low relative demand for women's labor,  but
it may also reflect program rules that extend benefits to mothers  until children reach a certain
age (Estonia is an example).
The second  caveat relates to the fact that the working of such  programs cannot be
evaluated  in isolation,  that is,  separately  fromr  other important institutional features  of
the economy.  In conjunction with structural parameters of income support systems, a host of
institutional  and  other  features  - primarily  those  affecting  the  performance  of the  labor
market,  such  as  labor legislation  and collective  bargaining  arrangements  - as well  as labor
market conditions  have to be considered  so as to more accurately determine and attribute the
effects of income support programs.  For example,  an increase  in the  intensity of job-search
monitoring  may  well  produce  different  results  depending  on  the  rate  of unemployment.
Similarly,  the  effects  of experience  rating  on  layoffs  depend  largely  on  the  strictness  of
employment protection  legislation - if the  latter is in place,  additional  effects  of experience
rating  may  be  small.  Unemployment  benefit  systems  are  also  affected  by  wage  setting
arrangements:  under flexible  wage  arrangements,  more  adjustment  is  likely to be  achieved
via real wage reductions as opposed to employment reductions.  In contrast, more rigid wage
determination  may  prompt  more  employment  adjustment  and  larger  inflows  to  insured
unemployment;  in  turn,  higher  costs  of unemployment  benefits  stifle  job  creation  and
contribute  to  higher unemployment  on its  own, particularly  for marginal  groups of workers
(for a modeling  along these lines,  see Aghion and Blanchard,  1994, and Layard et al,  1991).
Recognizing  the  above,  in discussing  the  effects  of income  support  systems  we will  try to
emphasize  whether these effects are of partial or general equilibrium nature.
Various  simultaneous  programs and policies  can  also  have  offsetting  effects,  or
can  reinforce  each  other.  For example,  the employment  effects of liberalization  of fixed-
term  work depends  not  only on job protection  of regular jobs  but  also  on whether  or  not
fixed-term  workers  qualify  for  unemployment  benefits.  Or  increasing  monitoring  of job
search  may  not  help  if monitoring  of informal  employment  remains  lax.  Moreover,  the
effects of the generosity of the unemployment benefit program may well depend on a host of
labor  market  policies  (from  wage  setting  blehavior  and  minimum  wage  regulations  to
employment  protection  legislation)  that influence  the job creation  capacity  of the  economy
and thus the demand  side of the market.  For example,  Orzsag and Snower  (1998) argue  that
positive effects of lower benefits on the intensity of job search  are reinforced  by tax cuts that
43induce  employers  to  hire  more  workers  (indeed,  this  speaks  in  favor  of broader  reforms,
which tend to be more effective  and politically more acceptable  - see below).  Changing  only
one program may not produce  the desired effects.  In line with the interdependency  of social
risk  management  mechanisms  emphasized  in  Chapter  2,  one  should  therefore  judge  the
effects  of a particular program  in  the  context of the whole  economic  system rather  than  in
isolation.  (Examining  the adjustment of the system  in its entirety  allows one, among others,
to set the appropriate counterfactual,  for example, by taking into account  existing distortions
which prevent the economy from being perfectly competitive.)
4.1  Distributive effects  of income  support systems  for unemployed
The main objective of income support systems for the unemployed is to provide  for a
lost  job,  that  is,  to  compensate  workers  for  the  loss  of  income  when  they  become
unemployed.  When  evaluating  these  systems,  it  is  therefore  natural  and  legitimate  to
investigate  their  distributive  effects.  Below  we  examine  three  interrelated  aspects:  (i)
coverage  - how  widespread  are  different  support  systems,  (ii)  adequacy  - how successful
these  systems are  in smoothing  consumption  and reducing poverty, and  (iii) redistribution  -
how they change income  distribution,  in particular, whether they result in a redistribution of
income from the rich to the poor.
Coverage.  In developed  countries,  workers  are usually protected  by  several income
support programs.  As described  above,  the majority  of unemployment  insurance  programs
are  government  mandated  and  cover  all  employed  individuals  irrespective  of the  type  of
industry or  sector  (see table  3.2).  Many  exclude  the  self-employed,  and  some  other groups
such  as  agricultural  workers  and  household  workers.  Similarly,  coverage  by  legislated
severance  pay  tend  to  be  wide.  All  countries  also  offer  social  assistance-type  programs
providing assistance  of the last resort, usually open-ended  in duration.  Developed countries
also offer  other types of income support  programs  (early retirement,  public  works,  training,
employment subsidies) which are usually targeted to specific  groups.
In contrast,  workers in transition and particularly  in developing countries  are covered
by few, if any, public income maintenance  programs.  Formal sector workers enjoy important
advantages  over  those  employed  in  the  informal  sector.  For  example,  unemployment
insurance  in transition  economies  covers  most of the  labor force,  and  workers  are  usually
also  eligible  for  severance  pay.  In  developing  countries,  unemployment  insurance  is
available only in a limited number of countries, and it does not necessarily  cover all workers
in  the  formal  sector.  In  addition,  Latin  American  and  East Asian  countries  also typically
mandate severance  pay (see the previous chapter).  In contrast, workers in the informal sector
are  much more  exposed to  income/unemployment  risk.6 They  are excluded  from programs
which  require  payment  of social  security  contributions,  and  typically  there  are  few  other
public programs they can participate  in.
Because  of  a  large  informal  sector,  the  coverage  of unemployment  insurance  and
legislated severance pay tends to be low in developing countries.  For example,  in their study
6 Informal sector is  increasingly viewed as "unregulated entrepreneurial  sector," which itself generates many
unemployed (see Arango and Maloney, 2000).
44of the mandatory  severance  pay  program in Peru,  MacIsaac  and Rama (2000)  estimate that
only about 20 percent of private sector workers  are legally entitled to severance pay, most of
them being wealthier  workers.  The coverage  is so low because  many private sector workers
are self-employed  or work in household  enterprises,  and many salaried workers  do not have
the minimum  seniority needed  to qualify  for severance pay.  But what is noteworthy  is that
legal  entitlement  does  not guarantee  the  actual  receipt  of the  benefit.  MacIsaac  and  Rama
(2000) estimate that only  about half of the workers who are  legally entitled to severance  pay
are likely to get the benefit if dismissed.  The actual payment is more likely if the worker has
a written contract,  and if s/he works  in a  larger,  unionized  firm which  pays social  security
contributions.
There  is  also  a more  subtle  point about the  coverage  of some  groups  of workers  -
namely,  the  generosity  of severance  payments  militates  against  the  access  of particular
groups  of workers  to jobs  and thus  prevents  them  from  being  covered  by  formal  income
support  programs.  Blanchard  (1998)  shows that an  increase  in  firing costs  leads to higher
unemployment  of  marginal  groups  of  workers  because  of their  inferior  access  to jobs.
Productivity  of  these  workers  before  hiring  is  not  easily  revealed  and  therefore  their
probability of being hired in the presence  of increased  firing  costs is lower.  Indeed,  OECD
(1999)  finds  that  stricter  employment  protection  legislation  reduces  employment  among
prime  age women and  youths, thus rendering  them more susceptible  to unemployment  risk.
Similarly, Kugler and  Saint-Paul  (2000) show that larger firing costs increase  discrimination
against  unemployed  workers,  because  they  increase  the  costs  associated  with  hiring  a  bad
worker.  Moreover,  in the presence  of higher severance  costs  for older workers,  separations
decisions  may  be biased  against  young workers.  In  other  words,  it seems that large  firing
costs  contribute  to  the emergence  of dual  labor  markets,  with well  protected  formal  sector
workers  (which  tend  to  be  predominantly  prime-age  males)  contrasted  by  much  less
protected  informal  sector workers  and the unemployed  (see also  below on efficiency  effects
of severance pay).
Unemployed  workers may  also qualify for some other income support programs.  As
noted  earlier,  unemployment  assistance  is  available  in  some  transition  countries  after
exhausting  unemployment  insurance  entitlement,  as  are early  retirement  programs.  Social
assistance  is rarely  available  in developing  countries,  and  if it  is,  it is often  provided on  a
one-time  basis.  Workers  may  also benefit  from public  sector  retrenchment  programs.  One
program that - in the absence of social  assistance  - provides assistance  of the last resort are
public works,  although  the program  is often  not available  to  all  potential  beneficiaries.  In
Mexico, training  is used as a form of assistance of last resort (30 percent of the unemployed
received  some  training;  see  de  Ferranti  et  al,  2000).  Recently,  other innovative  programs
have  also  been  emerging  besides  from  already  mentioned  UISAs.  For  example,  one  such
program  is  the Emergency  Loan  Facility  availible to  displaced  workers  in the  Philippines,
contingent on their previous payments into the  Social Security Fund.
Among the programs available to informal sector workers, public works programs are
probably  the  most  important  ones.7 Although  they  are  not  universally  found  in  the
7 Being  without  much  of external  assistance,  the  infonnal  sector  has  shown  great  ingenuity  in  developing
infornal,  community-based  measures  to  deal  with  adverse  income  shocks.  They  include  livelihood  (self-
45developing  world,  several  developing  countries,  particularly  those  in  South  Asia,  have
longstanding  traditions  in  the provision of such programs.  Employment  generation in these
programs can also be quite significant.  For example, in Africa the scale of operations ranged
from 0.17 million person-days  annually  in Tanzania during the period  1980-86 to 4.6 million
person-days  annually  in Botswana between  1982-87.  In  1985-86, public  works participation
in Botswana  was as high as 21  percent of the total labor force.  The cash for work programs
in Latin America  were  usually much  larger.  For instance,  Chile's program  provided  40-45
million person-days  of employment  in  1987; participation  was about  13 percent of the labor
force (in  1983).  But even these programs pale in comparison  to those in South Asia.  India's
nationwide  Jawahar  Rojgar  Yoguna  program  generated  830-850  million  person-days
annually in employment between  1991-92, reaching  1 billion person-days by 1995  (Subbarao
et  al,  1997).  In  addition,  public  works  have  been  used  in  transition  economies,  but
participation  has  been  kept at a modest level,  usually below  1 percent  of the  labor force  a
year  (the highest  participation,  reaching  3.2 percent  of the  labor  force,  was  in Hungary  in
1996;  see Vodopivec  et al, 2001).
Adequacy  of support.  To gauge  the adequacy  - undoubtedly an  elusive concept  -
we  discuss  below  (i)  the  replacement  rate  and  the  entitlement  duration  of unemployment
benefit  programs,  and  (ii)  consumption  smoothing  and  (iii)  poverty  reduction  effects  of
income support programs.
Replacement rates and entitlement durations  of  unemployment benefits.  Replacement
rates among countries differ widely.  In  developed countries,  they are in the range of 20 to  75
percent,  and even higher  in Nordic countries  (for example, the replacement  rate in Denmark
is  90  percent).  In  the  U.S.,  a  broad  consensus  has  emerged  that  an  adequate  income
replacement  rate is  50  percent  (O'Leary,  1997).  The replacement  rates  in developing  and
transition  countries  are  mostly  in  the  range  of 45  to  70  percent,  although  there  are  also
notable exceptions  (there is a very low imputed  replacement rate in Estonia - see Vodopivec
et al, 2001).  Similarly,  the range of the potential  entitlement  duration of benefits is also very
large.  In developed countries, it ranges from 6 months to long-tern-/indefinite;  in developing
and  transition  countries,  from  6  months  to  24  months  (with  some  extensions  close  to
retirement age).
With  the  above  wide-ranging  differences  in  the  replacement  rate  and  in  the
entitlement  duration,  a  better  comparison  of adequacy  is  obtained  by  combining  the  two
measures  in  an  "index  of generosity."8 Judged  by  this  measure,  unemployment  benefits
systems in transition economies on average lag significantly behind OECD systems,  but there
also  are  substantial  variations  within  the  two  groups  of countries  (see  Vroman,  2001,  for
OECD  countries,  and  Vodopivec  et  al,  2001,  for transition  countries).  Among  European
transition  countries, for example,  unemployment  benefits  are the most generous in Slovenia
employment)  and  micro-credit  programs,  often  supported  by NGOs  and  cooperatives,  and  micro-insurance
programs to cover contingencies  such as death,  disability, and maternity.
The  index of generosity is defined  as the product of the replacement rate and the share of benefit recipients in
total  number of unemployed, times  100, and  equals the cost of unemployment  benefits per percentage  point of
unemployment (see Vroman,  2001).
46and  Hungary  (with  a  generosity  index  of 23),  and  the  least  generous  in Estonia  (with  a
generosity index of 2.8).
Consumption smoothing effects.  Research  on  developed  countries  (primarily  the
U.S.)  suggests that  unemployment  benefits  fairly  adequately  smoothen  consumption.  For
example,  Hamermesh  and  Sleznick  (1995)  find  that  the  welfare  of  benefit  recipient
households  was  on  average  only  3-8  percent  lower  than  the welfare  of otherwise  identical
households.  Similarly, Gruber  (1997)  finds that  in the absence of unemployment  insurance,
average consumption expenditures would fall by 22 percent.
There are only a few studies on the consumption smoothing effects of income support
programs  in  developing  countries.  For  example,  similar  to  the  findings  for  the  U.S.,
Maclssac  and Rama (2000) report that per capita consumption  by the unemployed  decreases
by  10 to  20  percent.  But  the  receipt  of severance  pay more than  outweighs  this effect  of
unemployment,  so  that  the  consumption  per  head  of  those  unemployed  who  received
severance  pay is higher than otherwise similar workers who are  employed  - suggesting  that
severance pay may be  overly generous  in Peru.  Kugler  (2000) also finds  some support that
withdrawals  from  UISAs  in  Colombia  helped  mitigate  the  consumption  losses  during
unemployment  (her  estimates  of  coefficients  indicating  withdrawal  are  positive  but
insignificant).
Poverty reduction.  Unemployment  benefits  appear  to have  a rather small  effect  on
the reduction of poverty;  in contrast, the effects of public works are much stronger.
In European transition economies,  unemployment  benefit programs  have only mildly
reduced  poverty - not an  unexpected  finding  given that poverty  reduction  is not  one of the
stated  goals  of unemployment  benefits.  For  rnost of the  European  transition  economies,
benefits  reduced  poverty  by  less  than  2  percent;  sizeable  effects  where  found  only  in
Hungary  and  Poland  (see  table  4.1).  Why  are  the  effects  small?  Few of the  poor  were
eligible  for  these  benefits,  and  even  when  they  were,  the  benefits  did  not  represent  a
substantial  share  of household  incomes.  As  shown  in  table 4.1,  the  share  of the poor who
were  recipients  of unemployment  benefits  was  below  11  percent,  and  this  share  was  the
lowest in those countries  where the reduction  oi poverty  was minimal.  Moreover,  the share
of unemployment  benefit payments in total household  incomes was quite low as well - it was
the  highest  in  Poland  with  34  percent,  and  particularly  low  in  those  countries  with  the
smallest effect of benefits on poverty (except in Latvia).  Unemployment  benefits are also not
targeted  to the poor.  The  share of benefits received  by the poor was highest in Estonia  (31
percent);  the  shares  were  much  smaller  in  other  countries,  with  the  share  in  Slovakia
amounting to a mere 0.5 percent.  Interestingly,  despite channeling quite a high share of
benefits to the poor, the overall  effect  on the reduction  of poverty  in Bulgaria was the least
among the countries in question, presumably because poverty was so deep.
47Table 4.1: Poverty-related  effects  of unemployment  benefits  and their share in
household  incomes,  transition economies,  mid-1990s*
Bulgaria  Estonia  -Hungay  Latva-  Poland''  Slovakia-  Slovenia'
Poverty reduction
(change  in poverty  1.1  0.5  14.8  2.2  16.7  2.7  6.8
headcount brought
about by UB receipt,
in percent)**
Coverage  (the share
of poor who were  3.8  3.8  7.5  2.5  5.6  0.6  11.5
UB recipients,  in
percent)
Targeting (the share
of UB received by  17.4  31.1  4.9  12.4  6.8  0.5  16.0
the poor, in percent)
Average  share of




Sources:  Own  calculations  from  online HEIDI  data (Household  Expenditure  and Income  data for Transitional
Economies),  World Bank and  Slovenia  Statistical Office.  Survey year: Bulgaria,  1995; Hungary,  1993; Latvia,
1997; Poland,  1993;  Slovak Republic,  1993;  Slovenia,  1997-98.  Sample  Size:  Bulgaria: 2,466; Hungary:  8,105;
Latvia: 7,690; Poland:  16,051;  Slovakia: 2,129;  Slovenia:  2,577.
Notes:
*Unemployment  benefits include both payments  of unemployment  insurance and unemployment  assistance.
**Poverty  reduction  is defined  as the difference  in the headcount of poor  UB recipients  in a hypothetical  case
when UB is removed  from total household incomes  and the actual headcount,  divided by the total number of the
poor. The poverty line is 50 percent of median  household income.
The  poverty  reduction  effects  of public  works  - a  program  often  introduced  in
response  to  economic  and  natural  shocks  to  provide  income  to  the  poorest  segments  of
population - seem to be larger.  Subbarao  et al (1997)  state that evaluations of public works
programs  show  significant  improvements  in  the  economic  circumstances  of participants,
citing  India's  Maharasthra  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  (MEGS)  as  case  in  point.
Evidence  shows  MEGS  participants  to  have  higher  annual  incomes  than  non-participants,
with  wages  from  the  scheme  contributing  highly  to  total  income.  Relatedly,  Datt  and
Ravallion (1994)  estimate that poverty  severity declines from  5 to 3.2 percent due to MEGS
participation.  One reason attributed to the  superior poverty reduction performance of MEGS
was its low cost of participation - the program was structured to minimize earnings foregone
from  other  sources  due  to  participation.  Although  public  works  programs  have  had  some
success  in preventing  greater impoverishment,  due to the temporary  nature of most of these
programs, their impact on poverty is often transitory.
48As  for  other  programs,  family  assistance  schemes  have  been  shown  to  protect
families from poverty in developed countries.  For example,  Subbarao et al (1997)  show that
the  percentage  of family  poverty  reduced  due  to the receipt  of social  insurance  benefits  in
OECD  countries  range  between  7 and  93  percent.  Other  means-testecl  programs  show  an
almost identical range of impact.  Evidence for non-OECD countries has been harder to come
by.  However,  the impact  on poverty  has  been considered  weak due to,  in varying  degrees,
meager public spending  on such  provisions,  lowv  levels and  short  durations  of benefits,  and
poor targeting.
Income  redistribution  generated  by  income  support  systems.  Do  different
programs  have different effects on income redistribution?  In table 4.2 we report evidence  on
the  incidence  of benefits/beneficiaries  for  different  programs,  from  which  we  derive  the
implied  income redistribution.  Except for unemployment  insurance,  data for other programs
refer to one country only, so conclusions are preliminary.
Table 4.2: Distribution of benefits and beneficiaries  of unemployment  support
programs, mid-199Os*
Poorest  2". poorest  Middle  2nd richest  Richest
quintile  quintile  quintile  quintile
Unemployment  insurance
Average  15.4  22.3  22.5  20.0  18.9
Brazil  10.6  24.6  19.1  25.1  13.6
Bulgaria  17.8  14.9  32  13  22.4
Estonia  31.1  17.7  19.6  18  13.6
Hungary  7.8  20.4  28.2  24.6  19.1
Latvia  15.7  13.8  18  26  26.5
Poland  14.8  24.1  22.9  21.6  16.6
Slovakia  3.1  33.2  20.8  18.8  24.1
Slovenia  22.5  30  19  13.1  15.4
Unemployment  insurance savings accounts
Colombia  0.0  4.3  n.a.  19.1  76.6
Severance  pay
Peru  4.7  9.5  28.6  33.3  23.8
Public works
Argentina  78.6  15.3  3.5  2.1  0.4
Training
Mexico  69.9  15.5  8.1  5.0  1.5
Sources: Same as table 4.1  for transition countries; de Feranti et al (2000) for Latin American countries.
Notes:
*Share  of  benefits  received  by  individual  quintile,  for  transition  economies,  and  share  of  beneficiaries  in
population' group, for Latin American  countries.
**Unemployment  insurance  benefits  include  both  payments  of unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment
assistance.
49The  evidence  shows that by far the most progressive  programs are public  works  and
training:  among  the  poorest  20  percent  of the  households,  there  are  79  and  70  percent  of
participants  in these two programs,  respectively.  This means that,  given that  both programs
are
Table  4.2  also  suggests  that  the  redistributive  effects  of unemployment  insurance
programs  are  rather  modest.  While  the  share  of unemployment  benefits  collected  by the
richest quintile  exceeds  the  share  collected  by the poorest  quintile  in quite  a few  countries
(similar  finding  also  applies  to  the  40  percent  cut),  overall  effects  are  neutral  or  may  be
progressive,  because  unemployment  insurance  contribution  rates are  earnings related.  Still,
evidence  shows  that  unemployment  benefits  offer  only  limited  scope  for  redistribution  of
income  from  the rich  to the  poor.  Similarly,  unemployment  benefits  are  not an  important
tool for income redistribution  in developed countries either.  As shown by Forster (2000), the
effects  of benefits  are  progressive  in about  half of the  OECD  countries,  and neutral  in the
other  half.  Note that  a  limited  scope  of redistribution  carried  out by the  UI  system  is not
surprising,  since  the primary  objective  of UI  is  consumption  smoothing  and  thus  it is  not
designed to bring about income redistribution.
Table 4.2 also shows that the participants  of both the Colombian  UISA program  and
the Peruvian severance pay scheme belong mostly to the richest segments of population (this
fact is not an  immanent property of these programs,  but it is probably quite typical  for low-
income  countries).  Because  of the  limited  direct  redistribution  involved  in  these  two
programs,  this fact  alone does not allow implications  about income  redistribution  effects of
these programs.  But some efficiency properties of these programs may also have distributive
effects.  This  applies  to  severance  pay:  as  shown  above,  it  hinders  access  to  jobs  by
disadvantaged  groups.  By contributing  to labor market dualism, severance  pay increases the
advantage of already privileged  formal sector workers, thus increasing inequalities  in society.
Let  us  also  devote  some  attention  on  the  distributive  effects  from  introducing
unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts  (UISAs).  The  UISA  system  can  in  principle
provide the same income protection as the traditional  unemployment  insurance system (with
less  adverse  incentives,  as  claimed  above).  Switching  from  an  unemployment  insurance
system  to  an  UISA  system,  however,  does  have  distributive  consequences,  because  the
benefits  are  financed  in  a  different  way.  According  to  Feldstein  and  Altman  (1998),
distributive  effects for the U.S.  are likely to be small - with the caveat that they work  in the
"wrong"  direction,  that  is,  they  tend  to  hurt  the  poor.  Feldstein  and  Altman  find  that
individuals  in  all  quintiles  slightly gain,  and  individuals  in the bottom quintile  slightly lose
(the  fact that  these  estimates  do  not  take  account  of behavioral  responses  to  the  changed
system  most  likely  makes  the  distributive  effects  worse).  It  is  hard  to  predict  what
distributive  effects  the  switch  to  an UISA  system would  have  in the context  of developing
countries.  Under some proposed designs, however,  the government would subsidize  savings
accounts of low income workers, thereby improving their ability to smooth consumption  and
making the system more progressive  (see Chapter 6).
50Distributive effects:  a summary
Coverage: In comparison to their counterparts  in developed economies, formal sector
workers  in developing  countries  have much  more limited choice of income  support  systems
for  the  unemployed  (see  table  4.3).  For  example,  the  most  prevalent  form  of insurance
against  unemployment  in  Latin  America  is  severance  pay;  however,  not  all  formal  sector
workers  are  legally  entitled  to  this  benefit.  Moreover,  if dismissed,  even  those  who  are
entitled  often  do  not receive  severance  pay.  Workers  in  the  infornal  sector  are  the  least
protected.  They  are  excluded  from all  programs  where  eligibility  is conditional  on  social
security contributions.  Their options are thus limited to a subset of formnal programs  (such as
public works), and, increasingly,  to innovative programs offered by self-help organizations.
Table 4.3:  Summary of distributive effects  of income support programs for the unemployed
Coverage  Adequacy  Effects on income
redistribution
Unemployment  . In developed  . Consumption smoothing:  Mildly progressive  (in
Unemploymenistance  economies,  wide  in developed economies,  the  some developed
insurance/assistance  coverage  (self-  consumption  level of  countries) or neutral
employed, agricultural  claimants fairly well  effects on
and household workers  preserved.  In most transition  redistribution.
excluded).  countries, benefits  less
In developing  generous.
countries mostly not  . Poverty reduction: in
available or  available  transition economies, benefits
to segments of formal  mildly reduce poverty.
sector workers.
51Table 4.3:  Summary of distributive effects  of income support programs for the unemployed
Coverage  Adequacy  Effects  on income
redistribution
Available to a subset  Little evidence.  . Little evidence.
Severance pay  of formal sector  Consumption  per head of those  . Program
workers, not always de-  unemployed  who received  participants
facto provided in spite  severance  pay is higher than  concentrated  among
of legal entitlement.  otherwise similar workers who  the rich (Peru).
Hinders  access to  are employed (Peru).  . By contributing to
jobs by disadvantaged  labor market dualism,




sector workers,  thus
increasing inequalities
in society.
Available to a subset of  Inconclusive evidence.  . In its pure form,
Unemployment  formal sector workers.  redistributive  effects
insurance savings  eliminated  by design.






introduction  are likely
to be  small
(simulation results
obtained on the U.S.).
*  In principle,  Strong effects on poverty  Strongly progressive.





economies,  they have
been typically kept
below  I percent).
In reality, jobs often
rationed.
Source:  Derived  from the discussion on distributive effects in the text.
Adequacy of support:  In  developed  economies,  replacement  rates  and  entitlement
duration  periods  of  unemployment  benefits  vary  widely,  providing  little  guidance  to
developing  and  transition  countries;  overall  generosity  of  the  benefits  in  developed
economies,  however,  exceeds  the  generosity  found  in  transition  economies.  There  is
abundant  evidence  that  unemployment  benefits  are  effective  in  smoothing  consumption  in
developed  economies;  there  is  little  evidence  of  such  effects  for  either  unemployment
benefits  or  other  income  support  programs  in  developing  and  transition  countries.  Most
effective  in  reducing  poverty  in  developing  countries  seems  to  be  public  works;
52unemployment  insurance  also contributes  to the reduction of poverty,  but its  scope seems to
be limited.
Income redistribution: By  far  the  most progressive  programs  are  public works  and
training.  Unemployment  insurance  in transition countries  seems  to have little redistributive
effects.  By  design,  the  UISA  system  offers  little  redistribution  - only  individuals  who
deplete  their  savings  in their  accounts  may  be  entitled  to  transfers  from  the  public  purse.
Severance  pay seems  to increase the advantage  of already privileged  formal  sector workers,
contributing to labor market dualism.
4.2 Efficiency  effects  of income support programs
This subsection reviews  some of the most studied effects of income support programs
for the unemployed - effects on economic efficiency.  Where pertinent, the following aspects
are considered:
*  Unemployment and labor  force participation. By  changing  the  opportunity  cost of
leisure and through a variety of other channels, unemployment  support programs are
often  hypothesized  to  affect  unemployment,  employment  and  labor  force
participation.  Moreover,  effects on job search  intensity, post-unemployment  wages,
labor  supply of other family  members,  and on the promotion  of regular  vs. informal
jobs are also examined.
*  Persistence  of  unemployment.  Recent  research  points  to  the  interaction  of
unemployment  benefit systems with adverse shocks,  so the effects of benefit systems
on the persistence of unemployment  are considered in its own right.
*  Output and growth.  Income  support  systems  may  interfere  with  allocation  and
reallocation decisions,  thus affecting output and growth of the economy  (and not just
unemployment).  For example,  recent  research  on worker  and job flows  shows that
reallocation  contributes  significantly  to  aggregate  productivity  growth  - in the U.S.
manufacturing  sector,  roughly  half  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  can  be
accounted for by the reallocation  of outputs  and inputs away from less  productive  to
more productive  businesses (see Davis and Haltiwanger,l 999).  Effects on facilitating
restructuring of enterprises  are also considered.
Below we  present  the  effects  for  each  income  support program  separately;  a more
technical  and detailed discussion is relegated to the annex of this chapter.
(a) Unemployment  insurance
Benefits  influence  unemployment  by  affecting  job  search  intensity  and  wage
bargaining.  These  effects  are  theoretically  ambiguous,  but empirical  studies  - both  micro
and macro - overwhelmingly  show a positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.  Effects
on employment  and  labor  force participation  are  less clear  cut.  In addition,  by  interacting
with  shocks,  benefits  contribute  to  the  persistence  of unemployment.  Benefits  may  also
affect output and growth, for example, by influencing the pace of enterprise  restructuring and
the intensity of layoffs.  Below we examine above issues in more detail.
53Effects  on unemployment and labor  force participation.  Undoubtedly  the  most researched
effects of unemployment  insurance  are its effects  on unemployment.  Conceptually, benefits
affect unemployment  through two main channels.  First, they influence job search effort and
the  reservation  wage of recipients  - with theoretically  ambiguous  effects  on efficiency.  As
described  in  the  annex,  models  can  be  constructed  which  predict  that  benefits  prolong
unemployment  spells  (for  example,  by  emphasizing  the  fact  that  leisure  becomes  more
attractive),  as  well  as  shorten  them  (for example,  by  stressing  that more  resources  enable
more effective job search).  Second,  unemployment  benefits improve the bargaining position
of workers,  which  leads to higher wages - and hence to a higher equilibrium unemployment
(Blanchard,  1999).
In  the  light  of these  theoretical  ambiguities,  empirical  studies  are  of  particular
relevance.  By and  large,  they  show  that  unemployment  benefits  increase unemployment.
For example,  summarizing  the  evidence,  Calmfors and  Holmlund  (2000,  p.  145)  argue  that
"there  is  considerable  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  lower  benefit  levels  and  shorter
entitlement  periods  associated  with  unemployment  insurance  reduce  unemployment"  (a
similar conclusion  is reached by Decker (1997)  for the U.S.).  As shown  in the annex, many
studies  of individual  countries  using  microdata  find  that both  a higher  level  and  a  longer
duration of benefits increase unemployment (for the evidence on OECD economies, see table
4.4.  and  on  transition  economies,  table  4.5).9  Typically,  cross-country  studies  - directly
investigating the  relationship  between equilibrium  unemployment  and  the generosity  of the
benefits  - corroborate  such  findings (for example,  Layard et al,  1991,  Elmeskov et al,  1998,
and  Nickell  and  Layard,  1999).  True,  there  are  also  studies  which  find  effects  of
unemployment  insurance  on unemployment  insignificant,  but most observers  agree  that the
evidence  on positive effects is more compelling.
In  particular,  the evidence  based on  microstudies is very credible.' 0 First, there  is a
large number of studies,  both in developed  and  transition  economies,  which find a positive
elasticity of unemployment  with respect to the level  and duration of benefits (see box 4.1  for
the  size of these  effects).  Moreover,  disincentives  created  by unemployment  benefits  show
up  clearly  in a pronounced  spike  in  the probability  of exit from  unemployment  just before
benefit  exhaustion.  And  third,  strong  evidence  on  moral  hazard  is  provided  by the  U.S.
unemployment  insurance  experiments.  Those unemployed who were offered a bonus for fast
reemployment  significantly  reduced  their  unemployment  spells,  without  affecting  their
reemployment  earnings.
9 If one assumes that the inflow of workers into unemployment  is invariant to the increase of unemployment
benefits,  then the increase of unemployment duration also increases the equilibrium unemployment (the latter
being determined by the average  duration of unemployment  and the inflow into  unemployment).
'° Cross-country studies are, among others, criticized as suffering  from the problem of reversed causality.
54Table 4.4: Incentive  effects  of unemployment  insurance, OECD countries
Study  Data  Model/Methodology  Findings
Marston (1975)  Household survey of exhaustees in  Empirical hazard  UI system causes an increase of unemployment  by 0.2-0.3
Pennsylvania,  1966-67.  percent of the labor force.  Weekly escape rates rise
dramatically from  1.1  percent just before exhaustion  to
13.4 percent just afterward.
Lancaster (1979)  U.K.,  1973  Proportional hazard,  Unemployment  spell increases  significantly  with age, the
Survey data for the registered  altemative specifications  unemployment rate, and benefit  level
unemployed  including  Weibull  Benefit elasticity=0.43-0.60
10%  rise in benefit level increases duration by  I week if
the duration was  17 weeks (benefit  elasticity=0.6)
Moffit and Nicholson  U.S.,  1974-77  Regression,  static  labor-  10%  increase  in  replacement  rate increases  avg.
(1982)  Benefit recipients  eligible for Federal  leisure choice model  unemployment spell - males:  1.5-2.3 weeks; females:  1.3-
Supplemental  Benefits extension  1.7 weeks
Moffit (1985)  U.S.,  1983  Non-parametric  10%  increase  in  the weekly benefit level  increases
Continuous  Wage and Benefit History  proportional hazard,  unemployment duration by about  1.5 week  (benefit
file  for  13  states  alternative  specifications  elasticity =0.36)
I week increase in benefit duration increases
unemployment duration by  I day (duration elasticity=0. 16)
Narendranathan,  Nickell,  United Kingdom,  1978-79  Weibull model,  alternative  Benefit elasticity  = 0.28-0.36
and Stern (1985)  Survey and administrative data for  specifications  Benefit effect declines with  duration for the first six
DHSS benefit recipients  months.  After six months, benefit effect becomes
negligible.
Ham and Rea (1987)  Canada,  1975-80  Discrete-Time-Duration  Exit rates first decline (until 24th week) and then rise, with
Sample: males (ages  18-64) from  Model, altemative  a "spike" near benefit exhaustion
Canadian  Employment and  specifications
Immigration Labor Force File
Meyer (1990)  U.S.,  1983  Semi-parametric  10%  increase  in the benefit level increases  duration by  1.5
Continuous  Wage and Benefit History  proportional  hazard,  weeks (benefit elasticity=0.88)
file  for  12 states  alternative  specifications
Male  UI recipients  (age<55)  Exit rates varies  over benefit duration - first decline, then
steady,  and then sharp  increase near benefit exhaustion.
Over the six  weeks prior to benefit exhaustion,  exit rates
triple.
55Table 4.4: Incentive effects  of unemployment  insurance, OECD countries (cont.)
Study  Data  Model/Methodology  Findings
Carling,  Edin, Harkman,  Sweden,  1991  Semi-parametric  Exit rate increases sharply close to benefit exhaustion.
& Holmiund  (1996)  proportional hazard  In the period 3 weeks prior to benefit exhaustion, job-
finding rates increase by 170%
Nickell  (1979)  U.K.,  1971-72  Logit, alternative  Presence  of negative duration dependence  for first 20
Unemployed  males from  1971-72  specifications  weeks (benefit elasticity:  0.84-0.95) of spell, negligible
General Household Survey  effect thereafter
Katz and Meyer (1988)  U.S.,  1983  Semi-parametric  Benefit elasticity=0.8-0.9
Male  Ut  recipients  from Continuous  proportional hazard,  Potential benefit duration elasticity: 0.36-0.44 at 26 weeks;
Wage and Benefit History  file for 12  alternative specifications  0.48-0.5 at 36 weeks
states  Exit rates rises sharply before benefit exhaustion; exit rates
decrease from 26 to  12 weeks  until benefit exhaustion.
56Table 4.5: Incentive effects  of unemployment  insurance, transition economies
Study  Data  Model/Methodology  Findings
Bulgaria
Jones and Kotzeva (1998)  Bulgaria,  1993-1996  Survivor functions, binary  Exit rate to employment increases markedly between the
Aggregate data from the  logit  18*' and 26kh month of the spell, that is, after social
Study of the effects of the  Ministry of Labor, household  assistance benefit exhaustion.
transition to social assistance  survey  data, and data from  labor  Survival  functions for SA recipients  and non-recipients
office registers  indicate "waiting behavior"  for the former.
Cazes  and Scarpetta (1998)  Administrative data of entry to  Empirical  hazard function,  Exit probability toward the end of the entitlement period
registered  unemployed, 1991-93.  piece-wise  constant hazard  increased dramatically.  Benefit recipients exit
function  unemployment  more slowly than non-recipients,  but
many leave to inactivity, especially in backward areas.
Kotzeva,  Mircheva, and  Registered unemployed,  Binomial logit  Recipients of Ul are significantly less likely to take a
Woergoetter  (1996)  December  1992 - July  1994  job.
Czech  Republic
Ham,  Svejnar and Terrell  Registered  unemployed,  October  Hazard model  Elasticity of duration with respect to:
(1998)  1991  - March  1992  - increase of  replacement rate =  0.34
- increase  in duration of benefit = 0.44
Estonia
Vodopivec,  Woergoetter  ,and  Labor force survey,  1991-1995  Empirical  hazard  function  Exit to employment significantly  increases  around the
Raju (2000)  point of benefit  exhaustion.
Hungary
Micklewright and Nagy  Hungary, March-April  1994  Non-parametric  and  High proportion  of Ul recipients  remain until benefit
(1998)  Sample:  Mar-Apr 94 recipient  parametric proportional  exhaustion.  Exit rates are characterized  by a large  spike
inflow into the Ul register  hazard,  discrete time-  in the period immediately  after benefit exhaustion: job-
Source:  UI register;  follow-up  duration  model  exit hazard  increases six- to  eight-fold compared  to the
surveys  period prior to exhaustion.
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Poland
Adamchik (1999)  Poland,  1994-1996  Proportional  hazard  Negative  effect of the receipt of benefits on  probability
Labor force surveys  of exit to a job, dramatic increase  of the hazard as the
benefit  is about to expire. Puhani (1996)  Poland,  1992-1994  Hazard  Entitlement to unemployment  benefits significantly
Labor force  surveys  Weibull model, different  prolongs duration of unemployment  The magnitude of
specifications  the effect stays roughly the same  after the  Ul reform  that
reduced the potential length of the entitlement. Steiner  and Kwiatkowski  Poland,  1992-1993  Multinomial logit  Ul recipients had lower exit rates than non-Ul (1995)  labor force surveys  recipients,  particularly with respect to the exit rate from (cited in Kwiatkowski,  1998)  unemployment to inactivity.
Boeri and Steiner  (1996)  Poland,  Hazard  Exit rates  increase as entitlement  duration approaches
Administrative data  exhaustion, especially  in the capital  (males: increased
flow to employment;  females:  increased  flow to
inactivity).
Exit rate to inactivity  increased markedly  in the month
after benefit exhaustion.
Gora (1996)  Poland,  1992-1994  Binomial logit  Ul recipients  had a lower exit rate to employment than (cited  in Kwiatkowski,  1998)  Labor force surveys  non-UI  recipients.
Cazes and Scarpetta (1998)  Administrative data of entry to  Empirical hazard function,  Exit probability related to differentiated  maximum
registered  unemployed, 1990-93.  piece-wise constant hazard  lengths of UB entitlement.  Unemployment benefit
function  recipients exit unemployment  much  more slowly than
non-recipients,  but many leave to inactivity rather than
to employment, especially  in backward  areas.
Romania
Earle and  Pauna  (1998)  Labor force survey,  Hazard  model  Receipt of benefits  increases probability of leaving
administrative  sources  unemployment (no disincentive effects).
58Table 4.5: Incentive effects  of unemployment  insurance, transition economies  (cont.)
Study  Data  ModeUMethodology  Findings
Slovakia
Lubyova and Ours (1999)  Labor force surveys,  1994-96  Proportional hazard  Little evidence of disincentive  effects.
Ham,  Svejnar  and  Terrell  Registered  unemployed, October  Hazard model  Elasticity of duration with respect to:
(1998)  1991  - March  1992  - increase of replacement  rate = 0.06
- increase in duration  of benefit = 0.41
Slovenia
Vodopivec  (1995)  Slovenia,  1990-92  Semi-parametric  Strong waiting  effect - exit to employment  significantly
proportional  hazard  increases just before benefit exhaustion.
59Box 4.1:  How large are employment  disincentive effects  of unemployment  insurance?
The effects  are  measured  by the  benefit elasticity  (the  elasticity  of the  duration  of unemployment  with
respect  to  the  benefit  replacement  rate),  and  duration elasticity (the  elasticity  of  the  duration  of
unemployment  with respect to the potential duration of benefits).
According to  Layard et al (1991),  the benefit elasticity ranges from  0.2 to 0.9, depending  on the state of
the labor market and the  country concerned (for example,  a 0.6  elasticity  means that in response  to a  10
percent  increase in the replacement rate, the duration of an unemployment spell increases  by one week, at
the average  duration  of 17  weeks).  According  to Katz and  Meyer (1990), the  duration elasticity in the
U.S.  is in the  range  of 0.4-0.5  (that  is, a  one  week  increase  in  the  potential  entitlement  duration  of
unemployment  benefits  is  associated  with  one  to  one  and  a  half  day  increase  in  the  average
unemployment spell of recipients).
Katz  and Meyer  (1990)  estimate  that  increases  in potential  benefit duration  have much  larger  adverse
incentive  effects  on  unemployment  than  do  changes  in  unemployment  benefit  that  leave  benefit
expenditures  unchanged.  Moreover,  they suggest that longer  duration of benefits  explains about  10-30
percent of the difference  in mean unemployment spell duration between  the U.S. and U.K.
Several  other results  related  to  the  effects  of benefits  on unemployment  should  be
mentioned.  First, direct evidence on the intensity of job search by benefit claimants is scarce
and inconclusive.  Second,  there  is no compelling  evidence  that unemployment  benefits,  by
subsidizing job search, facilitate better job matches  as indicated,  for example, by the level of
post-unemployment  wages.  While several studies from the seventies  confirmed  such effects,
newer  studies show weak or negligible  effects.  Third, there  is no conclusive  evidence  that
benefits  facilitate entry into regular jobs.  In fact, Cunningham (2000) shows that an increase
in the generosity of unemployment  insurance  in Brazil  - by relaxing a liquidity constraint -
led  to  increased  participation  in  the  self-employment  sector.  Fourth,  empirical  studies
confirm  theoretical  predictions  that  more  generous  replacement  rates  suppress  the  labor
supply of other family members  (see annex for details on the above results).
Higher  taxes  on  labor - which  include  unemployment  benefit  contributions  - are
also  shown  to  significantly  increase  unemployment  (see,  for example,  Nickell  and  Layard,
1999, and  Daveri and  Tabellini, 2000).  By creating  a wedge between the  costs of labor and
real consumption  wage, labor taxes reduce  the demand  for labor  and (if demand for labor is
not perfectly  inelastic)  employment,  and  hence  increase unemployment.  Although  estimates
vary, Nickell  and  Layard (1999)  report that a 5 percentage  point decrease  of aggregate  tax
wage  (which  include  payroll,  income,  and  consumption  taxes)  would  reduce  the
unemployment  rate by  13  percent (for example, from  8 to  7 percent)."  They also argue that
different  types of taxes  have the  same effect  on unemployment.  Recently,  Elmeskov  et al
(1998)  showed  that  there  are  significant  interactions  between  taxation  and  collective
bargaining  arrangements,  and that the effects  of the tax wedge  are  less  pronounced  in  both
"  Negative effects may only apply in the short run (long run effects may be less pronounced,  as some studies
find that employment  is  insensitive  to the level of total taxes in the long-run - see,  for example,  Gruber  1997).
60highly  centralized/coordinated  and decentralized  countries  (this  is  consistent with the hump-
shaped  influence  of wage  bargaining  systems  on  unemployment  of Calmfors  and  Drifill,
1988).
Does  it  matter  whether  employers  or workers  pay  contributions  for unemployment
insurance?  In  essence,  no.  Who bears the tax depends primarily on the elasticity of demand
for and  supply of labor  (see  de  Ferranti  et  al,  2000).  For  example,  even if employers  are
nominally paying the contributions, they may be able to shift the burden to workers, the more
elastic the supply of labor, the more so.  But wage setting mechanisms seem to matter here as
well.  To  the  extent  wages  are  prevented  from  adjusting,  taxation  may  have  a  more
pronounced  effect on employment (and hence  on unemployment) than in the case of flexible
wage setting.  Moreover,  there  may  also be  a demonstration  effect  - if workers  are  paying
contributions,  they  will  be  more  aware  of the  costs  and  less  likely  to  support  generous
systems (World Bank, 1994).
Effects  of  unemployment  benefits  on  labor  force  participation  are  not  well
researched.  Atkinson and Micklewright  (1991)  report studies  which find that specific groups
are attracted  into the labor force (both  employment and unemployment) by the entitlement to
unemployment  insurance.  The  OECD's  Jobs  Study  (OECD  1994,  p.192)  reports  the
entitlement  effect  for  women  and  older  workers:  the  availability  of benefits  seem  to  be
positively  correlated  with the  unemployment  rate  of women  and  older  workers.  But  the
entitlement  effect  had  little  effect  on  employment  of  these  groups,  as  increases  in
unemployment  are attributable to reductions  in inactivity.  For the U.S., Clark and Summers
(1982)  estimate  that benefits  increased  labor  force participation  rate  by increasing  both  the
unemployment  and the  employment  rate.  In  contrast, Nickell  and Layard  (1999)  find the
effects on the increase  of unemployment  and labor  force participation  canceling  each other,
with no net effect on employment.
Effects  on persistence of unemployment.  Another  efficiency  aspect  relates  to  the
capacity  of the  economy  to reduce  unemployment  to  equilibrium  level  in the  wake  of an
adverse  shock.  Theoretical  models  show that benefits  slow down  the adjustment to such  a
shock  - and  precisely  the  interaction  of shocks  and  institutions  (unemployment  benefits
being one of them) has been recently advanced  as the main explanation for the persistence of
European unemployment.  Below we examine these issues further.
Theoretical  models  predict  that  economies  with  unemployment  benefits  experience
larger  and  more  prolonged  unemployment  following  a  transient  shock.  For  example,
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997) develop  a model to study the dynamics of two economies, one
with a unemployment insurance  system and one without, when a transient economic  shock is
introduced.  The  "non-unemployment  insurance"  economy  recovers  more  rapidly  as
reservation  wages  adjust  quicker  and  job  search  intensity  is  higher  than  in  the
"unemployment  insurance"  economy.  The economies also respond differently to "economic
turbulence."  Unemployment  in the "non-unemployment  insurance"  economy remains  more
or less constant, while the "unemployment  insurance"  economy experiences  a large increase
in unemployment  as more  workers  experience  a significant  skill  loss.  Moreover,  Millard's
61(1996)  modeling  exercise  finds  that  a  transient  productivity  shock  leads  to  prolonged
unemployment when replacement rates are high.
The  interaction  of institutions  with  adverse  shocks  seems  to  also  offer  a  dominant
explanation  for the rise of European unemployment  in the last several  decades.  Indeed,
one  of the  stumbling  blocks  for proving  that institutions  (and  unemployment  insurance  in
particular)  have  affected  aggregate  unemployment  has been  a lack of empirical  support for
such  a  link in  explaining  the  rise of European unemployment  over the last several  decades.
The  same institutions  existed when unemployment  was much lower,  and their changes alone
cannot explain the persistent rise in the average unemployment rate in European economies.
Recently, Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and Blanchard  (1999) offered an explanation
for the  above  puzzle  based on the  interaction  between  shocks  and  institutions.  They  show
that the impact  of a shock  on the persistence  of unemployment  can be  amplified  by a more
generous  unemployment  insurance  system  and  higher  employment  protection  (including
more generous  severance  pay).  More  generous  unemployment  insurance  and  employment
protection  change  the  nature  of unemployment:  they  increase  the  average  duration  of
unemployment  and  thus  increase  the  number  of the  long-term  unemployed.  Moreover,
Blanchard and Wolfers  argue that the long-term unemployed  who are not searching for a job
do not matter for wage formation - they do not exert enough pressure  on wage moderation  -
and thus slow down the adjustment  of unemployment  after an adverse  shock.  According to
Blanchard  and  Wolfers,  there  are  two  channels  through  which  this effect  works:  duration
dependence  (less  intense  job  search  activity  and  the  loss  of  skills  due  to  the  prolonged
duration of unemployment) and marginalization (risky workers are less likely to be hired, due
to higher expected firing  costs in the presence of employment protection).  Fehn et al (2000)
provide  another  explanation,  showing  that  institutional  shocks  contribute  to  high
unemployment via encouraging  a long-term  substitution of labor with capital.' 2
Effects  on output and growth. Unemployment  benefits  may  also  affect  output  (for
example,  by attracting  workers to  risky, but highly productive jobs), as well  as growth  (for
example,  by affecting  the pace of job creation).  Unemployment  benefits  may  affect  growth
also by stimulating enterprise  restructuring  and intensity of layoffs;  here experience rating is
likely to  play a role.  Moreover,  benefits may also  affect  the cyclical  pattern of growth  by
acting as an automatic stabilizer. Below we examine these and related issues in more detail.
The  effects  of unemployment  insurance  on  output  and  growth  have  not  been  well
researched,  let alone  quantified.  The predictions of the theoretical  models  about the effects
on output are conflicting.  On the one hand, general equilibrium modeling of Acemoglu  and
Shimer (1999,  2000)  suggests that unemployment  insurance helps the economy to achieve  a
higher  output  by  contributing  to  the creation  of high-quality,  high-wage jobs  with  greater
unemployment  risk.  Similarly,  Hassler et al  (1999) argue that more  generous benefits  help
12  Daveri and Tabellini (2000) point to yet another cause of high European unemployment:  a rise in labor costs
and thus the cost of a generous  European welfare state in general  (see below).
62workers  to obtain  and retain specialized  skills - which  may be efficiency  enhancing.  On the
other  hand,  Attanasio  and  Rios-Rull  (2000)  arrive  at  opposite  results  - they  show  that
government-mandated  programs may crowd out private insurance  programs and thus hurt the
efficiency of the economy (their results also point to the importance of crowding out effects).
One  channel  through  which  unemployment  insurance  may  influence  growth  is  by
encouraging  labor  reallocation  and,  in  particular,  restructuring  of  enterprises.  While
partial  equilibrium  results  indeed  suggest  this  is  the  case,  it  seems  that these  results  are
overturned  by  general  equilibrium  models.  For  the  U.S.,  there  is considerable  empirical
evidence  that  the  availability  of benefits  strongly  increases  the  probability  of temporary
layoffs  (Clark  and  Summers,  1982;  Feldstein,  1978;  and  Topel,  1983),  although  benefits
have little  effect  on quit and  permanent  layoff probability.  In other words,  when deciding
about temporary  layoffs,  employers  do  take  into  account  the availability  of unemployment
insurance.  Similarly,  restructuring  programs that provide  workers with sufficiently generous
compensation  are successful  in the  sense that they facilitate the downsizing of that particular
enterprise  to  a  desirable  level,  although  some  may  suffer  from  rehiring  problems
(Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999).
These  partial  equilibrium  results  do  not  necessarily  carry  over  to  the  general
equilibrium  framework.  For example, the theoretical modeling of Blanchard  (1997) does not
support the argument that restructuring  could be facilitated  by more generous unemployment
benefits  (see  annex).  Similarly,  in  the  context  of  a job  creation/job  destruction  model,
Mortensen  (1994)  finds that an increase  in the replacement  rate of unemployment  insurance
would  reduce  job  creation  and  thus  aggregate  output  (because  his  computations  fail  to
account  for  the  insurance  value  of  the  unemployment  insurance  program,  welfare
consequences  are not clear).  Therefore,  the overall potential of income support programs  in
spurring enterprise restructuring  is likely to be limited. 1 3
In  the  context  of enterprise  restructuring,  it  is  worth  looking  at  the  effects  of
experience  rating.  By imposing additional costs on employers, Feldstein  (1976) shows that
experience rating  curbs  layoffs  and thus increases  employment.  But again,  this  is a partial
equilibrium result.  In a more complex model, Burdett and Wright (1989) show that the effect
on employment  is ambiguous - namely, by increasing  labor costs, experience  rating reduces
the  number  of workers  the firm  is  willing  to hire.  In a  similar  vein, Mortensen's  (1994)
model ofjob creation and job destruction, shows that the transition of the current U.S. system
to  one  of full-experience  rating  would  discourage  layoffs,  but  only  by  a relatively  small
amount.  Because job creation would also be adversely affected, the net effect,  according to
Mortensen,  would be "a small although probably insignificant increase  in the unemployment
rate."  The effects of experience rating thus show primarily as a reduction of inflows to and
13  But  Forteza  and Rama  (2000)  show  that  greater  mandated  benefits  (represented  by  the  wedge  on  wages
created  by  social  security  contributions)  do  not  stand  in the  way  of recovery  after  economic  reforms  are
undertaken.
63outflows  from  unemployment,  but  not  as  an  increase  in  employment. 1
4 It  has  to  be
emphasized that experience rating is more  important when employment protection is low, as
it is  in the  U.S.;  in  the European  context,  employment  protection  legislation  takes over  the
role  of experience  rating  - with similar effects  on  labor market  flows and employment  (see
below).
Another  aspect  of unemployment  benefits  systems  that  may  affect  growth  is  the
taxation of labor.  Summarizing the literature,  Nickell and Layard (1999) conclude that total
labor taxes (which include payroll,  income and consumption  taxes) may negatively affect the
growth rate but the result is not robust.  They also  argue that there are no differential  effects
of different types of taxes on labor costs and hence on unemployment.  Recently,  however,
Daveri and Tabellini (2000)  found that in the Continental  European context  (in the presence
of strong  unions,  but with low  density  and lack of coordination)  distorting  effects  of labor
taxes  are  much  bigger than  those produced  by either  capital  or consumption  taxes.  They
claim that higher labor taxes (which exclude  consumption taxes) have been  shifted to higher
real  wages,  which  led  firms  to  substitute  labor  with capital  and  slowed  down  growth and
investment.  They suggest that by reducing the wedge between wages and the cost of labor to
employers,  general  taxation  is  more  conducive  to job creation  and  growth  than  financing
based on contributions.
Finally,  let  us  consider  whether  unemployment  insurance  acts  as  an  automatic
stabilizer.  In contrast to contributing  to the persistence of unemployment by interacting with
adverse  shocks,  unemployment  benefits,  in  their  role  of  an  automatic  macroeconomic
stabilizer,  soften the impact of adverse  shocks  on GDP - but,  by the  same token,  they also
restrain  expansion  when  the  economy  starts  growing  again.  Theoretical  modeling  by  von
Furstenburg (1976) shows that benefit  expenditures and taxes work in opposing directions to
moderate  economic  contractions  and  expansions.  During  downturns,  unemployment
insurance  benefit  payments  increase  and  unemployment  insurance  taxes  fall,  and  the net
injection  of purchasing  power  moderates  the  severity of the  contraction.  During  upturns,
however,  unemployment  insurance  taxes  increase  and  unemployment  insurance  benefits
decrease, restraining the expansion.
Empirical  evidence  seems to  show that unemployment insurance  reduces GDP losses
during downturns by  10-15  percent.  For example,  Dungan and Murphy (1995)  find that the
Canadian  unemployment  insurance  program  reduced  the  loss  in  GDP  by  13-14  percent
during  the  1983-84,  as well as the  1990-91  recession.  For the  U.S.,  Chimerine et al  (1999)
find  that the  unemployment  insurance  program  reduced  the  loss  in real  GDP  by  about  15
percent during recessions.  Other researchers  find that the effect of unemployment  insurance
is weaker.  For example,  Hamermesh  (1992) cites studies which indicate  that unemployment
14  Indeed,  the evidence  shows  a strong positive  effect  of imperfect  experience-rating  - where  employers  bear
only a part of the cost of unemployment  benefits  drawn by their laid off workers - on  temporary layoffs.  This
introduces  incentives  for increased temporary  layoffs during economic  downturns.  For example, Topel  (1983)
attributes  as  much  as  30  percent of temporary  layoff  spells  to imperfect  experience  rating,  Card  and  Levine
(1994) 50 percent,  and Anderson and Meyer (1994) over 20 percent.
64insurance reduced the magnitude of cyclical  output fluctuations  by no more than  10 percent.
Furthermore,  Dunson  et  al  (1991)  finds  that  the  effectiveness  of the  U.S.  unemployment
insurance program  as a counter-cyclical  macroeconomic  stabilizer  has diminished over time.
To  summarize,  the  discussion  above  provides  evidence  that unemployment  benefits
increase  the  duration  of unemployment  spells  of recipients  (evidence  from single-country
studies),  and contribute  to higher  equilibrium  unemployment  (evidence  from  cross-country
studies)  - although  the  magnitude  of  such  effects  is  not  a  firmly  established  parameter.
Benefits  also contribute  to the persistence  of unemployment.  Their effects  on restructuring
and  growth  are  less  researched  and  are  probably  not  very  significant;  there  is  also
inconclusive  evidence  on some other effects  (for example,  on the effects  of benefits  on post-
unemployment  wages).
Let us conclude  the  discussion  of the  efficiency effects  of unemployment  insurance
by remarks about why - despite a wealth of studies devoted to these effects - a consensus has
not been reached in quite a few areas.  First, one obstacle is the fact that many theoretical  and
empirical  results  are  of partial  equilibrium  nature,  and  these  results  may  or  may  not  be
validated  in  a  general  equilibrium  framework.  Second,  as  it  is  made  clear  in  laying  out
conceptual  issues  in Chapter  2,  there are many institutional  and program  features  with rich
possibilities  of interaction,  and  only a  subset of these  features  is usually  incorporated  in  a
general  equilibrium  model.  Leaving  out relevant  aspects  may  be  responsible  for  different
results of various models.  And third, some of the empirical estimates  are "country specific"
and no corrections have been  made to account  for country  differences.  For example,  while
most studies find a positive relationship between benefits and the duration of unemployment
spells of recipients,  estimates  of the magnitude  of these  effects  vary.  Quite likely,  some of
the  differences  in  magnitudes  among  countries  could  be  attributed  to  differences  in  the
effectiveness  of monitoring  and enforcement  of job search.  If job  search  requirements  and
work  tests  are  strictly  enforced  and  benefits  withdrawn  when job  offers  are  rejected,  the
generosity of benefits is less important and moral  hazard problems less pronounced.  That is,
given  the  generosity  of benefits,  the  stricter  the  monitoring,  the  less disincentives  benefits
create.  Indeed,  OECD  (2000)  reports that the recorded  incidence  of benefit  sanctions  varies
greatly  across  OECD  countries,  and  that  such  sanctions  have  a  fairly  large  impact  on
individual  rates of exit from unemployment.  Monitoring and enforcement  features of benefit
systems,  being  hard  to  measure,  have  been  are  inadequately  controlled  for  in  empirical
research  on  disincentive  effects  of  unemployment  benefits,  which  has  contributed  to
differences  in their estimates across different countries.
(b) Unemployment  assistance
With  benefits  contingent  on  the  family  income  (and  assets)  of the  unemployed
individual, unemployment assistance is susceptible to several types of disincentive problems.
First, the program may encourage  longer unemployment  spells, because,  ceteris  paribus, the
largest payments  are received by persons  with zero  earnings,  and a lower wage  rate and/or
lower hours  worked  cause the  payments  to be  larger.  Second,  payment  of unemployment
assistance  benefits to an unemployed family member may influence  labor supply decisions of
65other family members.  If one of the  spouses is unemployed,  the other may  be less likely to
work since his/her  earnings could either make the  family ineligible  for benefits or reduce the
size of the payment.  Third,  knowing  that they would qualify  for unemployment  assistance
benefits,  workers  have  an incentive  to  quit  and  become  unemployed.  And  fourth,  young
individuals  might claim to be unemployed  for purposes of collecting  benefits  when they are
not seriously searching for work or engaged  in training.
Box  4.2: Activation  policies  under unemployment  assistance in Australia
Australia  has undertaken a variety  of initiatives  to  promote  activation  among  unemployment  assistance
recipients.  These  initiatives  include  adjustments  in  the way  suitable job  has been  defined, and  the work
search requirement administered.
Prior  to  the  large  increase  in unemployment  in  the  mid  1970s,  emphasis  was  placed  mainly  on  the
acceptance  of suitable  work  (that is,  work  which  could not  be refused  while retaining  an entitlement  to
benefits).  With  a sharp  increase  in the unemployment-vacancy  ratio,  there were changes  in  the  definition
of suitable work.  Guidelines were broadened  in  1976 to require  acceptance of work in line with  local job
availability  even  if it meant a reduction  in wages and/or status.  By  1989,  this definition had been further
modified  to require acceptance  of casual, part-time or temporary work.
Moreover,  work  search  requirements  have  become  more  formal,  and  the  evidence  of  active  search
emphasized.  Changes  effective  in  1991  required  both  the  short-term  and  the  long-term  unemployed  to
satisfy an activity test. For those unemployed less than twelve months the activity test included  active work
search  or participation in labor market  or vocational  training.  For the  long term unemployed  there was a
requirement to  participate  in an activity agreement  (which  could  include unpaid volunteer  work)  intended
to  secure  reemployment  but  tailored  to  individual  circumstances.  Further  changes  in the  activity  test
became  effective  in  1995,  when  increased  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  early  identification  of those
recipients who were likely to be unemployed  long term.
Source:  Vroman (2001).
Vroman  (2001)  reports  that  the  disincentive  problems  related  to  unemployment
assistance  have  been  less  researched  than  those  related  to  unemployment  insurance.  His
analysis  of the  Australian  unemployment  assistance  system  suggests  that  a lower  income
guarantee  would  probably  result  in  shorter  spells  of unemployment  (although  no  hard
evidence  is  presented).  Suggestive  of incentive  problems  are frequent  changes  in policies
aimed at promoting  employment  among benefit recipients (see box 4.2).  Vroman also points
to  another  body  of literature  that  is  relevant  in  this  context  - the  analysis  of the  work
disincentives  of social  assistance programs.  Those  studies  find  high effective marginal  tax
rates (related  to phasing out of benefits when family income exceeds the maximum allowable
for the receipt of full benefits, as well  as to the taxation of earnings and income of the family)
and  poverty  traps  as  impediments  to work  by the  social  assistance  recipients  (see  below).
Moreover,  studies  of the  Czech  Republic  and  Poland  provide  empirical  evidence  that the
presence  of an  unemployed  spouse  lowers  the  hazard  rate  of exit  from  unemployment  to
employment  (see  annex).  Vroman  (2001)  also  reports  that part  of the  reason  for Australia
changing  to  a  more  individualized  unemployment  assistance  system  in  1995  was  to
66encourage  work  among  other  persons  in  families  (often  wives)  where  one  member  is
unemployed.
(c) Severance  pay
Theoretical predictions.  There  are  both  potential  efficiency  gains  and  losses
associated  with  severance  pay  (see  Addison  and  Teixeira,  2001,  for  an  excellent,  recent
review  of  both  theoretical  and  empirical  effects).  Among  the  gains,  severance  pay  may
promote  longer-lasting  employment  relationship and  thus improve incentives  on the part  of
employer  to provide training,  thus increasing  the current  productivity of workers  as well  as
their future  employability  (employers  may be reluctant  to provide  training if the propensity
of workers to leave is high).  Moreover,  longer-lasting employment  is conducive to instilling
trust,  cooperation,  and loyalty between the employer and workers, as well  as to encouraging
team  spirit among workers, which may contribute to higher productive efficiency  and reduce
the resistance  of workers to the introduction of new technologies  (OECD,  1999).
Among the costs, severance pay is recognized as a source of labor market "sclerosis,"
that is, it reduces the intensity of labor market flows, particularly to and from unemployment.
As  Blanchard  (1998)  shows,  severance  pay  increases  firing  costs  and  thus  reduces  the
probability  of exit  from  employment  to  unemployment,  but  at the  same  time  it  imposes
additional  costs  on employers  and  thus  hinders job creation.  (Interestingly,  the  predicted
effects  of  severance  pay  on  unemployment  are  therefore  ambiguous.)  Calmfors  and
Holmlund (2000) also note that high firing costs slow down the pace of structural  change, by
reducing the  incentives  of employers  to  introduce  new technologies.  Moreover,  as  pointed
out when discussing distributive  effects, Blanchard's (1998)  model shows that severance  pay
contributes to labor market dualism.
Empirical evidence.  We  are  not aware  of direct  empirical  evidence  on the  positive
effects of severance pay on firm productivity  (based on firm-level  data).  Nickell and Layard
(1999)  find  a  positive  effect  of employment protection  on aggregate  growth,  but  the effect
disappears  once  differences  in the  level of productivity  among countries  are  controlled  for.
Moreover,  it is not clear which circumstances  and  interactions  may be instrumental  for such
effects. 15
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence  on the negative effects of severance
pay.  There  are  a number of studies which  show that strict  employment  protection reduces
employment.  One  of the  early  studies  is  Lazear  (1990),  which  finds  that  severance  pay
reduces  both employment  and labor force  participation.  Newer studies  confirming  the link
between  job  security  and  lower  employment  include  Haffner  et  al  (2001),  for  OECD
countries,  and Heckman  and Pages  (2000),  for OECD  and  Latin  American  countries.  The
15  A  stream  of literature  on  the  effects  of worker-management,  cooperation,  and  participatory  approaches  in
management  finds  mildly positive  effects  of these  features  on productivity  of firms,  but cannot pinpoint  the
exact ingredients  and their interactions  which contribute to the success.  Tyson and  Levine (1990)  do single out
measures to enhance  substantive participation as instrumental  for higher productivity - but it is unclear to what
extent employment  protection boosts such measures.
67latter  study  attributes  a  reduction  in  employment  of 5  percentage  points  to job  security
provisions  in  Latin  America.  OECD  (1999)  finds  insignificant  effects  on  overall
employment  rates,  but points  out  that negative  effects  are  concentrated  among  prime  age
women,  the  youth,  and  older  workers.  To  the  extent  severance  pay  increases  youth
unemployment,  this has additional negatives consequences  in terms of the persistence of their
unemployment and their reduced future earnings capacity (on new evidence on the long-term
effects  of youth  unemployment,  see  Mroz  and  Savage,  2000).  Studies  also  show  that
severance  pay contributes  to  part-time  employment  and  self-employment.  Consistent  with
the  theoretical  predictions,  the  effects  of  employment  protection  legislation  (of  which
severance  pay  is  one  of the  most  important  determinants)  on unemployment  are  largely
inconclusive.
There is also a mounting evidence that severance  pay reduces  inflows to and outflows
from unemployment.  By doing  so,  it  contributes  to  longer unemployment  spells  (stagnant
unemployment pool);  flows through employment  may not be affected that strongly (for a
recent  survey,  see  OECD,  1999).  Reduced  labor  market  flows  may  hinder  labor  force
adjustment  and the reallocation  of jobs, and may thereby  slow  down aggregate  productivity
growth  (see Davis  and Haltiwanger,  1999,  for a survey  of the effects  of job reallocation  on
aggregate  productivity growth).  But the question whether job security stands in the way of
productivity  and  growth  has hardly  been  settled  in advanced  economies.  Although  recent
studies show that efficiency  in these countries  depends  critically on the ability to reallocate
resources  rapidly,  Nickell  and  Layard  (1999)  argue  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  assume  a
simple  linear  relationship  between  the  pace of reallocation  and  economic  growth.1 6 To be
able to  evaluate  the desirability of worker  and job flows,  one should therefore examine  the
scope  and size of the contribution of worker and job flows to productivity and overall  growth
in  transition  and  developing  countries  - an  area  that  has  hardly  been  addressed  by
researchers.  In  all likelihood,  however,  individual  country characteristics  may well  dictate
different levels of labor reallocation;  for example, the reallocation  should undoubtedly figure
prominently in transition economies.
It is worth mentioning  that severance  pay does not create  a moral hazard  problem  by
lowering job search effort  - but  it does affect  incentives  to enter unemployment  and hence
creates  another moral  hazard problem.  Relatedly,  De Ferranti  et al  (2000)  report that  large
litigation costs arise from disputes over the cause of separation in Latin America.
(d) Unemployment  insurance saving accounts
Theoretical  predictions. The main rationale and key advantage of the UISA system as
an alternative  to the traditional  unemployment  insurance  system is its potential of improving
the  incentives  of employed  workers  and job seekers while  conceivably  providing  the  same
protection  as  traditional  unemployment  insurance.  As  shown  by several  theoretical  papers,
unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts  would  radically  change  workers'  incentives
16  For  example,  Abraham  and  Houseman  (1994)  find  that  despite  slower  employment  adjustment,  stricter
employment protection  legislation  in Europe leads to similar hours adjustment to the one in  United States.
68(Orszag and Snower,  1997;  Orszag et al,  1999).  By internalizing the costs of unemployment
benefits,  the  UISA  system  avoids  the  moral  hazard  inherent  in traditional  unemployment
insurance.  The  system  is thus  credited  with  a  potential  to  substantially  decrease  overall
unemployment  and,  by lowering  payroll  taxes,  increase  wages.  In particular,  Orszag  and
Snower  (1997)  show that unemployment  insurance  savings accounts  reduce  unemployment
by  both  increasing  on-the-job  effort  of employed  workers  as  well  as job-search  effort  of
unemployed workers.  Orszag  et al (1999)  also recommend  a comprehensive  vs. a piecemeal
approach  when  introducing  savings  accounts.  They  warn that  a potential  complementarity
problem  exists  if the  savings  account  is  not  set  up  for multiple  uses:  under  the traditional
unemployment  system,  workers  who  have  built  up  substantial  resources  in  their  pension
accounts  have  the  incentive  to  withdraw  from  the  labor  force  and  claim  unemployment
benefits until they retire.  Setting up an integratecl  savings account reduces such incentives.
One  important  caveat  about  the  feasibility  of  unemployment  insurance  savings
accounts  applies,  however.  Unemployment  insurance savings accounts eliminate  pooling of
resources  across  individuals  and,  instead,  rely  on  incomparably  more  restrictive  inter-
temporal  pooling  of resources  of one  individual  only.  This  raises  an important  feasibility
question:  if  a  significant  proportion  of  workers  cannot  save  enough  - via  modest
contributions  from  their  earnings  -during  their  productive  life  to  draw  upon  their
accumulated  savings  during their unemployment  spells,  then such  a system  is non-viable.  In
other words, if unemployment  is concentrated among a group of workers, these workers may
not be able to finance their unemployment benefits through their own savings (and there may
be  a  large  group  of  workers  who  would  never  use  their  savings  accounts  to  draw
unemployment benefits).  Under such circumstances,  the UISA system would be irrelevant as
an alternative to the traditional unemployment insurance  system.
Empirical evidence.  Unemployment  insurance  savings accounts  are  still  largely  an
"uncharted territory."  Much less empirical  evidence  exists about this system than about other
systems of income support,  and  - apart from  Kugler's  (2000)  evaluation  of the Colombian
program  - there  has  been  no  rigorous  analysis  of existing  UISA  programs.  It  is  thus
premature to give a reliable evaluation of this system.
In  the  first  study  providing  empirical  evidence  on  the  effects  of  unemployment
insurance savings accounts (UISA), Kugler (2000) examines the effects of a 1990 conversion
of the  severance  pay program  into  an  unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts  program
(similar to the one described  above) in Colombia.  She finds that the lion's share of the costs
of the transfer that firrns make to individual workers'  accounts  (75-87 percent)  show up as a
reduction  of wages;  that implies that the likely effects  of the new program on the reduction
of labor  demand  and  employment  are  small.  She  also  finds  that,  in  accordance  with  the
theoretical  predictions,  the  conversion  increased  both  firing  and  hiring  by  firms,  in
comparison  with  the previous  system of severance  pay.  Her  work, however,  does not shed
light on the  interesting  question  of the effects  of UISAs  on the  reemployment  probability,
that is,  whether  or not the  system  improves job search  incentives.  There  has been  no other
rigorous empirical  work  about the effects of real world UISA-like  systems - although  some
69researchers  report problems with the Brazilian  FGTS system (see box 4.2).  More research as
well as piloting is needed to learn whether problems of the Brazilian program can be avoided.
Box 4.2:  Incentive problems with Brazilian individualized  severance  funds
Because  of  difficulties  in  monitoring  the  eligibility  conditions  under  the  traditional  unemployment
insurance, in  1966 Brazil  introduced  a variant of unemployment  insurance  savings accounts  called FGTS.
Eight  percent  of wages  is deposited  into  an  individual  account.  If dismissed,  the  worker  receives  the
resources accumulated  in  the account;  if the dismissal is  without a cause, the employer must pay an additional
40 percent of the balance.
While  the  program  avoids  the  problem  of disincentives  in job  search  found  under  unemployment
insurance,  it creates incentive and other problems  of its own.  First, the system creates  perverse incentives
on the part of the worker to precipitate  a firing so as to be able to access the funds in the savings account.
It  is estimated  that the system increases  the  labor  tunover rates  by 30  percent.  Second,  it also creates
additional  litigation costs incurred  in deciding whether or not the cause for dismissal is  "just."
Source:  Gill et al (2000).
In the absence of suitable real world practices,  Feldstein and Altman (1998) simulate
the working  of an UISA system  for the U.S.,  so  as to be  able  to draw inferences  about  the
feasibility  of the  system.  In their  simulations,  the protection  provided  by  unemployment
benefits  is the sarne  as under the current  system,  but  it is financed  through  unemployment
insurance  savings accounts, to which individuals are required to contribute  4 percent  of their
wages.  Their  simulations  show  that  over  a  25  year  period,  only  a  small  proportion  of
workers  (5-7  percent)  end  their  working  life  with negative  balances  (these  estimates  are
conservative  in  the  sense that  they  do  not account  for  behavioral  responses  to  changes  in
incentives),  and that the cost to taxpayers is reduced  by more than  60 percent.  Feldstein  and
Altman  thus  conclude  that  the  UISA  system  is  a  viable  alternative  to  the  standard
unemployment  insurance system.  Of course, their conclusion is valid for the U.S.  economy.
Since  in  other  countries  the  probabilities  of entry  into  and  exit from  unemployment  differ
substantially  from  those  of the  U.S.,  the  conclusion  of the  viability  of the  UISA  system
cannot be extrapolated  to other countries, particularly not to developing ones.
(e) Public works
By providing job opportunities,  although  in  somewhat  artificial  environment,  public
works programs  address equity  considerations  - but what are their efficiency  consequences?
For example, how helpful are they in increasing the probability of the unemployed to obtain a
regular job and how they affect participants'  reemployment wages?
Evaluations  show  that  public  works  mildly  reduce  unemployment  and  increase
employment.  But they  have  strong substitution  effects  (which can  reach  100 percent),  and
reduce the probability of employment in non-assisted jobs and reemployment  wages (see,  for
70example,  Dar and Tzannatos,  1999, or Calmfors,  1994).  Fretwell et al (1998) find that public
works  participants  in the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland  have  no  different  or even
worse  chances  of  finding  a job,  and  that  their  wages  in  jobs  following  public  works
participation  are likely to be no different  or lower than the  wages of non-participants.  They
argue that public works thus proved to be mostly a way to provide  income to the needy  and
are less suitable as a vehicle of increasing the employability of the unemployed.
The effects, however, may depend strongly  on country-specific  circumstances  and the
design of the program.  For example,  by shifting the focus from manual  to skilled work, the
Slovenian  public  works  program  succeeded  in  attracting  more  educated  and  younger
individuals  than did such  programs  in other transition  economies  (Vodopivec,  1999).  This
may  be  the  reason  that  the  program  increased  the  chances  of obtaining  a  regular  job
immediately  upon  leaving  the  program  (due to  stigmatization,  the  longer-term  effects  are
found to be negative).  The study also finds that the positive effects  on job finding probability
are  concentrated  anong  younger  workers,  and  that  public  works  reduce  the  exit  rate  to
inactivity.
Public  works  can  also  be  expensive.  For example,  Betcherman  et  al  (2000)  report
annual  cost  per  participant  ranging  from  $786  in  Madagascar  to  $5,445  in  Senegal.
Moreover,  Maloney  (2000)  reports  that  it  takes  typically  $3  or  more  to  generate  $1 of
additional  income for the poor.
(f) Evaluation of efficiency  effects  of other programs
Let  us  also  present  summary  evaluations  of three  other  programs  which  are  -
primarily in developed economies - used to address unemployment problems.
Social assistance.  As  argued  by  Atkinson  (1995),  high  rates  of withdrawal  of a
targeted  transfer may  create a poverty  trap.  He  quotes  a study  by Burtless  (1990)  showing
that  means-tested  transfers  have  a  statistically  significant,  but  small,  effect  on  the  labor
supply of low-income men and women with children.  Although assessments vary, incentives
may be better structured  under decentralized  administration and financing of these programs,
which facilitates flexibility in the formulation and implementation  of appropriate solutions to
local  and  individual  problems.  Moreover,  the  integration  of social  assistance  with  active
labor  market  programs  in  Nordic  states  has  been  attributed  to  local  governments  being
responsible  for  the  financing  of these  programs.  In  order  to  strengthen  incentives,  the
national  government  may  resort  to  dispensing  subsidies  for  the  enforcement  of  labor
requirements  and employment promotion.
Early retirement.  Compared  to the  1970s and  1980s,  the prevalence of public  early
retirement  programs has fallen drastically, as they proved financially very costly and did not
free  up jobs  for  younger  workers  as  envisioned.  As  mentioned  in  Chapter  3,  instead  of
encouraging  exit  to  employment  as  a  means  to  address  unemployment,  early  retirement
programs  seek to promote exit to inactivity or to pre-empt the occurrence of unemployment
by encouraging exit from employment to inactivity.  Gruber and Wise (1998)  report findings
71which confirm the  success of these programs with respect to this  objective.  They state that
the structure  of incentives  and disincentives  created by early retirement  programs  in Europe
strongly  encourage  the early  exit of older workers  from the  labor force.  This association  is
supported by a number of studies conducted  in recent years on the effect of social security on
early retirement in OECD countries.
But this apparent  success of early retirement  programs has  to be  qualified  in several
ways.  First, the withdrawal  of older workers brings significant efficiency  losses.  Gruber and
Wise  (1998)  show  that  the  foregone  productive  capacity  of older  workers  due  to  early
withdrawal  from the labor force was sizeable,  ranging  from 22 percent in Japan to 67 percent
in Belgium for those between  55 and 65 years of age.  Second,  the programs failed to achieve
their  goal  of stimulating  youth  employment  - Boldrin  et  al  (1999)  report  that  the  early
retirement  of  older  workers  has  not  induced  a  lower  unemployment  rate  among  young
workers in Europe.  This is not surprising:  if younger workers are complements for - and not
substitutes of - older workers,  early retirement  programs may even have a negative effect on
the  employment  of young  workers.  And  third,  overall  evaluations  of early  retirement
programs  have  to  account  for  complex  general  equilibrium  effects.  For  example,  the
additional financial burden of supporting the pensions of early retirees may well contribute to
an increase  in  social  security  contribution  rates  (higher tax  on eamings),  thereby  adding  to
labor  costs.  This  may,  via  reduced  labor  demand,  contribute  to  a  higher  equilibrium
unemployment. ' 7
Work-sharing.  How valid is  a popular belief that if each worker works shorter hours,
more  workers  will  be  employed?  Obviously,  the  increase  of employment  is  not the  only
possible  outcome:  if, for example,  shorter hours  put upward  pressure  on wages,  employers
may  substitute  labor  with  other  inputs,  and they  may  also  be  forced  to reduce  output.  A
recent  evaluation  of hQurs  reduction  in  Germany  in  the  1980s  raises  some  doubts  about
employment  enhancement  effects (Hunt,  1996).  In response to a one hour reduction of hours
worked, employment  did increase,  but very little  (by 0.3-0.7 percent for hourly workers  and
by 0.2-0.3  percent  for  salary  workers),  and the  wage  bill  rose.  But  total  hours  worked  fell
sharply, which possibly led to output losses.
(g) Summary of efficiency  effects
The  main  findings  about  efficiency  effects  of  income  support  programs  are
summarized in table 4.6.  As  evident from the table,  it seems that a consensus is emerging  in
some areas, but in others researchers  are still far from agreement.
As for unemployment  insurance,  its efficiency score  card is heavier on the negative
than  on the positive  side.  There is mounting evidence  that the generosity  of unemployment
insurance  reduces  the probability of exit from unemployment to employment,  a result that is
fairly  robust  across  countries  and  labor  market  regimes.  Another  significant  agreement  is
that unemployment insurance  increases the equilibrium unemployment  rate  (the transmission
17  The  view  that  increased  labor  costs  contribute  to  unemployment  and  slowdown  in  economic  growth  has
received strong endorsement  in a recent  work by Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
72channels  being  job  search  intensity,  wage  bargaining,  and  possibly  labor  taxation).  By
interacting with adverse  shocks, benefits also  contribute to the persistence of unemployment
(the argument  that has recently been offered to explain the rise of European  unemployment).
Moreover,  while  benefits  make  restructuring  more  attractive  - and  increase  temporary
layoffs,  general  equilibrium  analyses  show  that  overall  adjustment  is not  assisted,  because
job  creation  is  hindered.  On  the  positive  side,  there  is  agreement  that  unemployment
insurance  is  effective  as an  automatic  macroeconomic  stabilizer.  There  are  also  important
areas  of  disagreement:  the  evidence  is  inconclusive  on  the  effects  of benefits  on  post-
unemployment  wages  and thus on the quality of job matches; whether benefits enhance entry
into regular jobs; and whether they contribute to higher output and growth.
There  is  a remarkable  agreement  that  severance  pay reduces  employment  rates,  as
well as that it reduces inflows to and outflows from unemployment.  While  the first effect is
clearly negative,  various  interpretations  exist on the efficiency  effects of the latter.  Under
some circumstances,  however, the likely efficiency  effects of reduced dynamics are negative:
transition  economies  are a  case in point.  No evidence,  however,  exists about the  effects of
severance  pay  on job matches  and  on  employrnent  in regular jobs  as opposed  to  informal
ones.
As for other income support programs examined  above, there  is little evidence on the
effects of unemployment  assistance  as a self-standing program.  The most significant gap in
understanding  of the working  of income  support  systems, however,  relates to the  effects of
unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts.  Because  only  few  such  programs  exist,  and
because  most of them have only recently been introduced,  such  a gap  is understandable  - but
addressing this gap should figure prominently on the research agenda in the near future.
The above review  shows that different  income support programs for the  unemployed
produce  quite  different  efficiency  effects.  Nonetheless,  there  is a common  thread through
these results:  none of the programs seem to be without negative  effects on efficiency.  This
is just another  confirmation  that  income  security  does  come  - and  can  only come  - with
significant  costs  to the  economy.  The  challenge  is, of course, to  choose  programs  which
minimize the negative  effects while  providing adequate  income  security  to the unemployed.
We tackle this challenge in chapter 6.
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Job-search effort  Equilibrium labor  Enhancing  Labor supply of  Encouragement  Output and
and post-  market outcomes  restructuring  of  other family  of taking  growth
unemployment  and persistence  of  enterprises and  members  regular vs.
wages  unemployment  overall  informal jobs
_________________  __________________  adjustm  ent  _
Unemployment  *  Significant  *  A benefit  *  Attractiveness  of  Reduces labor  *  Inconclusive  *  By acting as insurance  disincentives  for  increase  in increases  restructuring  supply of  the  evidence on entry  automatic leaving  the equilibrium  increases;  in  U.S.,  spouses of  into precarious  macroeconomic unemployment  unemployment  rate.  strong evidence on  unemployed  jobs.  stabilizer,  Ul (moral hazard  *  For some groups  increase of  workers.  *  In  Brazil, Ul  reduces  GDP problem).  positive effect on  temporary  layoffs  payments  increase  losses during Inconclusive  labor force  (partial equilibrium  probability to  downturns by 10- evidence on  the  participation,  but  results).  enter self-  15  percent. improvement of  reductions  in  *  Because job  employment.  . Theoretical job matching (via  inactivity  primarily  creation is hindered,  predictions  about post-  show up as increases  overall  adjustment  the effects on unemployment  in unemployment.  not assisted  output wages).  *  Benefits slow  (Blanchard,  1997).  inconclusive.
down adjustment  to  *  The effects on
shocks - make  growth




Unemployment  Significant  Similar,  but  milder  Similar,  but  milder  Strong  disincentive  Similar  effects  as  Similar,  but  milder assistance  disincentives  for  effects  as  under  effects  as  under  for  other  family  under  effects  as  under leaving  unemployment  unemployment  members  to  taking  unemployment  unemployment unemployment,  insurance.  insurance,  a job.  insurance,  insurance.
particularly  for
low-wage earners.
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Job-search effort  Equilibrium labor  Enhancing  Labor supply  of  Encouragement  Output and
and post-  market outcomes  restructuring of  other family  of taking  growth
unemployment  and persistence  of  enterprises and  members  regular vs.
wages  unemployment  overall  informal jobs
adjustment
Severance  pay  No moral hazard  . Strongly reduces  Negative effects on  No evidence.  No evidence.  The effects on problem with job-  employment,  labor reallocation - growth not well
search effort,  but  particularly  of  economy's  researched.
incentives  to enter  young workers.  "sclerosis"
unemployment  Increases  increased:  inflows
increased.  (Large  participation in self-  into unemployment
litigation costs from  employment.  reduced, but so is
disputes over the  e  Effects on  job creation.
cause of separation.  unemployment
)  inconclusive.
Unemployment  No moral hazard  In comparison to  Conversion of  No evidence.  No evidence.  No evidence. insurance  problem (theoretical  unemployment  severance pay into
savings  prediction).  insurance,  the  UISA increased
accounts  reduction of  both firing and
(UISA)  unemployment  hiring by firms (theoretical  (Columbia).
prediction)
Public works  If wages kept  Mildly reduce  Negligible effects.  Negligible  effects.  In transition  Negligible  effects. sufficiently low,  unemployment and  economies,
little effects on job-  increase  participants are
search efforts.  employment.  stigmatized -
more  likely  to
take iniforinal jobs
or leave labor
force  after the
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*Source: Derived from the discussion of efficiency effects in the text;  findings for which empirical  support is provided  are printed in bold.
754.3 Suitability to confront different shocks
When  countries  are  affected  by adverse  shocks, do  they adjust their  income support
programs  for  the  unemployed  and/or  introduce  new  ones?  How  suitable  are  different
programs  to  deal  with  different  types  of shocks?  Are  income  support  programs  for the
unemployed counter-cyclical,  that is, do they get increased funding when an economy suffers
from a recession and needs income support programs  the most?  Moreover,  what happens to
marginal  groups  during  a  crisis?  Below  we  examine  these  issues  by  summarizing  the
experiences  of different  regions  in  dealing  with  crises,  focusing  on  the  ability  of various
programs  to  confront  shocks.  Specifically,  we  review  the  responses  of three  groups  of
countries  to  their  respective  "shock"  experiences,  namely,  the  economic  system
transformation  in European  transition  countries,  the  financial  crisis  in  East Asia,  and  high
macroeconomic  instability in Latin America.
(a) European transition countries
In  the  early  1990s,  reforms  in  transition  countries  drastically  reduced  output  and
severely  affected  employment.  Output  decline  was  predominately  related  to  supply  side
shocks  and  structural  imbalances  which  have  accumulated  for  decades  under the  socialist
regime (Holzmann  et al,  1995).  The cumulative  GDP decline was  about 25-35  percent  for
Central and Eastern European countries and about 40-50 percent for the Baltic Republics (see
figure  4.1).  Reductions  of output  invariably  reduced  employment  and  increased  both  the
number  of unemployed  and  inactive  individuals.  Due  to  the low  probability  of exit  from
unemployment,  long-term unemployment also became a serious problem.
Figure 4.1: Evolution of GDP, European transition economies,  1989-99
(1989 = 100)
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The responses  of countries to the emergence of large-scale unemployment  varied.  To
reduce  inflows  into  unemployment,  some  countries  relied  on  employment  protection
(including  severance  pay)  and  job  preservation  subsidies.  In  addition,  Poland,  Hungary,
76Slovakia,  and Slovenia  devoted  considerable  resources  towards  promoting  early  retirement
(for example,  in  1992 the  expenditures  on early  retirement  in Poland reached  0.8 percent of
GDP - Vodopivec  et al, 2001).  Moreover, to assist the unemployed,  all countries  introduced
new labor  market programs,  both  income  support programs  as well  as  active  labor market
programs.
In  overhauling their cash benefit  systems,  European transition countries  followed the
blueprints  of  the  EU  welfare  states.  Most  importantly,  they  added  two  new  systems:
unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance  to their  existing  systems  of severance  pay,
family  benefits  and  pensions.  In  most  countries,  overall  expenditures  on  unemployment
benefits  were  below  one percent  of GDP;  in a few countries,  however,  they  exceeded  that
level (Hungary, Poland, and  Slovenia).
In addition,  all transition countries employed  active labor market programs,  including
training,  youth  measures,  employment  subsidies,  public  works,  and  support  for  self-
employment.  With  the exception of Hungary  and  Slovenia, the  level  of active  support  was
much lower than in OECD countries (in most countries, it was between 0.15 and 0.30 percent
of  GDP).  Hungary  spent  considerable  resources  on  training,  and  Slovenia  on  job
preservation subsidies (a record 0.8 percent of GDP in 1992).
In evaluating  income support  programs for the unemployed  in transition  economies,
Vodopivec  et  al  (2001)  note  that  due  to  fiscal  pressures  (and  perhaps  also  to  improve
incentives), the initial  generosity of unemployment  insurance systems had to be scaled down
- in  comparison  to  the  early  1990s,  several  countries  reduced  both replacement  rates  and
maximum  potential  entitlement  durations  of benefits.  They  also  point  out  significant
implementation  problems of these programs.  Scarpetta and Reutersward  (1994) also observe
that  the  real  value  of  unemployment  benefits  was  reduced  by  imperfect  indexation.
Vodopivec et al (2001) also note that while they were  effective in promoting early  exit from
the workforce,  early retirement programs  proved  fiscally  expensive  and did not increase  the
employment  chances  of young workers.  To  increase  the likelihood  of receiving  severance
pay,  some  transition  countries  also  introduced  public  guarantee  funds  (for  example,
Slovenia).  As  noted  earlier,  Fretwell  et  al  (1998)  assess  that  public  works  in  transition
economies  proved  mostly to  be a way of  providing income  to the needy than a vehicle  for
increasing the employability of the unemployed.
(b) Latin America and the Caribbean
Despite  efforts  to  strengthen  macroeconomic  stability,  many  Latin  American
countries continue to be characterized  by a high level of macroeconomic volatility (see figure
4.2).  This  environment  has  proven  to  be  quite  unfavorable  to  the  performance  of labor
markets,  with  unemployment  sometimes  persisting  at  high  levels  even  during  periods  of
economic expansion.
Under  such  circumstances,  providing  income  security  through  severance  pay  and
relying on the state to absorb  labor surpluses  - the dominant income  support mechanisms  in
77the past - have become untenable,  particularly as they served the needs of only a small subset
of the  labor  force.  Consequently,  additional  income  support  mechanisms  including  labor-
intensive  public  works  (for  example,  Argentina's  Trabajar  program),  short-term  training
programs  targeted  at  the  unemployed  (for  example,  Mexico's  Probecat  program),  wage
subsidies  for private  sector employment,  and credit for micro-enterprises were introduced.
Figure 4.2:  Annual GDP growth rate of selected  Latin American countries (1990-2000)
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In  comparison  to  OECD  countries,  Latin  American  countries  spend  much  less  on
labor market programs.  For example, in the mid-1990s,  OECD countries spent an average of
0.38  percent  of GDP  on  training  compared  to  an  average  of only  0.19  percent  in  Latin
America  (Argentina,  Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica,  Mexico, and Peru) (Marquez,  1999).
Similarly  OECD  countries  spent  0.34  percent  of  GDP  on  public  works  and  subsidized
employment compared  to 0.22  percent in Latin America.  Because  Latin American countries
spent  very little  on unemployment  insurance  programs,  the  difference  in  total expenditures
on labor market programs is even  greater (OECD countries  spent  on average  2.4 percent of
GDP, while Latin America, 0.46 percent).
Despite  the  limited  number  of options  used,  there  was  wide  heterogeneity  in  the
response to volatility and crises as well as in the character of programs  across countries.  For
example,  when  youth  unemployment  was  considered  a critical  problem,  training  programs
were  introduced  in  combination  with  scholarships,  job  search  assistance,  and  practical
training  opportunities.  Although  training  was financed  by  the  government  in  most  cases,
delivery varied from the traditional public training institutions to private entities and NGOs.
Many of the emergency programs were reintroduced or strengthened  during the crises
(such as the Tequila  shock of 1995), and the virulence of the shock contributed  to hastening
the  development  and  deployment  of an  assortment  of programs,  often  at the  expense  of
78judicious  planning  and  preparation.  This  resulted  in  programs  being  poorly  designed  and
incompatible  with each  other.  In addition,  contrary  to the  stated intent to assist  workers  in
the  most  precarious  positions,  many  of the  emergency  programs  failed  to  reach  them
(Marquez,  1999).  De  Ferrenti  et  al  (2000)  report  evidence  for  selected  income  support
programs  for the unemployed  which  show that with  the exception  of the  Probecat training
program  in  Mexico  and  the  Trabajar  public  works  program  in  Argentina,  program
beneficiaries  tend  to  come  from  the  top  three  income  quintiles.  Furthermore,  although
potential  coverage  rates  are  somewhat  higher,  actual  labor  force  coverage  rates  for  these
programs  tend to  be extremely  low (for example,  11.8  percent  for Brazil's  unemployment
insurance  program  and  3.6  percent  for  Peru's  mandatory  severance  pay program).  In the
1  990s,  several  Latin  American  countries  also  introduced  a  relatively  new  program  -
unemployment insurance savings accounts (see above).
There  is  also  evidence  that  fiscal  pressures  associated  with  recessions  reduced  the
capacity of governments to finance  social spending.  For example, with a decline in output by
5.3 percent  in  1995, targeted  spending per poor person  fell  by 28  percent  in Argentina,  and
the poverty rate increased  by 5 percentage  points (Wodon,  2000).  But it is interesting to note
that  the  only  class  of programs  with  a  counter-cyclical  pattern  of spending  were  income
security programs such as old-age pensions,  unemployment  insurance,  and family  assistance
(de Ferranti et al, 2000).
(c) East Asia
The  precipitous  decline  in  economic  growth  rates  during  the  recent  East  Asian
financial  crisis (see  figure  4.3  ) increased  unemployment  and  reduced wages;  interestingly,
while in some countries  employment decreased,  in Indonesia and the Philippines  it increased
(the  so-called  added  worker  effect).  In  the  worst  affected  countries  of  South  Korea,
Thailand,  and Indonesia,  the unemployment  pool increased by the order of a million workers
in each country.  Between  1997 and  1998, the unemployment rate more than doubled  in both
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79while Indonesia  and the  Philippines  showed  small increases.  In  1998,  real  wages fell  in  all
countries,  with  Indonesia  experiencing  a  staggering  37.8  percent  decline  from  the  year
before.
Figure 4.3:  Annual GDP growth rate of selected  East Asian  countries (1995-2000)
Before  the  crisis,  East  Asian  countries  did  not  possess  much  in  terms  of income
support  programs  for  the  unemployed  ex  ante  - the  high  economic  growth  environment
during the  1980s and early  1990s acted  as  an effective emollient  for many of the ails of the
labor market.  Apart  from  South  Korea  which  instituted  public  mandatory  unemployment
insurance  for firms  employing  more than  30  workers  in  1995,  and  Thailand,  where private
pension  schemes (Provident Funds) were sometimes  used to provide unemployment benefits,
workers  did  not  have  access  to  unemployment  insurance.  Furthermore,  labor-intensive
public works programs  had been  phased out in all the countries,  Indonesia  being the last in
1994.  The only longstanding program  available  for workers  was  legislated  severance  pay,
with coverage limited to the formal sector (Edwards  and Manning, 2000).
The  response  to  the  crisis  was  similar  across  the worst-hit  countries;  both  income
maintenance  and employment generation  programs were deployed  (Betcherman  et al, 2000).
Most  countries  adopted  large-scale,  labor-intensive  public  works  programs  as  emergency
measures.  Other programs were  also introduced; for example, Indonesia provided subsidized
credit to small-scale  firms and cooperatives;  South Korea introduced wage subsidies  to assist
firms  in  dire  circumstances;  Indonesia,  South  Korea,  and  Thailand  all  created  programs  to
promote self-employment.
Some changes  were made  in job security  legislation  to  help displaced  workers.  In
both South Korea and Malaysia,  laws  were  amended to entitle workers  who quit voluntarily
to  severance  pay.  In  Thailand,  separation  payments  were  made  more  available  with
emergency  funds  set  up  for  workers  of  insolvent  firms.  In  the  same  spirit,  public
unemployment  insurance  was  extended  in  South  Korea  to cover  smaller  firms,  but  since
contributory requirements  were left unchanged,  the effect was minor.  Only about 10 percent
of unemployed  workers  received  unemployment  insurance  compensation  during the  crisis.
An  interesting  program  where  workers  were  able  to  borrow  funds  conditional  on  their
previous  payments  of  social  security  contributions  was  introduced  in  the  Philippines
(Emergency Loan Facility For Displaced Workers).  This program has a striking resemblance
to unemployment insurance savings accounts systems in  some Latin American countries.
Although  evidence on  the  performance  of various  income  support programs  for the
unemployed  during the crisis is lacking, the limited evidence suggests that program coverage
rates were often very low, leaving large  numbers of displaced workers  and their households
to  fend  for  themselves.  Furthermore,  the  effectiveness  of public  works  programs  was
impaired by poor design and implementation,  resulting in poor targeting of benefits (leakage
of benefits  to  the  non-poor),  and  low  female  participation  rates  (Horton  and  Mazumdar,
2001).
80Summary of the responses.  Although the nature of the crisis differed, the response in terms
of income support programs to the unemployed  by the three  groups of countries were similar
- they  introduced  active labor market programs:  public works, training programs targeted  at
the unemployed,  wage subsidies for private sector employment,  and programs to  assist self-
employment.  But in contrast  to the other  two groups of countries,  transition countries  also
introduced new cash benefit systems, chief among them, unemployment  insurance and social
assistance.  This difference  can  be  attributed  to  a more  acute  contraction  in the  output  of
transition countries  as well  as to the dearth of informal risk management  mechanisms  at the
outset  of the  transition.  The  above  evidence  also  shows  that  crises  function  as  a  strong
promoter  of  institutional  innovations  - but  also  that  there  are  advantages  of  having
institutional support ready before a crisis hits.
The above  review  also allows the following tentative  evaluation of different  income
support programs with respect to their suitability in dealing with different types of shocks:
*  Unemployment insurance/assistance.  The  experience  of transition  countries  shows
that a massive increase of unemployment and the resulting  increase of unemployment
insurance  expenditures  can  result  in  the  scaling  back  of the  generosity  of benefits.
While  unemployment  insurance  can  effectively  insure  against  individual
(idiosyncratic)  shocks, it may not be equally effective against large  structural shocks
(partly because of its vulnerability  to political risk - see below).
*  Severance pay.  Effective  in  smoothing  consumption  regardless of the nature  of the
shock, but it may require a public guarantee fund/pre-funding  arrangement  to enhance
availability.
*  Unemployment  insurance savings accounts.  This  system  require  a  relatively  well
functioning  financial sector (saving instruments,  regulations,  supervision);  it is more
suitable  for  frequent  but  modest  risks  (this  evaluation  is  based  on  the  theoretical
insights of Gill and Ilahi, 2000, presented in Chapter 2, who show that self-insurance
through  savings  is more  appropriate  for smoothing  consumption under  frequent  and
moderate  risks  but not  very  good  for persistent  shocks,  an observation  particularly
relevant for unemployment insurance savings accounts).
*  Public works.  Large-scale,  labor-intensive  public works  programs proved  to be the
popular  emergency  measure,  providing  both  income  support  and  employment
generation.  But  evidence  shows  no  or  negative  effects  on  the  employability  of
participants.  Moreover,  funding  per  poor  person  declined  during  crises,  showing
vulnerability to covariant shocks.
*  Early retirement  programs. Effective in dealing  with sector/branch  risk (meso-level)
- but they entail high efficiency  and equity costs.
Based  on  the  above  evidence  as  well  as  postulating  the  properties  of individual
programs  from  their  functioning,  a  preliminary  assessment  of  various  income  support
programs is presented in table 4.7.
81Table 4.7: Suitability to confront various shocks of income support programs
for the unemployed
Suitability  Remarks
Unemployment  Effectively  insures against  idiosyncratic,  A massive increase of
insurance  sectoral, and regional shocks,  less effective  unemployment can result in the
against large covariant shocks (experience  of scaling back of the generosity of
transition economies).  benefits.
Unemployment  Similar as unemployment insurance.
assistance
Severance  pay  Suitable for all types.  May require public guarantee
fund/pre-funding arrangement.
Unemployment  More suitable for frequent but modest risks  Requires appropriate financial
insurance savings  sector (instruments,  regulations,
accounts  supervision).
Public works  Suitable for idiosyncratic, catastrophic  More effective if strong self-
shocks. Vulnerable to covariant  shocks.  selection;  may have a "low bang
for a buck."
Source: Derived  from the discussion  of the suitability of various  programs to different types of shocks in the
text.
4.4 Resistance  to political  risk (political economy  considerations)
By  design  or  by  default,  income  support  programs  typically  involve  income
redistribution.  To  bring  about  this  redistribution  and  to pay out  benefits  as  stipulated  by
program rules, unpopular measures - such as increasing contribution rates - may be
necessary.  Moreover,  some of these programs may be particularly prone to pressures seeking
to increase the generosity of benefits and/or to expand coverage.  Similarly,  once introduced,
these  programs  develop  their  own  constituencies,  making  reforms  or  their  dismantlement
difficult.  Below we  elaborate  on these  issues,  distinguishing  the following  three aspects of
political  risk:  the  ability  of the  program  to  maintain  benefit  levels  during  downturns;  its
susceptibility  to pressures seeking to increase benefit generosity;  and its tolerance to reforms
which attempt to reduce  benefit generosity.
Protection of benefit levels during downturns.  Being  largely  financed on  a  pay-as-
you-go  basis,  unemployment  insurance  programs  create  significant  unfunded  liabilities,
which make payments of program  benefit uncertain - i t may not be possible  to raise payroll
contribution  rates  and/or obtain budgetary  support necessary  to provide  benefits  at levels as
promised by the program, especially  during economic downturns.  For example, in transition
countries  in the  1990s,  a  substantial  decline  in  payroll  tax  revenues  together  with a  sharp
increase  in  the  number  of unemployment  benefit  recipients  resulted  in  the  reduction  of
82benefit  levels  of  unemployment  insurance  programs  (statutory  replacement  rates  were
reduced  and benefits  were  imperfectly  adjusted  to inflation  - see Vodopivec  et  al, 2001)."8
In  principle,  programs  which  require  pre-funding  of  liabilities  can  reduce  this  kind  of
political risk - and as the analysis of Smetters  (2000) shows, the political risk under publicly
managed funds is higher than the one under privately managed funds (see box 4.3).
Box 4.3: Should assets  be held by the government or on private accounts?
Assets  accumulated  under  insurance  programs  can  be managed  either  by the  government,  as  in  public
insurance programs,  or in private accounts,  as under  individual  retirement  accounts  or the UISA system.
What  is the  likelihood  that  mismanagement  or  high  administrative  costs  will  eventually  lead  to  the
reduction of benefits under the two options?  For the  U.S., Smetters  (2000)  concludes that  political risks
under  public  management  are  higher  than  under  a  private  one.  He  bases  his  conclusion  on  the
examination of explicit risks arising from the following: the use of accumulated  funds for other purposes,
investment  decisions  and  restrictions;  conflict  of interest;  reduced  redistribution;  failure  to  set  aside
enough money;  and high administrative costs.
Such a conclusion can  be extrapolated  to many  developing  countries - those which  have the capacity  to
effectively  regulate and supervise the financial  institutions that will manage these funds.  As shown by the
World  Bank  (1994),  publicly  managed  funds  (particularly  those  in  developing  countries)  have  lower
retums  than privately managed  funds.  Iglesias  and Palacios  (2000)  also find that public funds are  often
channeled  to politically-favored  projects.  In countries  with  high prevalence  of corruption,  the likelihood
of the use  of accumulated  funds  for other purposes,  if held publicly,  is particularly  high.  Moreover,  the
use  of individual  accounts  also  reduces  the danger  that  the  level  of benefits  is  increased,  and/or  new
beneficiaries are added to the program.
Susceptibility to pressures to increase benefit generosity.  As a largely pay-as-you-go
program,  unemployment  insurance  is highly  non-transparent  and  as such,  subject to  a high
degree  of political  interference  (for  example,  to  increase/maintain  benefits  for  selected
groups, or to expand program coverage).  The experience of transition countries supports this
conclusion (for example, many countries maintained generous benefits for older workers near
retirement,  while the generosity  of benefits  for others  was reduced).  Holmlund (1998)  also
shows  that  higher  union  coverage  leads  to  higher  replacement  rates.  This  hypothesis  is
confirmed  empirically  for OECD countries  (note that this  is consistent  with the  analysis  of
the incidence of unemployment  benefit programs in Chapter  3,  where the presence  of trade
unions  is found to  facilitate the  introduction of these programs).  At the  other extreme,  the
most resistant to political  interference  is  the UISA system,  where  the link between benefits
and  contributions  is most direct.  The  system  also  allows self-policing,  that is, workers  can
monitor their own accounts.
18  This has even been the case also with pension benefits in the advanced OECD countries,  where these benefits
have been systematically  cut since the 1980s (see Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt,  1999).
83Tolerance to  reforms which reduce benefit generosity.  Evidence  shows  that  once
instituted, income support programs for the unemployed are difficult to reform.  For example,
Peru attempted  to  reduce the  amount of severance  pay  in  1996, but ended  up increasing  its
generosity after a popular backlash (Maclsaac and Rama, 2000).  Similarly, France attempted
to reduce pension  benefits for its privileged public service employees  at the end of 1996, but
mass protests prevented it from doing so.
Several  arguments  have  been  furnished  to  explain  why  introducing  labor  market
reforms may be politically  difficult.  First, Meltzer and Richard (1983)  analyze redistribution
via government  programs using  a  median voter model  and argue  that that reforms  that put
middle  class  at  disadvantage  may  be difficult  to implement,  and that government  programs
are likely to  favor the  middle class,  thus failing to reach the very poor (on the evidence,  see
Lal  1994).  Second,  Lindbeck  (1995)  argues that  the  combination  of specific  benefits  and
general  taxes  creates  pressures  for  increased  social  security  spending  which  also makes  it
hard  to curb  this  spending  when needed.  The  perception  that  social  security  constitutes  a
"'social  contract"  between  the  government  and  its  citizenry  makes it even  more  difficult  to
scale benefits back.  Third,  in a similar vein, Hussler  et al (1999)  argue that social insurance
institutions  are  naturally  persistent.  They  offer  an  example  of highly  specialized  workers,
who prefer more generous benefits  so as to be able to pursue more selective search  strategies
- and in turn, more generous benefits reinforce higher specialization.  Fourth, Elmeskov et al
(1998)  apply the  insider-outsider  argument  to  contend  that employed  workers  oppose  labor
market  reforms  which  would  reduce  labor  market  rigidities,  as  they  themselves  are
unaffected by these  rigidities and fear that the reformns  would  reduce their bargaining  power
in wage negotiations.  Fifth, Elmeskov et al (1998) also point to equity concerns as inhibiting
reforms,  given the  widely held  opinion of a trade-off between  efficiency  and equity.  Sixth,
Buti et al  (1999)  argue that reforms may be opposed if benefits are uncertain  and remote, and
the  costs  are  felt  immediately.  Under such  circumstances,  there  may  be  more  losers  than
winners,  and  there  may be  large  uncertainty  among  groups  who  would  actually  gain.  This
view  is  supported by  Forteza  and Rama  (2000)  who shows  that  organized  political  groups
which stand to lose from economic reforms are successful  in diluting these reforms (they find
that  countries  with  more  organized  groups  and  public  employment  are  associated  with
weaker recoveries after adjustment programs).
Interestingly,  Ravallion  (1991)  suggests  that poorer targeting may not necessarily  be
undesirable  as it could  strengthen political  support for income  support  programs.  He finds
that  the  "leakage"  of benefits  to  non-poor  participants  in  the  Maharashtra  Employment
Guarantee  Scheme  in  India  may  have  been  instrumental  in  obtaining  sustained  budgetary
support.  The  importance  of  leakages  is  suggested  also  by  the  fact  that  the  ability  of
Argentina's public works (Trabajar) program to reach the poor worsened sharply with cuts to
the program's  aggregate  budget (Ravallion  1999b).  Moreover,  Saint-Paul  (1993)  shows that
reforms  aimed  at  increasing  the  flexibility  of  the  labor  market  are  more  likely  if  this
flexibility is sufficiently high even before  the reforms,  that is, when the employed  are more
vulnerable  to  unemployment.  He  thus points  to the  complementarity  of the  economic  and
political  aspects:  the more  flexible the  labor market, the  more the  employed  are exposed to
unemployment,  and  the greater the political  will to  fight  it.  Ravallion  and Lokshin  (1999)
84reach  similar  conclusions,  pointing  to  the  importance  of future  mobility  (as  opposed  to
"downward  mobility"  as  in  Saint-Paul's  model)  in  explaining  government  redistribution.
They find that in Russia, government redistribution is motivated not by considerations  about
current losses and gains,  but largely by expectations  about future  welfare - rich people who
expect  their welfare  to decline  are  in  favor of redistribution,  and  poor people  who  expect
their welfare to increase are opposed to it.
The above insights prove useful for creating a strategy for reforms: while the welfare
state has been created in an incremental  fashion, its scaling back may require  more bold and
comprehensive  measures.  For example,  Elmeskov  et al  (1998)  suggest that comprehensive
rather  than  piecemeal  labor  market  reforms  may  gamer  greater  political  support  for two
reasons:  (i)  the  costs  are  more  widely  and  evenly  distributed  across  different  groups  of
workers (greater fairness) and (ii). broad reforns have a higher likelihood of producing  gains
which can possibly  be used to compensate  losers.  Furthermore,  Orszag  and Snower  (1998)
point out "political  complementarities"  associated  with broad-based  and  concurrent  reforms
which  facilitate their successful  introduction  -- losers from one reform action  can potentially
be  winners  in  another  reform  action.  Comprehensive  reforms  would  also  avoid  "rule
instability,"  whereby  expectations  of future  changes  destabilize  the  economy  (Lindbeck,
1995).  Empirical  support for the  above  claims  is provided  by Van  Ours  and Belot (2000),
who  investigate  the  reasons  behind  the  success  of some OECD  countries  in  lowering  their
unemployment.  They  find  that  successful  countries  implemented  a  comprehensive  set of
labor  market  reforms  and  point  to  strong  complementarities  among  institutions  affecting
unemployment.
Moreover,  Freeman  (1992)  argues  that  one  way  to  convince  losers  that  they  will
eventually also gain from reforms is by creating  clear examples of winners  from reforms - a
variant of Hirshman's "light at the end of tunnel"  effect.  Freeman  shows that even workers
who  initially  lose  from  reforms  may prefer  greater  inequality  of earnings;  therefore,  even
from  a political  economy  standpoint,  policies  that will  spur  growth  are more  desirable  that
those that more  abundantly  compensate  the  losers  (as  long  as political  support  for reforms
remains).
In sum, while it may be difficult to pinpoint exact circumstances that are conducive to
changing  an  income  support  system,  some  principles  can  nonetheless  be  arrived  at.  First,
under stable conditions, public programs may favor the middle class, thus failing to reach the
poor.  Second,  not  only  the  current  degree  of income  distribution,  but  the  proposed  or
perceived  change  in welfare  may  be  an  important  determinant  of the support  for  income
redistribution programs.  Third, as Elmeskov et al (1998) show, critical developments  such as
an economic  crisis  or a change  in government  have  often paved the  way for the  successful
introduction  of major reforms,  although,  clearly,  these  are  not  sufficient  conditions.  De
Ferranti  et al  (2000)  also point out that  economic  booms have  not been  conducive  to labor
market  reforms, and might have even reversed some policies which made growth possible  in
the first place (Chile).  And finally, as discussed before,  reforming income support  programs
may  be  more  effective  and  feasible  if it  is  part of a  wider,  comprehensible  labor  market
reform initiative.
85Based  on  the  above  discussion,  in  table  4.8  we  summarize  the  evaluation  of the
resistance of alternative  programs to political risk:
*  Unemployment insurance is found to offer low to medium protection of benefit  levels
during  downturns  (due  to  its  largely  unfunded  liabilities  and  public nature  of fund
management);  to exhibit high susceptibility  to pressures  to increase  the generosity  of
benefits (because of its non-transparency);  and to possess  low to medium tolerance to
reforms which would reduce the generosity of benefits (because  social insurance may
be perceived as a "social contract"  and may exhibit "natural persistence").
*  Unemployment  assistance is  assessed  to  have  similar  properties  as  unemployment
insurance  (with  less  room  for  political  maneuvering,  since  the  program  rules  are
somewhat more strict due to means-testing).
*  Severance  pay is found to offer medium protection of benefit levels during downturns
(due to  its  largely  unfunded  liabilities);  to  exhibit  low to  medium  susceptibility  to
pressures  to  increase  the  generosity  of benefits;  and  to  possess  low  tolerance  to
reforms  which  would  reduce  the  generosity  of benefits  (because  "insiders"  can
effectively  resist reforms which would primarily benefit "outsiders").
*  Unemployment  insurance savings accounts,  being  a  funded  system,  offers  high
protection  of benefit levels  during  downturns;  exhibit  low susceptibility to pressures
to  increase  the generosity  of benefits  (due to a direct link  between  contributions  and
benefits);  and possess  low tolerance to reforms  which would reduce  the generosity of
benefits (because  each worker polices his/her own account).
*  Public works program offers low protection of benefit availability  during downturns;
exhibits high susceptibility to pressures to increase the generosity  of benefits  (leakage
to  better  off participants  makes  th-e  program  more  resistant  to  budget  cuts),  and
possesses medium tolerance to reforms.
86Table 4.8:  Resistance  to political risk of income support systems  for the unemployed
Protection of the level  of benefits  Susceptibility  to pressures to  Tolerance to reforms which
in downturns  increase generosity  reduce benefits
Unemployment  Low/medium (unfunded  liabilities,  High (as a pay-as-you-go  scheme - Low/medium  (social insurance insurance  so difficult to raise  and thus non-transparent,  it can be  constitutes a "social contract,"
contributions/obtain  budgetary  easily manipulated)  "natural persistence")
support;  public management of
funds susceptible to political
investments and  diversion of funds)
Unemployment  Low/medium  Medium  (less room for maneuver  Medium (the group against reforms assistance  than with unemployment  is less vocal than in the case of
insurance)  unemployment  insurance)
Severance  pay  Medium (not always available,  Low/medium (largely outside the  Low (insider-outsider argument)
particularly  during  downturns)  domain of the government, except
if part of public retrenchment
programs)
Unemployment  High (funded system)  Low (direct link between the  Low (self-policing)
insurance savings  contributions and benefits)
accounts
Public works  Low (countercyclical  funding  High (leakage to the better off  Medium (target constituency  may
pattern)  makes the program more resistant  not be politically vocal)
Ito budget cuts)
Source:  Derived  from the discussion on (he political  risk of various programs in  the text.
874.5 Concluding Remarks
The  above  review  of  the  performance  of  income  support  programs  for  the
unemployed  shows  that these  programs  generate  a  great  variety  of effects,  which  may be
intended  and  unintended,  anticipated  and unanticipated.  We  use the above  review, together
with  a  discussion  of country  specific  features  that  affect  the  choice  of income  support
programs in Chapter  6,  to formulate  tentative  guidelines  for countries wishing to  introduce
and/or improve income  support systems for the unemployed.  At this point, we would like to
emphasize only some conclusions of a more general nature.
The  above  review  makes  it  clear  that  there  is  no  program  that  would  outperform
others  in all  aspects.  Simple conclusions  based  on narrow  views may  be misleading:  one
program  may  offer  superior  provision  of insurance,  but  may  create  severe  labor  market
disincentives - and may create a constituency which will block future reforms of the program
- than another.  Therefore,  when introducing or improving  income support systems, countries
are  advised  to  carefully  examine  all  aspects  of performance.  Having  said  that,  however,
countries may also want to set their priorities regarding  different aspects of performance-  for
example, which groups they would like to target - and then choose programs accordingly.
The discussion above also reflects the fact that not all aspects of performance are well
researched.  Although in many areas there  is no shortage of studies, the results are sometimes
widely different and even conflicting.  Given the complex  interactions,  theoretical  studies of
necessity  abstract  from  important  institutional  features.  Therefore,  their  validity  has to be
checked  under country-specific  circumstances  by empirical  studies.  Because  there is a clear
dearth  of empirical  studies  on transition  and  particularly  developing  countries,  the task  of
replicating programs from developed countries is even more difficult and risky.  When doing
so, particular  attention  has to be paid to  country specific  considerations  - the task which  we
tackle in the next chapter.
88ANNEX: EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS
This  annex  complements  the  discussion  of  efficiency  effects  of income  support
programs in the main text by providing selective  details.  It focuses on the same programs  as
does  the  discussion  above:  unemployment  insurance,  unemployment  assistance,  severance
pay, and  unemployment  insurance  savings accounts.  It considers  the following  dimensions
of efficiency:
*  Job-search  effort
*  Post-unemployment  wages
*  Equilibrium labor market outcomes
*  Enhancing restructuring of enterprises  and overall adjustment
*  Labor supply of other family members
*  Encouragement of taking regular vs. informal jobs
*  Output and growth
Where  applicable,  theoretical  predictions  about the  effects  are  presented  before  reviewing
empirical  evidence.
(a)  Job-Search Effort
Unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance.  A stylized  prediction from
simple  theoretical  models  is  that  an  increase  in  the  unemployment  benefit  reduces  the
recipient's  probability of transition from unemployment to  employment,  that is,  it increases
the  expected  duration of unemployment.  This follows  from  simple job-search  models  (the
reservation  wage  is  assumed  to  rise  with  the benefit  level),  as  well  as  from  simple  labor
supply  models  (because  the  presence  of  unemployment  insurance  modifies  the  budget
constraint  - less  income  is  forgone  by  staying  unemployed,  and  a  utility  maximizing
individual  chooses  a longer duration of unemployment).  Search theory  also implies that the
reservation wage declines and the exit rate increases as one nears the date of expiration of the
benefits.'9 However,  once  more  complexity  is  introduced  in  the  models  (for  example,
recognizing  that unemployment  benefits are  paid  only for a finite period  and that by taking
employment,  one  re-qualifies  for unemployment  benefits),  it can be shown that the increase
of the benefit rate makes the transition to employment more attractive,  not less (see Atkinson
and Micklewright,  1991,  p.  1699).  Or  one can argue  that unemployment  benefit  increases
resources  devoted  to  search  and hence  increases  the  probability  of finding a job (in  such  a
case,  a job  offer  effect  prevails  over  the  reservation  wage  effect).  In  other  words,  the
19  There  are  three  types  of effects  of implied  by  Mortensen's  seminal  paper  (1977):  (i) For  the  qualified
unemployed  worker,  the  exit rate  increases  as he  (she) approaches  benefit  expiration.  (ii)  A rise  in  benefits
reduces the exit rate  for an insured worker who has recently  become unemployed , and inicreases the exit rate for
the  insured  worker who  is close  to  benefit  expiration.  This  follows  from the  fact that  a higher  benefit  level
increases both the value of continued search as unemployed  and the value of accepting an offer.  The immediate
value of higher benefits is small for workers close to benefit exhaustion,  because they are in similar situation  as
workers  not qualified for the benefit.  (iii) A rise in benefits  increases  the exit rate for an  unemployed  worker
who is not qualified (the entitlement effect).
89theoretical predictions  about the effects of longer duration and higher replacement rate on the
probability of transition from unemployment to employment are ambiguous.
The  empirical  results,  however,  are  much  clearer.  Let  us  start  with  developed
economies,  where  these effects have  been extensively  studied.  First, the majority of studies
find  that  the  elasticity  of  the  duration  of  unemployment  with  respect  to  the  benefit
replacement  rate is positive  (see  table  4.4).20 According  to Layard  et  al  (1991),  the benefit
elasticity ranges  from 0.2 to 0.9, depending also on the time elapsed from the start of benefit
receipt.  On  the  higher  side,  Katz  and  Meyer  (1990)  estimate  that  a  10  percentage  point
increase  in the  benefit level  is associated  with  about a  1.5 week  increase  in the duration  of
unemployment.  Second,  the duration of benefit entitlement  significantly affects the duration
of unemployment  spells.  Katz  and  Meyer  (1990)  estimate  for  the  U.S.  that  the  benefit
duration elasticity of unemployment  is in the range of 0.4-0.5.  Moffitt (1985)  finds that a  1
week increase  in the benefit duration is associated  with a 0.15 week  increase  in the duration
of unemployment,  and Ham and Rea (1987), with 0.26-0.33  weeks increase  in the duration of
unemployment  in  Canada.  Third,  studies  almost  invariably  find  a  sharp  increase  in  the
probability  of exit to employment just before the benefit is exhausted.  For example, Meyer
(1990)  finds  that  over  the  six  weeks  prior  to  benefit  exhaustion,  the  exit  rate  triples.
Similarly,  Carling et  al  (1996)  find evidence  for Sweden  which  shows  that in  the  3  weeks
prior to benefit exhaustion, exit rates to employment  increase by 170 percent.
Similar  to  the  evidence  on  developed  economies,  empirical  studies  for  transition
economies  overwhelmingly  show  that  unemployment  benefits  reduce  the  probability  of
leaving  unemployment  to take  a job.  Except  for two  studies  (on  Romania  and  Slovakia),
negative  effects  of the  potential  duration  of benefit  receipt  on the probability  of exit  from
unemployment to employment  have been confirmed  by all other studies  (see table 4.5  for a
summary  of empirical  findings).  For  example,  Ham  et  al  (1998)  estimate  that  a  I  week
increase  in  the  benefit  duration  is  associated  with  a  0.30  and  0.93  week  increase  in  the
duration of unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively.  It is particularly
interesting that adverse  incentive  effects can  be detected  even in Estonia,  a country  with by
far  the  most  parsimonious  benefit  program.  The  effects  of the replacement  ratio  are  less
pronounced:  Ham  et  al.  (1999)  find significant  effects  for the  Czech  Republic  but not  for
Slovakia;  Vodopivec  (1995)  also finds insignificant effects for Slovenia.  As for the scale of
these effects,  Ham  et al  (1998)  find the  effects for the Czech Republic  to be  comparable  to
the ones in developed  economies.  Micklewright  and Nagy (1996) estimate  for Hungary that
about  8 percent  of unemployment  benefit recipients  exit to jobs  from unemployment  at the
point of exhaustion;  Vodopivec  (1995) provides  an estimate of about  6 percent for Slovenia,
and Vodopivec et al (2001) provide  an estimate of 32 percent for Estonia.  Some of the above
studies  confirm  disincentive  effects  for  unemployment  assistance,  for  which  replacement
rates are generally  lower.2'
20 See Pedersen  and Westergard-Nielsen  (1993)  for a survey of studies which did not find significant effects of
benefits on unemployment duration.
21  For the evidence  on replacement rates in  transition economies,  see Scarpetta  and Reutersward  (1994).
90Strong evidence on the moral  hazard faced by the unemployment benefit recipients  is
provided  also  by  the  U.S.  unemployment  insurance  experiments  in  the  1980s  and  1990s
(Meyer  1995).  The experiments,  partly prompted by unemployment  insurance overpayments
resulting  from  the  failure  of claimants  to  actively  seek  work,  have  taken two  forrns:  cash
bonuses for those unemployment  benefit recipients who found jobs quickly and kept them for
some  time,  and  provision  of  varying  level  of job  search  assistance.  In  both  cases,
experiments  used random assignment.  The bonus experiments  show that incentives  faced by
unemployment  benefit  recipients  matter:  when  offered  a  bonus  for  speedy  reemployment,
treatment groups reduced unemployment  benefit  claims.  In several  cases, the reduction  was
statistically  significant.  Moreover,  there  was  no  evidence  that  speedier  return  to  work
reduced  reemployment  earnings.  Job-search  assistance  experiments  also  underscore  the
presence  of moral  hazard  faced  by  unemployment  benefit  recipients.  For  example,  the
experiment  introducing the honor system - the oversight of the treatment group was reduced
and the group  did not receive any job-search  assistance  - was associated  with a statistically
significant increase of unemployment benefit claims.
There  is  little  direct  evidence  on  the  intensity  of job  search  of  claimants  of
unemployment  benefits  in  comparison  to  non-claimants.  In  his  analysis  of job  search
practices of British benefit claimants,  Wadsworth  (1991)  finds that claimants  search for jobs
more extensively  than  non-claimants.  In the  absence  of better  information,  he  takes  the
number of search methods as a measure of  job search effort.
Severance  pay.  Because the amount of severance pay is not contingent on duration of
subsequent  unemployment,  it does  not alter  the  behavior of workers  when  searching  for  a
job, that is, it does not create  a moral hazard problem pertaining to job-search incentives.
Unemployment insurance saving accounts.  There has been no empirical  work on the
effects  of  UISAs  on  the  reemployment  probability  (see  the  main  text  for  theoretical
predictions).
(b) Post-unemployment  wages
The  above  evidence  documents  the  presence  of  disincentives  on  exit  from
unemployment  to  employment  created  by unemployment  insurance.  This  effect,  however,
could  be  seen  in  a  less  negative  way  if unemployment  insurance,  while  increasing  the
duration of unemployment, at the same time produced a better match between the worker and
his new employer.  If so, this would show up as an increase  in the post-unemployment  wage.
Below we discuss theoretical  aspects and empirical evidence on this issue.
Theoretical  predictions. Job search theory yields ambiguous predictions  with respect
to the relationship between unemployment  benefit levels and post-unemployment  wages.  On
the one hand,  an increase in the benefit level  raises the reservation wage  at the beginning of
the  covered  unemployment  spell.  This  improves  the  likelihood  of a  post-unemployment
wage  gain as  offered  wages have  to  be higher  to induce  the  recipient  to  exit compensated
unemployment.  On the  other hand, a higher benefit  level depresses  job search intensity and
91prolongs  unemployment.  The resultant  downward adjustments  in the reservation  wage over
the  unemployment  spell  increase  the  likelihood  of a  post-unemployment  wage  loss.  Wage
offers are also negatively affected by the perception  of greater skill obsolescence  and loss of
human capital  from longer unemployment  spells on the part of employers.
Evidence.  There  is  no  compelling  evidence  that  unemployment  benefits,  by
subsidizing job  search  costs,  facilitate  improved  job matches  (see  Cox  and  Oaxaca,  1990).
Using U.S.  data, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca  (1976), Burgess and Kingston (1976), Holen (1977),
and  Barron  and  Mellow  (1979)  find  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship
between benefit levels and post-unemployment  wages.  Most notably, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
(1976) estimate  that a  10  percentage  point increase  in the benefit  replacement  rate  increases
post-unemployment  wages  by  7  percent  for  older men  and  1.5  percent  for  older  women.
Similarly, using New Zealand data, Maani  (1993)  finds that a 10 percentage point increase  in
the  benefit  replacement  rate  was  associated  with  a  4.5%  increase  in  post-unemployment
wages.22 Other  studies,  however,  have  shown  a weak  or  negligible  benefit  effect  on post-
unemployment  wages  - Blau  and  Robins  (1986)  and  Kiefer  and  Neumann  (1989)  find  a
positive  but  statistically  insignificant  relationship  between  benefits and earnings.  Likewise,
Addison  and  Blackburn  (2000)  find  weak  evidence  in  support  of improved  earnings,  and
Classen  (1977)  finds  no  effect.  Meyer  (1995)  also  finds  that  re-employment  bonuses
shortened  the duration of compensated  unemployment  without  affecting post-unemployment
wages.
(c)  Equilibrium labor market outcomes
Below  we  summarize  the  theoretical  predictions  and  empirical  evidence  about  the
effects  of  the  availability  and  generosity  of unemployment  insurance  and  other  income
maintenance  systems  on  unemployment,  employment,  and  labor  force  participation.  In
contrast  to  the  discussion  of the  search  effort  effects,  this  discussion  focuses  on  general
equilibrium results.
Most  theoretical  models  predict  a  positive  effect  of the  increase  in  the  level  of
unemployment benefits on equilibrium unemployment.  In decentralized  wage negotiations  in
union-bargaining  models, a  higher  benefit  level  increases  the  negotiated  wage  at the  firm
level  and hence  overall  unemployment.  For example,  in the model presented  by Holmlund
(1998),  unemployment  is very  sensitive to  the  replacement  rate  - a rise  in the replacement
rate  from  50 to 60  percent  generates  an  increase  in the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate by
almost  4  percentage  points.  Equilibrium search models  also  predict  an  increase  in
equilibrium unemployment  in response to the increase of the replacement rate.  The increase
is less  intense than  in a union-bargaining  model - Holmlund (1998)  shows that a rise in  the
replacement  rate  from  50  to  60  percent  is  associated  with  an  increase  in the  equilibrium
22  The  results  of some  of the  studies  that  do  find  a positive  effect  of benefits  on  wages  are  considered
questionable  due  to  shortcomings  with  respect  to  the  data  and  approaches  used  (see  Welch,  1977).  One
significant  problem  that afflicts  studies of earnings-related  unemployment  benefit  systems is the difficulty  in
disentangling the effect of the benefit on post-unemployment  wages from previous wages.
92unemployment  rate  of  I  percentage  point  (the  relationship  is  non-linear).  Similarly,
calibration  of models  which  include  job  creation  and  job  destruction  effects  shows  that
halving the replacement  rate would  reduce  a typical unemployment  spell  from  3 months  to
less then 2.4 months,  thereby  reducing the unemployment  rate by one fourth,  that is, by  1.5
percentage point from the level of 6 percent (Mortensen,  1994).
Heer  (2000),  drawing  on  Fredriksson  and  Holmlund  (2001),  provides  one  of the  rare
explicit  treatments  of  both  unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment  assistance  as  two
components  of a compensation  system, with means-tested assistance available  to individuals
whose  eligibility  to  unemployment  insurance  payments  expires  (as  practiced  in  several
countries).  His  general  equilibrium  model  predicts  that  both  components  of the  system
reduced equilibrium employment, and that an increase of unemployment assistance payments
has  a  strong  disincentive  effect  on  a  worker's  search  effort.  Optimal  unemployment
compensation is shown to decline over time.
Note  that  general  equilibrium  models  rnay  reinforce,  but  can  also  reverse  partial-
equilibrium  results.  For  example,  the prediction  that a  higher benefit  reduces  the  outflow
from unemployment  (given the level  of labor market tightness)  can  be reinforced  by general
equilibrium  models that  endogenize  wage  settirig  and  labor market  tightness.  But in  some
other  general  equilibrium  models,  the  prediction  that  a higher  benefit  reduces  the  outflow
from  unemployment  is reversed.  For example,  if one  assumes that - in response  to higher
unemployment  benefits  - the equilibrium  wage  distribution  changes so that low-wage firms
increase  their  wage  offers,  then the  frequency of low wage  firms  declines  and  the  outflow
from  unemployment  increases  (Holmlund,  1998).  Moreover,  the  above  predictions  of
general  equilibrium models  are quite sensitive to changes  in assumptions.  For example, the
magnitude of the effects  that an  increase  of the replacement  rate  has  on unemployment  in
job-search models is very sensitive to the assumption about the value of leisure, for which no
reliable estimates exist.
As for the effects  on participation  in the labor force,  Friedman  (1968)  contends that
the  ability to  claim  unemployment  benefits  when  unemployed  makes  it more  attractive  to
enter the  labor  force  (both  to employment  or unemployment)  - the  so-called  "entitlement"
effect.  But this is again a partial equilibrium  result.  By imposing additional costs associated
with labor,  unemployment  insurance  may also induce employers to reduce their demand for
labor,  which  may  increase  equilibrium  unemployment  and,  in  turn,  reduce  labor  force
participation  (for example,  through the discouraged  worker effect).  Moreover,  the effects of
the availability of unemployment  insurance may show up primarily as increases of wages and
not as increases  in employment;  higher wages, in turn, induce more people to enter the labor
force,  but  they  may  also  increase  unemployment.  Thus,  the  effects  on  labor  force
participation rate (and employment rate in particular) cannot be determined unambiguously.
Similar  to  the effects  of unemployment  benefits,  the predicted  effects  of severance
pay on unemployment  are  also ambiguous.  Blanchard  (1998) creates  a model  with explicit
firing  costs  and  shows  that  severance  pay  increases  firing  costs  and  as  such  reduces  the
probability of an individual  transiting from employment to  unemployment.  But at the same
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employment.
An  interesting insight about the interaction of employment protection  legislation and
unemployment  insurance  was  offered  also  by  Pissarides  (2001).  He  argues  that  advance
notification  and  severance  pay,  by delaying  dismissals,  help  to  avoid  unemployment  - but
agreements  on  employment  protection  and  wages  must  be  left  to  the  firms  and  workers,
because  government involvement  can  be counterproductive.  Crucial  for his argument  is the
ability of firms to lower wages so as to pay the additional costs associated with dismissal;  if
this  is  not  the  case,  employment  protection  legislation  reduces  the  demand  for  labor  and
increases  equilibrium unemployment.  The same conclusion is also reached  by Addison et al
(1998),  who  show  that  when  government  mandates  worker  protection  (such  as  health
insurance and dismissal costs), this reduces output due to a loss of productive  efficiency.
Evidence.  As  the  above  review  shows,  by  focusing  on  distinct  features,  different
theoretical  models  make valid, yet different conclusions which  may sometimes conflict with
each  other.  Conflicting predictions  are the consequence  of the fact that modeling of income
support programs (unemployment  insurance and  severance pay in particular) has to account
for  various  and  complex  institutional  elements  that  are  impossible  to  capture  in  a  single
model if one wants to retain analytical  tractability.  It therefore takes empirical  verification to
determine  which effects  - and theoretical  models  - dominate.  Indeed,  several  studies have
tried to explain  differences  in labor  market outcomes through  differences  in institutions and
other control variables (such as the stage of the business cycle and differences  in earnings).23
Effects  on unemployment.  One of the best known studies  in this area is Layard  et al
(1991),  finding that in the mid- 1  980s the replacement rate of unemployment  benefit systems
in  OECD  countries  significantly  affected  the  average  unemployment  rate,  with  a  10
percentage  point  increase  in  the  benefit  rate  producing  an  estimated  1.3  percentage  point
increase  in  the  unemployment  rate.  The  study  also  confirms  the  positive  effect  of the
potential  duration of unemployment  benefit on the unemployment  rate.  Nickell  and Layard
(1999) obtain similar results for 1983-1994 period.  Two other recent studies, also for OECD
counties,  are broadly in line with the above results.  OECD (1999) finds significant effects of
the  replacement  rate  (but insignificant  effects of the potential  entitlement  duration);  Daveri
and Tabellini  (1999) find mostly significant effects of the potential  entitlement duration  (they
do not report results for replacement rates).
Consistent  with  theoretical  predictions,  the  effects  of  employment  protection
legislation  (of  which  severance  pay  is  one  of  the  most  important  determinants)  on
unemployment  are  largely  inconclusive  (for  a  survey  of the  effects,  see  OECD,  1999).
According  to  Mortensen  (1994),  however,  a  calibration  of a  general  equilibrium  model
applied  to  the  U.S.  economy  shows  that  the  introduction  of  severance  pay  increases
unemployment,  because  the  reduction  of job  creation  imposed  by  firing  costs  more  than
23  For example,  among  institutional  variables,  OECD  (1999)  uses  variables  characterizing  wage  bargaining,
income support for the unemployed,  taxation of labor, and spending on active labor market programs.
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Several studies find positive effects of severance pay on long-term unemployment.
Effects on employment.  In line with ambiguous  theoretical  predictions,  the effects of
unemployment  benefits  on employment  rates are  often  found  statistically  insignificant  (see,
for example, Nickell and Layard,  1999).  In contrast, there is quite strong evidence that strict
employment  protection  - and  severance  pay  in  particular  - reduces  employment.  For
example,  the  results  of Lazear  (1990)  show  that  increasing  severance  pay  by one  month
reduces employment per head by about 0.4 percent and reduces labor force participation rate
by 0.3 percent.  Some new evidence  include  (i) OECD (1999), who find that negative  effects
are  concentrated  among  prime  age-women,  youths,  and  older  workers,  (ii)  Haffner  et  al
(1999),  who  find  negative  association  between  the  strictness  of employment  protection
legislation  and  employment rates in OECD  countries,  and  (iii) Heckman and Pages  (2000),
who  also  confirm  the  link  between job  security  and  lower  employment  and  attribute  a  5
percentage  point reduction  in  employment  in  Latin America  to job security  provisions  (see
Addison and Teixeira,  2001, for a summary of empirical  effects  of employment protection).
Indirect  support of the negative effects of severance pay on employment is provided also by a
study of severance  pay in Peru by MacIsaac  and Rama  (2000).  They  find that higher firing
costs due to severance pay are borne by firms, since the earnings of covered  workers differed
insignificantly  from  earnings of non-covered  workers.  In the  Latin  American  context,  the
fact that severance pay lowers employment rates can also be interpreted as indirect evidence
that severance  pay also pushes workers into the informnal sector.
As far  as the  effects  on the  structure  of  employment  are  concerned,  Lazear  (1990)
shows  severance  pay  contributes  to  turning  full-time jobs  into  part-time  ones.  Moreover,
OECD  (1999)  finds  a  strong  link  between  stricter  employment  protection  legislation  and
higher rates of self-employment.  This result is also found by other studies.
(d) Enhancing restructuring of enterprises and overall adjustment
In  general,  theory  does  not  support  the  argument  that, to facilitate  the restructuring
process  by overcoming political  resistance,  the optimal  level of insurance protection  against
unemployment  is higher  during the transition  process.  Blanchard  (1997,  pp.  113-4)  shows
that more generous  benefits  indeed add to the attractiveness  of restructuring,  but at the same
time hinder (private) job creation.  He concludes  that " the case for increasing unemployment
benefits on efficiency  grounds is limited." Measured by the dynamics of job creation and job
destruction,  the  intensity  of  labor  reallocation  in  transition  economies  also  cannot  be
associated  in  an  obvious  way  to  the  generosity  of unemployment  benefits.  For example,
Haltiwanger  and Vodopivec  (1999)  find much higher gross worker and job flows in Estonia
as compared to Slovenia, with Estonia having one of the most frugal, and Slovenia one of the
most generous systems of unemployment benefits among transition economies.
Of course,  restructuring  programs that provide  workers  with a sufficiently generous
compensation  (at an extreme,  full insurance  - an income support at  100 percent replacement
rate) are successful in the sense that they facilitate the downsizing of a particular enterprise to
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Haltiwanger  and  Singh  (1999)  provide  a mixed picture  about  the success of these  projects
when  gauged  by a  broader  yardstick.  Financial  returns  were  high  - most of the  surveyed
projects recovered  their direct costs in as little  as two years.  But 40 percent of programs  for
which  data  existed  rehired  some  of  the  same  workers  which  they  shed  during  the
retrenchment,  a sign that economic  returns  may  not  be that clear.  Moreover,  active  labor
market  measures  which  may  be  part  of retrenchment  programs  may  also  have  dubious
economic effects (Dar and Tzannatos,  1999).
Haltiwanger  and  Singh find  that  individually  tailored  severance  payments  based  on
skills  and age, in combination  with a mix of strategies  for employment  reduction,  were  less
often associated  with rehiring.  Although they find that such an approach  can be  financially
expensive, they argue that it has "a potentially large payoff in productivity gains and in lower
adjustment  costs" (p. 52).  Undoubtedly,  when formulating programs,  the specific prevailing
conditions  in  a  particular  country  must  be  carefully  evaluated  before  applying  any of the
general  principles.  Given  that  many  of the  relevant  data  to  evaluate  the  effects  of these
programs are generally  not available (both on the benefits and particularly on the costs side),
economic effects of such programs are difficult to pinpoint.
(e) Labor supply of other family  members
Unemployment  insurance. Theoretical  considerations  suggest  that  more  generous
replacement rates will suppress the labor supply of other family members through the income
effect. Empirical evidence  confirms such predictions.  For example, Cullen and Gruber (cited
in  Gruber  1999)  find  that  the  labor  supply  of  wives  of  unemployed  workers  is  very
responsive  to  unemployment  benefits  received  by  their  husbands:  a  l$  increase  in  the
unemployment  benefits of a husband reduces the eamings of his wife by 36 cents.
Unemployment  assistance.  Theoretical  predictions  differ  from  the  ones  associated
with  unemployment  insurance,  reflecting  differences  in  program  rules.  Because
unemployment  assistance  requires  means-testing,  one  can  expect  that  this  will  create
disincentives  for  other  family  members  to  take  a job.  Empirical  evidence  supports  such
predictions:  for example,  Garcia (1989)  shows that if such  disincentives  were  removed, the
overall  participation  rate  of the  wives of the  unemployed  would  increase  by  8  percentage
points.  Similar evidence  is found in transition economies.  For example,  Terrell  et al (1996)
report that the presence of an unemployed  spouse  lowered the hazard of exit to employment
of unemployment  assistance  recipients  by  72  percent  for  females  and  by  82  percent  for
males.  Boeri (1997) reports similar effects for Poland.
(f) Decision  to enter regular vs.  informal jobs
The  existence  of unemployment  insurance  may  be  conducive  to  entering  regular
employment versus  informal jobs.  This is so if the expected unemployment benefits  exceed
the  cost  of paying  the  contributions  (for  example,  if the  government  or  the  employer  is
covering part of the cost).  The  evidence on this issue  is scant and inconclusive.  On the one
hand,  two  French  studies  find  that  the  availability  of unemployment  benefits  significantly
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finding  is  that  while  the  occurrence  of  unemployment  severely  reduces  the  duration  of
subsequent  job tenure,  the  duration of unemployment  has  no  deleterious  impact  - in  fact,
longer durations of unemployment are rewarded  by longer job tenures, presumably because  a
longer period  of job search  improves  the probability  of a better worker-job match  (Boheim
and  Taylor,  2000).24  On  the  other  hand,  Addison  and  Portugal  (1998)  find  no  signs  that
unemployment  benefits  facilitate entry  into stable jobs in Portugal.  Cunningham  (2000) also
shows  that  an  increase  in  the  generosity  of unemployment  insurance  in  Brazil  led  to
increased  participation  in the self-employment  sector;  this result suggests that in Brazil, the
lack of liquidity provides  a barrier for entry into self-employment  and supports the view that
markets in Brazil are well integrated  and participation in the informal  sector is not an inferior
choice.
(g)  Output and growth
The dynamic  general equilibrium  model  of Acemoglu  and Shimer (1999)  shows that
unemployment  insurance  helps  an  economy  achieve  a  higher  output  than  one  without
unemployment  insurance,  since unemployment  insurance  contributes to the creation of high-
quality, high-wage jobs with greater unemployment  risk.  In a subsequent  paper (Acemoglu
and  Shimer,  2000),  calibrations  of  their  model  show  that  moderate  increases  in  the
replacement  rate or the duration of entitlement lead to a rise in the share of good jobs as well
as  an  increase  in  both  welfare  and  output  (the  resulting  increase  of unemployment  is
primarily  due to  better-insured  workers  looking  for higher  wage jobs).  They  also  provide
some  empirical  evidence  that  states  in the  U.S.  with  higher replacement  ratios  experience
higher  unemployment,  but also a relative  increase  in the number of high wage  occupations
and  industries,  and  higher  productivity  growth.  Other  literature  also  shows  that
unemployment  insurance may improve allocation of resources (for example, Diamond  1981).
Central to the efficiency  increasing effect argument of Acemoglu  and Shimer is their
claim that unemployment  insurance  helps  create  high-quality, high-wage  jobs.  But there  is
also  evidence  which  points  to  the  contrary:  Anderson  and  Meyer  (1993)  find  that  the
industries  consistently  receiving  subsidies  from the  unemployment  insurance  system  in  the
U.S.  are construction,  manufacturing,  and  mining,  that is, industries  which  do not generate
high  quality  and  high-wage jobs.  Their  finding  is  consistent  with  the  prediction  that  the
system subsidizes  unstable employment,  as workers are more willing to take a more unstable
job (for example, a seasonal one) if they can count on unemployment benefits.
Efficiency enhancing  literature has to be contrasted,  among others,  with literature  on
optimal  unemployment  insurance.  The  latter  focuses  on the  moral  hazard  associated  with
search  effort  and models  the trade-off between efficiency  and equity.  Apart from  insights
about  the design  of an optimal  compensation program  (see below),  one interesting  outcome
24  The latter finding may be confounding the effects ofjob search  with the effects of other variables that are not
controlled  for  in  the  analysis  (for  example,  the  receipt  of unemployment  insurance,  which  may capture  the
difference  in unobserved differences  between the recipients or non-recipients)
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insurance  in the  U.S.  would  reduce  the  steady  state  unemployment  rate by  3.4  percentage
points  and  increase  output by  3.64  percentage  points  (Wang  and  Williamson,  1996).25  A
similar  finding,  in  the  context  of  a job  creation/job  destruction  model,  is  obtained  by
Mortensen  (1994)  - halving the replacement  rate of unemployment  insurance  would increase
job creation and thus aggregate output.
A  different  perspective  that  also  points  to  the  possibility  that  the  introduction  of
unemployment  insurance  may  be welfare-reducing  is  provided  by Attanasio  and Rios-Rull
(2000).  They  observe  that  a  government-mandated  program  may  crowd  out  private
insurance  schemes,  that  is,  break  down  the  social  fabric  that  maintains  private  transfers.
Specifically,  when  both  aggregate  and  idiosyncratic  risks  are  shared  among  members  of
extended  families,  and idiosyncratic  risk is less than fully insured  because of the presence of
enforceability  problems,  the  provision  of mandated  insurance  programs  is  almost  surely
inefficient,  because  it  crowds  out  private  insurance  against  idiosyncratic  shocks.  Their
findings point out that before introducing  unemployment  support programs,  the substitution
effects such a program would have on private arrangements should be considered.
5. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION  CRITERIA:  EXPLORING  COUNTRY-
SPECIFIC CONDITIONS
In the previous  chapter, we reviewed the  "generic"  performance of various  programs
- the  performance  under  stylized  conditions  that  usually  prevail  in  developed  economies.
Naturally, when introducing  new institutions to a country or trying to improve  existing ones,
one has to account appropriately  for country-specific  features,  because they determine how a
certain program works  in a particular country.  This is even more important when  we intend
to introduce  such programs to  developing  countries,  yet our knowledge of various  programs
is  based  predominantly  on  the  experience  of developed  countries.  In  a very  true  sense,
therefore,  one must "find what fits" developing countries.26
This  chapter  reviews  some  of the  most  important  country-specific  features  which
have to be taken into consideration when introducing or improving  income support programs
in  developing  and  transition  countries.  Some of these features  relate  to the  interactions  of
income  support  programs  with  other  social  risk  management  mechanisms,  some  to  the
desirability  of different  programs,  yet  others  to  specific  conditions  which  are  likely  to
strongly  affect  the  performance  of various  programs per se.  The  following  features  are
discussed:
*  interactions with labor market institutions and shocks,
*  administrative capacity for program implementation,
*  the characteristics of the unemployed,
25  The  large  positive  effects  on  employment  and  output  are  largely  driven  by a  sharp fall  in  unemployment
inflow  which results form  switching to optimal  unemployment  insurance  system,  and the empirical  foundation
for this sharp reduction is not very strong.
26  "Finding  what  fits"  was  the  topic  of the  keynote  address  "Taking  Labor  Market  Diversity  Seriously"  by
Richard Freeman at the World Bank's Core Labor Market Course in June 2001.
98*  the size of the informal  sector,
*  the prevalence  and pattern  of inter-household  transfers,
*  non-social insurance  and self-protection,
*  the nature of shocks,  and
*  cultural and political  factors.
5.1 Interactions with labor market institutions and shocks
The desirability of alternative income support programs for the unemployed depends,
among  others, on  the  expected  impact  of these  programs  on  labor  market  outcomes.  We
discussed  such impacts in the previous  chapter.  Here  we  would like  to stress that the same
income  support  program  may  produce  more  or  less  desirable  outcomes,  depending  on the
interaction  between  the  income  support  program  with  other  labor  market  institutions  and
shocks.  Specifically,  we  point out  below  that  (i)  the  impact  of unemployment  insurance
benefits  on the  equilibrium  level of unemployment  depends  on  the  interaction  of benefits
with  wage setting mechanisms,  and (ii) the impact of an adverse shock on the persistence  of
unemployment  depends  on  the  interaction  of the  shock  with  institutions,  unemployment
insurance  and  employment  protection  legislation  (including  severance  pay)  being  among
them.
The  impact  on  equilibrium  unemployment:  the  interaction of  income  support
programs with  wage-setting institutions.  Theoretical  studies  suggest  that  the  presence  of
unemployment  insurance  is  likely to  strengthen  the  bargaining  power of trade  unions  and
thus increase the equilibrium unemployment rate.  Under decentralized  wage setting in which
bargaining takes place  at the firm level,  union-bargaining  models predict a positive  effect of
the  increase  in  the  level  of unemployment  benefits  on  equilibrium  unemployment,  as  the
workers reservation  wage increases  (Holmlund,  1998).  Moreover,  depending on the level of
coordination  and centralization  of collective  bargaining,  this effect on unemployment  can be
fairly pronounced.  Centralized  and highly coordinated  systems as well  as fully decentralized
systems are shown  to be  able to restrain insiders'  pressure for wage increases;  on the other
hand, uncoordinated  and fragmented bargaining is likely to lead to larger wage pressures (see
Calmfors  and  Drifill,  1988,  and  more recently,  Elmeskov  et  al,  1998).  There  may  also be
other  interactions  influencing  the  effects  of  unemployment  insurance.  For  example,
Mortensen  and Pissarides  (1999) suggest that an increase  in the benefit replacement  rate has
a  stronger  impact  on  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate  when  payroll  taxes  are  higher;
Orszag  and  Snower  (1998)  also  argue  that  there  are  complementary  effects  between
unemployment benefits and payroll taxes.27
The  impact  on persistence of unemployment:  the  interaction of income  support
programs  with shocks.  As shown recently  by Blanchard and Wolfers  (1999), adverse shocks
have stronger or longer lasting  impacts on unemployment  due to their interaction  with labor
market institutions,  unemployment  insurance  system  and  employment protection  (including
27 Interestingly,  Elmeskov et al (1998)  do not find a empirical support of the hypothesis  that the combination  of
restrictive employment  protection  legislation and generous  benefits leads to particularly high unemployment.
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explanations of the rise of European unemployment  above).
Implications for program  choice  and design.  Other  things  equal,  the  level  of
coordination  and  the  degree  of  centralization  of  collective  bargaining  matters  - the
introduction of unemployment insurance is less likely to raise the equilibrium unemployment
rate in an economy with a centralized  and coordinated  wage bargaining system,  as well as in
a fully  decentralized  system.  Unemployment  benefits  also  interact  with  payroll  taxation.
Moreover, via their interaction  with adverse  covariant  shocks, more generous unemployment
insurance/assistance  and  more  protective  employment  legislation  contribute  to  the
persistence of unemployment.
5.2 Administrative capacity for program implementation
One  important  consideration  when  choosing  an  income  support  program  is  the
availability of administrative  capacity necessary for its implementation.  Below we focus  on
the  capacity  to  evaluate  initial  and  continuing  program  eligibility,  as  well  as  to  pay  out
benefits.  Specifically,  we discuss the capacity to generate and process information  on (i) the
payment  of  program  contributions  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  worker,  (ii)  his/her
employment/unemployment  status, job  search  effort,  and  incomes  from  other  sources  and
assets of the worker,  and (iii)  his/her  family circumstances - number of family members, as
well as their incomes and assets, and of course, to pay out benefits.
With recent advancements  in information  and communication technology,  the record-
keeping  of payments  of insurance  premiums  as well as  disbursements  of funds  has become
increasingly  affordable even in low income countries.  An example of such a program  which
exists  even  in  low  income  countries  are  pension  systems,  which  typically  require  a  long
history of contributions  for individual  workers.  Precisely  this kind of information  system  is
necessary  for the administration  of unemployment  insurance,  unemployment  assistance,  and
UISAs.
While  information  technology  is  instrumental  in  maintaining  records  on  premium
payments,  it  is  only  of  limited  help  when  it  comes  to  checking  additional  eligibility
requirements  under unemployment  insurance  and unemployment  assistance  programs.  The
need for additional  screening of applicants arises from the fact that these programs  are prone
to moral hazard problems: the status of unemployment,  coupled with sufficiently low family
earnings  in the  case  of unemployment  assistance,  trigger  the payment of benefits  - hence
disincentives  to  take  a job or to work longer  hours  (see above).  Besides  checking  whether
recipients are in fact working,  one also has to monitor whether they are available  and willing
to take a job, and whether they are actively searching for a job.
Several  factors  make  monitoring  of  eligibility  conditions  under  unemployment
insurance and unemployment  assistance  a challenging task even for developed  and transition
countries.  First,  what  is the  best way  to monitor "availability  for work"  - the  requirement
often used to curtail informal employment?  Different countries  use different approaches,  but
they all  have  shortcomings.  For example,  recent amendments  in the unemployment  benefit
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employment  offices  for three  hours  per  day,  but  preliminary  results  show  little  effect  on
disqualification.  Moreover,  such  an  arrangement  may  well  backfire  because  it  forces
employment  counselors to assume two opposing roles: one of job facilitator,  and the other of
a policeman.  On the  one  hand,  counselors  try  to help  the unemployed  by preparing  a job
plan,  directing  them  to  training,  etc.;  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  forced  to "spy"  on  the
unemployed  to find  out  whether  they  are  in  fact  available  to take  a job - and,  if deemed
necessary,  disqualify  them  from  receiving  benefits.  Second,  similar  difficulties  exist  with
respect to the monitoring of the requirement of 'actively  seeking employment."  Because this
requirement  entails  many  different  aspects,  it cannot  easily  be  incorporated  in legislation.
What  can  normally  be  reasonable  to  expect  from  the  unemployed  may  well  depend  on
individual circumstances  (such as skills, qualifications, experience,  and also the length of the
unemployment  spell),  as  well as  on  available  vacancies  in  the  local  labor  market.  Third,
additional  problems  are  involved  in  determining  a "suitable  job,"  and the  amount  of work
that  may  be  undertaken  without  being  disqualified  from  benefit  receipt.  It  is  thus  not
surprising  that  disqualification  from  unemployment  benefits  occurs  rarely,  and  that  this
practice  differs  across  countries  as well  as within  a  country  (see  box  5.1  for evidence  on
transition countries, and OECD (2000) for evidence on OECD countries).
Box 5.1: Benefits  disqualification  in transition countries
Micklewright  and Nagy  (1996)  report  that  in Hungary  disqualification  from  unemployment  insurance
benefits receipt rarely occurs.  For example,  of the  March  1992  cohort of benefit  recipients, 4 percent of
spells  ended  that  way.  The  risk of disqualification  was much higher for the  young,  the  less-educated,
blue-collar  workers,  and those living in the capital,  Budapest.  While  conceivably  such differences could
occur  with  the  same  degree  of enforcement  of the  niles,  in all  likelihood  the  severity  with  which  the
sanctions are imposed vary across offices within the country - as well as between countries.  For example,
the risk of benefit disqualification  in  Slovenia is much lower than in Hungary - in  1998, only one percent
of spells ended  with disqualification,  and in 1999, onlv 0.65 percent,  despite changes  in legislation aimed
at improving  the  monitoring  of benefit  eligibility.  And in Estonia,  the  country  with extremely  modest
unemployment  benefits,  casual  evidence  suggest  that  employment  offices  sometimes  side  with  the
unemployed  and  do  not take  any actions  that  would  result  in disqualification  - precisely  because  the
benefit  is so low.
Source:  Vodopivec  et al (2001).
Underscoring  the importance  of quality  monitoring  and  enforcement,  recent  studies
suggest  that  effective  monitoring  and  the  use  of sanctions  strongly  reduce  the  average
duration of unemployment  benefit payments, and increase  the transition rate to employment.
In  a recent  review  of the  literature,  OECD  (2000)  reports  the results  of studies  on various
OECD  countries,  which show  that compulsory  intensive  interviews  reduced  the  volume  of
benefit  claims;  that the increase  of job search  requirements  led to reduction  of the average
duration  of unemployment  benefit  payments;  and  that  the  imposition  of the  sanction  on
unemployed  workers  strongly  raised  the  subsequent  transition  rate  to  employment.
Moreover,  in  a  theoretical  search  equilibrium  model,  Boone  et  al  (2001)  show  that
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are well above the ones typically observed in Europe.
The  task  of monitoring  labor  market  status  is  even  more  difficult  in  developing
countries.  Above  all,  monitoring  of availability  for  work,  and  earnings  obtained  from
informal employment,  becomes  exceedingly  challenging.  The existence  of a large  informal
sector, together with the ease of entry into - and exit from - informal sector activities, makes
verification  of the status of unemployment,  as well as earnings of individuals,  more difficult.
The  task  of  monitoring  eligibility  is  somewhat  easier  in  countries  with  interlinked
administrative  bases  of individuals  (see box  5.2  for  examples  of how modem  information
technology,  coupled  with the existence  of large  administrative,  individual -level  data bases,
helps prevent fraud in Poland and Germany).
Box 5.2: Fighting fraud and reducing costs  through the use of
advanced  technology
Advanced  information  and  communication  technology  and  the  existence  of  interconnected
administrative  data  bases  can  help  prevent  fraud  and  reduce  administrative  costs.  Below  are  two
illustrative examples:
(a) Improved monitoring of benefit receipt via cross-checking of various administrative databases. In
Poland,  a  pilot  management  information  project  in  the  Poznan  region  reduces  benefit  leakage  by
checking whether unemployment  benefit recipients  have already taken a job.  The screening is based on
advanced  communications  capabilities  among  employment  offices,  on  one  side,  and  Social  Security
Administration  and Tax Office, on the other.  Estimates show that by reducing this  leakage,  the costs of
the project will be paid back in about two years.
(b) Monitoring illegal employment.  In Germany,  staff of employment offices make  field visits to check
whether  workers are  legally employed.  Equipped  with computers  and mobile phones,  the employment
office  staff  can  log  on  to  institutional  databases  from  the  field  and  check  if a  particular  worker
contributes  to  the  unemployment  insurance  and  pension  funds,  and  whether  he/she  is  receiving
unemployment  compensation.
Source:  Leipold,  Knut (2000).
In  developing  countries,  however,  such  interlinked  systems  rarely  exist,  and  other
information  technology  of  local  government  and  public  employment  service  offices  is
limited.  Another  matter  is  also  whether  the  rules,  even  in  the  absence  of  information
problems,  are  strictly  enforced.  Faced  with  the  above  described  monitoring  problems,  a
recently introduced Argentinean unemployment  insurance  system altogether avoids checking
the continuing  eligibility  of their unemployment  insurance recipients,  but has developed  the
capacity to cross-check  whether benefit recipients are also on social security payment rolls (box
5.3).
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unemployment  insurance in Argentina
Argentina  introduced  its  unemployment  insurance  system  in  1992,  following  a macroeconomic  crisis that
raised  the  fear of large-scale,  open  unemployment.  The  total  number of recipients  is  relatively small - on
average,  about  100-125,000  workers  receive  benefits,  out  of 2  million  officially  unemployed  workers.
Administration of the program  (processing of claims and  payment of benefits)  was handed over to the social
security  system  (ANSES  - Administracion  Nacional  de  la Seguridad  Nacional),  which  operates a  national
network of offices and which reports to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  Workers go to one of 150
local ANSES offices to register and receive their checks;  there are  no job placement or other reemployment
services provided.
While  the  administration  of benefits  has  seemingly  proceeded  smoothly  (workers  are  informed  of their
eligibility and receive  payments  on a timely  basis),  the system only recently  acquired  the capacity to detect
recipients  who  have  found  new jobs  in  the  formal  sector - and  still  applies  few  measures to  prevent  the
leakage of  benefits to those who have found jobs in the informal  sector.  Through a newly introduced  system
of common  personal  identification  numbers,  the  government  has  been  able  to  cross-check  whether
unemployment  insurance recipients are also on social security payment rolls. (Personal identification numbers
were  introduced  in  1994,  and  it took  several  years  to  develop  this  cross-checking  capability.)  This  way,
significant  numbers of benefit  recipients  actually  working  in the  formal  sector are  purged  from  the  benefit
receipt lists.  However,  a far greater number of recipients  are likely to be working in the  informal sector, with
no measures  being taken to detect them and to take the benefit away.
Source:  Mazza (1999).
While the monitoring of eligibility requirements  under unemployment insurance  and
unemployment  assistance  in  developing  countries  seems  to  be  more  challenging  than  in
developed countries,  their existing capacity  is much worse.  For example, none of the offices
of the Filipino public employment  service come  close to the capacity necessary  for checking
a claimant's  labor  force  status and job search  efforts,  and for means-testing.  Even in  more
developed  regions,  the  majority of these  offices  have  only  one  employed  worker,  and  the
offices  are active  only in peak  periods.  Such  offices  may also be  influenced  by local chief
executives  and  therefore  (mis)used  for  political  purposes.  Administrative  capacity  for
implementing public works programs is less demanding - and usually stronger,  as such tasks
have become routine for many local governments in developing countries.
Additional  administrative  costs can  be  expected  under means-testing  programs  such
as  unemployment  assistance,  eligibility  criteria  for  which  also  include  testing income  and
assets of applicants and their families.  To minimize leakages of program benefits to the non-
poor, experience  shows  that means-testing  may require  significant resources.  For example,
screening  of applicants  for  tuition  fee  subsidies  and  allowances  at  the  University  of the
Philippines  - a  program  that  imposes  similar  information  requirements  to  those  under
unemployment  assistance  - is  carried  out  at  a  cost  of P480  (around  $10)  per  applicant
(Esguerra et al, 2001 ) - a cost comparable  to the total per capita social sector spending in the
Philippines!  Large  administrative  costs  are  also  reported  by  Subbarao  et  al  (1996)  for
government cash transfers to the extreme poor - one peso for every two pesos transferred.
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implement income support programs  varies greatly across different  programs.  Some income
support  programs  - severance  pay,  public  works,  and  UISAs  - have  relatively  modest
informational  and  organizational  demands,  and  adequate  administrative  capacity  is usually
found  in  developing  countries.  Other  programs,  above  all  unemployment  insurance  and
unemployment  assistance,  require  extensive  and  sophisticated  information  which  often
cannot  be readily  provided by the  existing  capacity of developing,  particularly low-income,
countries.  In comparison  to  developed  countries,  eligibility monitoring  is more demanding
and  costly - because  of a  larger  informal  sector,  which  provides  more  abundant  informal
employment  opportunities,  and  weaker  administrative  databases,  which  prevent  cost-
effective  methods  of cross-checking  benefit  - receipt  --  and  the  existing  capacity  much
weaker.
The  lack  of appropriate  administrative  capacity  to  effectively  monitor  continuing
eligibility  and  impose  sanctions  suggests  some  of  the  desirable  design  features  of the
unemployment  insurance  system.  Under  such conditions,  the moral  hazard  problem  which
arises  from  asymmetric  information  is  particularly  prominent  and  insurance  principles
suggest  that  there  should  be  a  high  level  of deductibles  and  co-payment.  In the  case  of
unemployment  insurance,  this underscores the desirability  of (i)  limited  duration of benefits,
and (ii) declining level  of benefits during individual  unemployment  spell (see the  discussion
on declining benefits in Chapter 6).
5.3 The characteristics of unemployment
When contemplating  the introduction  or reform of an income support program for the
unemployed,  it is worthwhile to examine the characteristics  of unemployment - for example,
the frequency and duration of unemployment and the characteristics  of unemployed  workers.
As discussed above,  the choice of an appropriate policy instrument depends on the nature of
unemployment  spells.  Moreover,  the provision of income security  may only  come at  a cost
in terms of efficiency or access to (formal) employment,  so policymakers  should know which
groups  of population  are  the  beneficiaries  of different  programs,  or are  the  most  likely to
benefit from their introduction or reform.
As  argued  by  Gill  and  Ilahi  (2000),  it  is  important  to  know  the  nature  of
unemployment  spells  when judging  the  desirability  of public  income support programs.  If
unemployment  spells are  more  frequent  and  shorter,  self-insurance  measures  may be  more
appropriate;  on the other hand, less  frequent and  longer unemployment  spells speak  in favor
of public insurance programs.
There are also  other characteristics  of unemployment  in developing countries  that are
worth considering  when choosing income support programs:
*  A  peculiarity  of  low-income  countries  is  that  unemployment  may  not  be  more
common among poor workers, that is, that members of poorer households may be less
than  proportionally  represented  in  the  ranks  of  the  unemployed  (Edwards  and
Manning,  2001).  For example,  in Peru and  Brazil,  the poor show disproportionately
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Uruguay,  unemployment  is  still  heavily  represented  among  richer  quintiles  (de
Ferranti  et al, 2000).  Moreover,  in the Philippines  in  1997,  only  12.1  percent of the
households  whose heads  were unemployed  were poor, in comparison to a 25  percent
poverty  incidence  in  general  (Balisacan,  1999).  Although  the  same  group  of
households  whose  heads  were  unemployed  represented  12.7  percent  of the  total
population, its contribution  to the total number of poor persons was only 6.1  percent.
Therefore,  it  seems  that  in  low  income  countries,  members  of poorer  households
cannot afford to stay unemployed for a prolonged period of time.  They try to cushion
the loss of earnings by opting for low productivity jobs (mostly in the informal sector)
instead  of not  working  at  all  while  they continue  to  search  for more  adequate  and
better paid jobs.
*  Moreover,  in some  low-income  countries,  the most  deprived  groups  are  found  not
among  the  unemployed,  but  among  the  underemployed  (that  is,  among  employed
persons who desire to work additional hours in their present or other job, or to have a
new job with longer hours).  In the Philippines,  these are mostly unskilled workers  -
self-employed  subsistence  farmers  and  fishermen,  seasonal  workers,  and  informal-
sector  workers  (Esguerra  et al,  2001).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  contrast  to
unemployment,  underemployment  is higher in rural areas.
Implications for program choice  and design.  The  above  facts  have  important
implications for both equity and efficiency  aspects of income support programs.  First, equity
considerations  suggest  that  the  underemployed  - not  only  the  unemployed  - should  be
regarded  as an  important  potential  client  group  for income  support programs.  Second,  the
efficiency  effects of an  insurance  type of income  support program  are  difficult to  predict.
The  fact that  poor workers  prefer underemployment  to unemployment  suggests that  moral
hazard  problems  may  figure  prominently  once  insurance-type  public  income  support
programs  are offered.  Some workers  who in the absence  of unemployment  benefits  choose
temporary jobs because  they  cannot afford  to  stay out of work  (the underemployed)  would
prefer unemployment  if offered  unemployment  benefits  - that is,  insurance  would  prevent
them  from taking  self-protection  measures.  Such efficiency  losses  could  be  high,  because
activities forgone due to public income support  mnay not be much less productive  than those
carried out in formal  production units, due to the  low capital intensity of the latter ones.  On
the other hand,  if unemployment  benefits  contribute to  more effective job search,  that is,  if
the recipients  find better paying jobs or find jobs quicker, this enhances efficiency.28 In the
absence  of  empirical  evidence  in  developing  countries,  it  is  not  possible  to  make  firm
conclusions.  Third,  if unemployment  spells  are  less  frequent  and  longer  self-insurance
measures are less adequate and public insurance programs  called for.
28  According  to  Klassen  and  Woolard (2001),  the  absence  of unemployment  benefits  in South  Africa  affects
household  formation and residential choices  in ways that are detrimental  to job finding.  The  system  forces the
unemployed  to base their location decisions on the availability of economic support - generally available in  rural
areas,  often in parental households  - rather than on  the availability of job openings.  Klassen and  Woolard  thus
conclude  that the  absence  of unemployment  benefits may  not  only lower  welfare of the  unemployed  and  their
dependents, but it may also not reduce unemployment  duration - and may actually increase  it.
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The  informal  sector  is  a  pervasive  and  persistent  economic  feature  in  most of the
developing  world,  particularly  in  low-income  countries,  contributing  significantly  to
employment  creation,  production,  and income  generation.29 Recent estimates  of the  size  of
the  informal  sector  in  developing  countries  in  terms  of  the  share  of  non-agricultural
employment  range  roughly  between  a  fifth  and  four-fifths.  In terms of its contribution  to
GDP, the informal sector accounts  for a quarter to two-fifths of annual output in developing
countries  in  Asia  and  Africa.  The  importance  of  the  informal  sector  as  a  source  of
employment  and  income  is  brought  into  sharp  relief  when  juxtaposed  against  a  sluggish
formal  private  sector  and  especially  a  shrinking  public  sector  as  is  the  case  in  several
developing  countries.30 Consequently,  much of the  slack  in  the labor  force, particularly  in
urban centers,  is absorbed  by the informal  sector.  Furthermore,  during economic  crises, the
inforrnal  sector  often acts as a "shock absorber"  for the labor market, providing employment
for  numbers  of workers  displaced  from  formal  sector  jobs  as  evidenced  in  the  recent
economic crisis in South-east and East Asia.
Informal  sector  employment  is  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of insecurity.  As
shown  by Arango  and  Maloney (2000)  for Argentina,  the probability  of an  informal  sector
worker  to  become  unemployed  is  double  that  for  a  formal  sector  worker.  The  adverse
income  and  consumption  consequences  of unemployment  are  also more  severe  than  in the
formal  sector  as  income  support  measures  for  the  unemployed  are  typically  lacking.  Of
particular concern is the lack of statutory social security coverage  of informal  sector workers
in the developing  world, especially  since they constitute a significant proportion of the labor
force  if not  the  majority.  Van  Ginneken  (1999)  reports  that  coverage  is  lowest  in  sub-
Saharan  Africa and  South Asia, roughly between  5 to  10  percent  of the  labor force.  Other
regions  have  higher  coverage  rates  but  also  exhibit  high  intra-regional  variation  (Latin
America:  10  to  80  percent;  South-east  and  East  Asia:  10  to  100  percent;  and  Central  and
Eastern  Europe:  50-80  percent).  Moreover,  trends  in  social  security  coverage  across  the
developing  world show wide variation - coverage  is generally  on the decline  in sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia, level in Latin America, and on the rise in South-east and East Asia.
Being  excluded  from  programs  whose  eligibility  is  conditional  on  social  security
contributions, workers in the informal  sector are much more vulnerable to the adverse effects
of unemployment  than workers  employed  in formal  sector.  Even  small disruptions  to their
income  flows  can  cause  a  severe,  sometimes  permanent,  deterioration  in  their  economic
circumstances.  Although  they may  have access  to  public  works,  informal  sector  workers
and their households  have been largely left to their own devices.
29  The  informal  sector  is defined  in  various  ways.  For statistical  purposes,  informal  economic  activities  are
generally  defined  on  the  basis  of  their  legal  organization  (unincorporated  enterprises).  An  approximate
definition  often used  in household and  labor force  surveys is the  size of the enterprise  -- firms with  workforces
with 5 or  less workers,  for example,  are  considered  informal.  For a more  extensive  discussion  on definitions,
see ILO (2000).
30  It  has been argued that job creation in the formal sector is inhibited partly by the high costs of social security
contributions, which makes "informality"  a more attractive option.
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has important  implications  for both the design and mix of income support programs.  First, a
large informal  sector underscores  the importance of programs  which are available to workers
in the  informal sector, particularly as  many of these workers are less able to self-protect than
formal  sector  workers  (see  below).  Reinforcing  the  importance  of wide  access  to  income
support  programs  is  the  fact  that  the  informal  sector  can  be  viewed  as  an  "unregulated
entrepreneurial  sector,"  which  itself generates  many  unemployed  (Arango  and  Maloney,
2000).  Second, given abundant and diverse employment opportunities in the informal sector,
the  need  for  monitoring  the  continuing  eligibility  of  benefit  recipients  (particularly
availability for work) is likely to be large.
5.5 Inter-household transfers
In  many  economies,  private  transfers  importantly  contribute  to  consumption
smoothing  and thus  represent  a mechanism  of social  risk  management  that  should  not be
overlooked.  For example,  in  the  much  studied  case  of the  Philippines,  Cox  and  Jimenez
(1995)  showed that in 1988, transfers generally flowed from rich to poor households  and they
accounted  for  12  percent  of the  overall  income  of households.  Urban  households  in the
lowest  quintile  benefited  most  - their  income  increased  by  80  percent  as  a  result  of the
transfers.  Absent  these  private  transfers,  income  poverty  rates  would  have  been  a third
higher.  The  scope  and  intensity  of inter-household  transfers  was  uneven  across  regions.
Below we examine the nature of such transfers  (primarily  in the Philippines),  and then draw
implications for the design of income support programs.
Using detailed  data on gifts,  loans,  and asset sales, Fafchamps  and Lund (1997) find
that transfers  among rural  Filipino  households  are triggered  by  the  contingency  of a  shock
(such as the loss of work or crop failure),  and they claim that the system is best described as a
system of quasi-credit.  In this system,  mutual insurance is provided by tightly knit networks
of friends  and  relatives  through  flexible,  zero-interest  informal  loans,  combined  with pure
transfers.  Mutual  insurance  does  not  appear  to  take  place  at  the  village  level;  rather,
households receive help primarily through networks  of friends and relatives.  This highlights
the  possibility that  even  the  proximity  and  familiarity  provided  by  living  closely  together
may  not  suffice  to  provide  reliable  modes  of  monitoring,  and  to  ensure  willingness  to
reciprocate  transfers  in  the  future.  Loans  are  taken  for  consumption  purposes.  Most
borrowers  and  lenders  have exchanged  loans  before,  and many  have  switched  roles  in  the
transaction.  Indeed,  having provided  transfers  to other  households  entitles  the provider  to
call  on the  support of the borrower once  (s)he,  in tum, requires  support.  Few  loans require
collateral  or  have  a set repayment  schedule,  and  loan  contracts  are  rarely  interlinked  with
other contracts.  The majority of informal loans, 80 percent, carry no interest charge.
Fafchamps  and  Lund  (1997)  reject  models  of risk  sharing  that  portray  informnal
lending  as  an  efficient  mix  of perfectly  enforceable  credit  and  insurance  contracts:  full
insurance  cannot be rejected  for funerals and for the unemployment of the household head or
his  or  her  spouse,  but  it  can  be  rejected  for  all  other  categories  of  risk  such  as  those
associated  with  acute  sickness  and  mild  sickness.  They  also  find  that  poor households,
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receive  as much support as they may need.
An interesting  insight into the crowding  out of private transfers  by a public program
is provided  by Cox and  Jimenez  (1995).  Based  on empirical  estimates of a private transfers
function,  they  simulate  the  effects  of the  introduction  of unemployment  insurance  in  the
Philippines,  assuming  a  50  percent  replacement  rate.  Their  simulations  show  that  the
reduction  of private transfers would erode 91  percent of the income received from the public
program,  yielding very little net gain.  As mentioned above, Attanasio  and Rios-Rull  (2000)
show that the introduction of unemployment benefits may even be welfare-reducing,  because
the existence of public insurance  program may destroy the  social fabric necessary to support
private insurance arrangements  and thus crowd out private transfers.  Consistent with the this
argument and also pointing to the cultural differences  among countries as determinants  of the
size of private  transfers,  Bentolila  and  Ichino  (2000)  show that  despite  low unemployment
benefits,  the unemployed reduce  their consumption  less in the Mediterranean  countries  than
in  Germany,  the U.S.  and the  U.K.  In the  absence  of other compelling  explanations,  they
attribute this to higher private transfers  in the Mediterranean region.
Implications  for program choice and design. The  above  findings  have  diverse  and
far-reaching  consequences.  First,  although  they  may  be  sizeable,  private  transfers  are
vulnerable  to  covariant  risks,  and  offer  only  limited  insurance  against  income  shocks,
particularly  to  the  poor.  This  suggests  that  there  is  scope  for  public  income  support
programs,  including  those  focusing  on  the  unemployed.  Second,  the  size  and  nature  of
private transfers,  and the likely  substitution effects of public insurance  programs,  have to be
considered  before  such  programs  are  introduced.  Simple analyses  that  do not account  for
private  transfer  responses  to  the  expansion  or  introduction  of public  income  support
programs  exaggerate  the  effectiveness  of these  programs.  Analysis  suggests  that  these
responses  could  consist  of sharp  cutbacks  in  private  transfers,  particularly  for  programs
where  the  main  beneficiaries  are  likely  to  be  the  non-poor,  whose  transfers  are  more
responsive  to  income  shocks.  If the  introduction  of a  public  system  of insurance  breaks
down  the  habit  of self-help,  the  overall  effect  may  be  welfare  reducing.  Third,  regional
unevenness  of  the  size  of  transfers  suggests  that  some  regions  are  more  in  need  of
supplementary  public programs  such as public works than others (indeed,  the relative size of
inter-household  transfers  may  be  taken  as  one  of  the  indicators  of  targeting  of  such
programs).
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Income  Number of  Percent of households responding to crisis by:
decile  responses  Changing  Taking  Migrating  Receiving  Receiving  Increasing
eating  children  to city or  assistance  assistance  working
pattem  out of  other  from  from gov't  hours
school  countries  friends/
relatives
Poorest  2,256  56.7  12.4  7.8  16.5  10.7  37.5
2  2,223  52.3  9.3  5.4  17.1  8.8  36.8
3  2,211  50.7  7.3  5.4  16.3  8.4  33.6
4  2,206  51.0  8.7  5.2  17.0  6.8  33.1
5  2,180  47.8  7.1  4.5  17.2  5.9  29.4
6  2,155  48.3  5.6  3.8  16.4  5.7  27.0
7  2,138  47.0  5.0  3.7  15.0  4.5  26.1
8  2,125  44.1  3.5  3.4  12.5  2.9  22.3
9  2,097  41.4  3.2  3.1  13.8  3.9  23.1
Richest  2,011  33.3  1.2  3.5  12.0  2.6  18.2
Total  21,602  47.5  6.4  4.6  15.4  6.1  28.9
Source: Esguerra et al (2001).
5.6 Non-social  insurance and self-protection
While  non-social  insurance  and  self-protection  mechanisms  may  provide  adequate
protection  against  income  shocks  for  high-income  workers,  many of the  other  workers  in
developing  countries,  particularly  those employed  in the informal  sector,  remain  vulnerable
to even small income  shocks.  For example,  surveys  show that during the recent East Asian
crisis,  the  poor  in  the  Philippines  had  to  resort  much  more  frequently  than  the  rich  to
changing eating patterns, taking children out of school,  working longer hours, and migrating
to urban  areas  or other  countries  (see  table  5.1).  World  Bank  (2000)  also  shows  that the
ability of the poor to maintain their consumption in the face of crisis-induced  income shocks
is  more  limited  than  the  ability  of the  non-poor.3'  Moreover,  different  types  of  shocks
frequently result in the  exhaustion of savings set aside for consumption smoothing, and - if
they are covariant - in the reduction  of the ability of households to provide  support  to each
other.
The  savings  and wealth  of the  unemployed  offer  inadequate  self-insurance  even  in
developed  economies.  For  example,  for  the  UJnited  States,  Gruber  (1999)  finds  that the
median worker who becomes unemployed has sufficient financial assets to replace  75 percent
of  his  (her)  realized  income  loss.  He  finds  that  the  wealth of older  and  white  workers
relative  to income  losses from  unemployment  is  larger,  and that wealth  holdings  are  much
31  The findings of de Ferranti et al (2000)  deviate  somewhat from the above  ones - they find that the  poor are
affected more than the rich when the shocks are big, but vice versa when the shocks are small.  They also report
that in Latin America,  school enrollment is insensitive to aggregate economic fluctuation.
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hand,  evidence  also  shows that unemployment  benefits do crowd  out precautionary  savings.
For example,  Engen and  Gruber  (cited in Gruber  1999) find that a  10 percent increase  in the
generosity of benefits  reduces savings by 2.8 percent, and somewhat smaller elasticity (-0.18)
is reported by Bird and Hagstrom (1999) for both unemployment  insurance and means-tested
benefits.
Workers  in the formal  sector  have access  to consumer credit,  at least those higher in
the  income  distribution,  and  larger  companies  also  frequently  have  private  retirement,
education,  accident insurance,  and/or life plans for their workers.  But access to credit and to
fringe benefits  is  highly  uneven.  For  example,  in the  Philippines,  only  30  percent  of the
highest-paid  workers  have  access  to consumer  credit,  and  they tend  to  be  concentrated  in
metropolitan  Manila and other regions  in its vicinity;  outside of these regions, only about  10
to  15  percent  of workers  have  access  to  consumer  credit  (Esguerra  et  al,  2001).  These
magnitudes  are also indicative  of the relative  adequacy  of savings  that poor households  are
capable  of making.  For poorer workers  in  urban areas,  pawnshops  are a means  to generate
cash on the basis of assets they may have accumulated  - at very high interest rates.
Among  poor  workers  in  rural  areas,  insurance  takes  less  institutionalized  modes.
Because  rural  financial  markets  are  segmented  and  highly  incomplete,  in many  countries
only a minority of small farmers  can obtain agricultural  loans from banks  and other lending
institutions,  and  crop  insurance  is  very  limited.  Covariance  of risk  and  moral  hazard
problems make the establishment of credit and insurance programs particularly  difficult, and
the  poor  experience  of programs  in rural  areas  is testimony  to  this  difficulty  (Hazell  et al,
1986).  Often  farmers  resort to costly informal  substitutes of precautionary  saving  such  as
distress  sales  of productive  assets  and  accumulation  of  farm  animals  and  excess  grain
supplies.  According to Rozensweig  and  Binswanger (1992),  "investment  portfolios of small
farmers reflect their difficulties in smoothing consumption  in the face of high risks."
There  are also  specific  informal  insurance  mechanisms  that have  developed  in some
countries.  For example,  in the Philippines,  one important mechanism  of informal  insurance
used  by small farmers  is share-tenancy,  which allows tenants to borrow from their landlords
using  their share  in farm produce  as collateral.  This  arrangement  reduces  the  magnitude  of
the income loss to the farming household if there is crop failure.
It is important to bear in mind that in dealing with income shocks,  it is the household,
rather  than just  the individual,  which  is the  locus of distress  - and thus the response  to the
shock affects  all household members.  For example,  in the Philippines during the recent East
Asian  crisis,  predominantly  male  industries  (agriculture,  manufacturing,  and  construction)
were more  adversely  affected,  and  male unemployment  increased  more  than  female.  This
triggered  the  entry  of secondary  income-earners  into  the  labor  markets  - particularly  of
youths, resulting in significant declines  in high school enrollment rates.
Implications  for project choice and design.  The ability of low-income  workers  and
farmers to buy insurance  in the market, and to self-insure  and self-protect,  is limited.  While
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example,  to  take  informal jobs)  and  to self-insure  (for example,  to  save  for precautionary
reasons),  it would  also reduce their vulnerability  to income  shocks.  Interestingly,  in  Brazil,
unemployment  benefits  are  also  found  to  foster  self-protection  via  promoting  self-
employment  (Cunningham,  2000).  Possible  other  ways to  improve  self-insurance  and self-
protection  include  programs  which  address  financial  and  insurance  markets  imperfections
(such as replications of Bangladesh's Grameen Bank savings programs),  and various types of
publicly  supported  livelihood  programs.  Such programs  not only encourage  group savings
institutions,  they  also help  participants  to  "graduate"  from  being  primarily  beneficiaries  of
grants  into entities  capable of tapping the formal  financial  system.  In general,  strengthening
the financial  sector would also promote  self-insurance  by allowing  individuals/households  to
hold more diversified  saving  portfolios and thus increase the attractiveness  of precautionary
savings.  In  addition,  to  discourage  counterproductive  coping  mechanisms  such  as taking
children out of school and reducing childcare, income support programs could be targeted at
vulnerable  family  members  of  the  unemployed  in  the  form  of,  for  example,  schooling
subsidies.
5.7 The nature of shocks
The choice of the income support programs also depends  on the nature and frequency
of the shock typically faced by a given country,  in other words,  on the type of unemployment
risk  which  these  sources  represent.  Apart  from  the  idiosyncratic  risk  of unemployment
resulting  from the  ongoing,  regular  process  of labor  reallocation  in  an economy  (when  an
individual's  probability of becoming unemployed  is unrelated  to the probability  of others),
there are also other significant types of risks connected  by other sources  of shocks.  Below
we  will  discuss  shocks  associated  with  macroeconomic  volatility,  structural/technological
shocks, and geography and climate.
Before  discussing  these  sources  of  shocks,  it  is  useful  to  present  a  typology  of
unemployment  risks.  Unemployment  risk  can  be  idiosyncratic  (when  an  individual's
probability  of becoming  unemployed  is unrelated  to the probability of others),  or covariant
(when an  individual's probability  is related to the probability  of others).  Covariant risk can
be  further  categorized  as  the  risk  at the  middle  level  ("meso-risk"),  for  example,  the  risk
affecting workers of an enterprise or industry in need of structural adjustment,  and the risk at
the  macro  level  ("macro-risk"),  affecting  the  whole  economy,  for  example,  recessions.
Moreover,  risks can be also  catastrophic  (large  and rare) and  non-catastrophic  (modest  and
frequent).
Macroeconomic volatility.  Many  countries  are subject  to  large  swings  in  economic
activity,  with recessions  resulting  in  significant  reductions  in  employment  and  increases  in
unemployment.  Vulnerability  to  macroeconomic  volatility  is  underscored  by  trade
liberalization  and  the  ensuing  increase  in  intemational  competition,  and  the  spreading  of
globalization  in  general.  A  further  source  of  macroeconomic  instability  can  be  capital
account liberalization and exchange rate misalignment.  The recent Asian financial crisis also
highlighted the problem in a part of the world that once seemed to be immune to recessions.
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and  factor prices  (OPEC  shocks in the  seventies),  systemic  and political  changes  (transition
economies),  or technological  shocks  (for example,  reduction  of TFP  growth  for developed
European  countries  in  the  last  30  years)  that  put  workers  at risk  of unemployment.  The
magnitude,  duration,  and frequency  of such  shocks  have  to be  considered  when designing
income  support  programs  - as  well  as  the  interaction  of such  programs  with  the  shocks
themselves  (see above).
Geography and climate. In some developing  countries,  geography  and climate cause
significant employment  and income insecurity.  For example,  the drought  brought by the El
Nifno phenomenon  resulted  in a strong decline in agricultural  production  in South East Asia,
rendering  many  small  farmers  completely  defenseless.  For  countries  in  the  monsoon  belt,
another significant  source of  job and  income insecurity is typhoons.
Implications  for program choice and design. Not all programs  are  equally  suited  for
all types of unemployment  risks, and the selection  of programs  should take  into account the
prevalence  and severity of shocks typically confronted.  While individuals tend to self-insure
against relatively  frequent  and modest  shocks (Gill  and Ilahi,  2000), they  often cannot  take
effective protective  measures  if shocks are relatively  large and rare - particularly if they are
of a  regional  or  covariant  nature.  Public  systems  - through  the  ability  to  pool  resources
across larger groups - are called for, and there should typically be a menu of such programs,
so as to address the different  types of shocks and the different  abilities of individuals to self-
insure  and  self-protect.  For  example,  during  recessions,  many  unemployed  exhaust  their
unemployment insurance benefits, and fewer first-time job-seekers  find jobs without a period
of initial  unemployment.  Additional  programs may be needed  - for  example, public  works
and public  training programs  (note that the  latter programs  also encompass  other  objectives
besides  pure  income  transfer).  Similarly,  in  dealing  with  meso-risks,  special  redundancy
programs may be put in place to promote  enterprise restructuring.  The occurrence of natural
calamities points to the need for flexible, quickly  deployable  programs (for example,  public
works).
5.8 Cultural and political factors
There  may  be many  other  factors  which  determine  the  choice  of income  support
systems  for  the  unemployed,  and  influence  their  functioning.  For  example,  due  to
differences  in  social  norms  and  culture,  societies  differ  in  their  propensity  to  resort  to
informal  mechanisms  (such  as  reciprocal  gift-giving)  to  deal  with  economic  hardships.  In
transition  economies,  for  example,  decades  of  state  paternalism  have  reduced  private
transfers.  As  a consequence,  the introduction of formal,  public income  support  systems for
the unemployed  may not have crowded  out private transfers  on a large  scale - nor displaced
existing  social  networks  that would  have  supported  private  transfers.  Moreover,  in  some
societies,  the  receipt  of  state  transfers  - or  participation  in  public  works  - may  be
stigmatizing,  and redistributive  programs  opposed.  Countries  also differ according  to  how
susceptible  they are to corruption.
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attuned to the prevailing social norms and culture, and take advantage of existing institutions.
For example, programs which are more prone to "political risk" must be avoided  in countries
with  more  corrupt  governments.  Similarly,  targeting  income  support  to the  poor through
public  works  would  benefit  from  presenting  the  program  as being  rooted  in a  tradition  of
rural  communities'  collective  support,  such  as  is  the  tradition  of  bayanihan  in  the
Philippines.
5.9  Concluding remarks
This chapter singled  out country-specific  features  which warrant  particular  attention
when introducing  or improving  public  income  support  programs.  The justification  for this
discussion  is  the  danger  that  countries  may  adopt  solutions  which  work  well  in  other
countries  without carefully  examining which  prerequisites  are  needed and which conditions
are  conducive  for  their  successful  functioning  - and  without  anticipating  the  likely
consequences  when such prerequisites  and conditions  are missing.
T
he conclusion that the rule "one size fits all" is not valid applies even more forcefully
to developing  and transition countries.  First,  these countries may deviate  significantly from
the  typical  labor  market  and  other  institutional  features  under  which  income  support
programs  have predominantly  been "tested"  andl their properties  (as known  in the literature)
established.  Second,  the  desirability  of  alternative  income  support  programs  depends
crucially  on the  interactions  of these programs  with other  existing  social  risk management
mechanisms,  which may be very different in developing  and transition countries.  And third,
these  countries  may  lack  the  capabilities  necessary  for  the  smooth  and  effective
administration of income support programs for the unemployed.
Based  on the  discussion  of this  chapter,  table  5.2.  summarizes  key  considerations
about  the  influence  of country-specific  features  on  the  applicability  of alternative  income
support  programs  for  the  unemployed.  We  will  use  these  evaluations  to  provide  some
guidelines  for  choosing appropriate  income support  programs  for the unemployed,  the task
we tackle in the next chapter.
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Unemployment  Unemployment  Severance  pay  UISAs  Public works
insurance  assistance
Interactions with  . Benefits are less likely  Similar to Ul.  Due to interaction
labor market  to raise equilibrium  with shocks,  more
institutions and  unemployment  rate in  an  protective
shocks  economy with centralized  employment and coordinated  wage  legislation
bargaining  system,  as well  contributes to the
as in a fully  decentralized  persistence  of
system.  unemployment.
. Due to interaction  with
shocks,  more generous
unemployment  insurance
contributes to stronger or
longer lasting impacts on
unemployment.
. Benefit replacement  rate
has a stronger impact on the
equilibrium  unemployment
rate  when payroll taxes are
higher.
Administrative  . Extensive and  Similar to Ul.  . Modest  Similar informational  Less demanding capacity  for  sophisticated  informational  Additional  capacity  informational  demands as for  informational  and program  requirements  for the  needed for means  demands for  pension systems.  organizational implementation  monitoring of continuing  testing.  administering the  requirements. eligibility.  benefit.
. Cross-linking of  . May  impose a
administrative  databases is  burden on the  legal
an important  advantage.  system  to resolve
disputes about the
cause of separation.
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Unemployment  Unemployment  Severance  pay  UISAs  Public works
insurance  assistance
The characteristics  . More appropriate if  Similar to Ul.  More appropriate if  . More suitable,
of unemployment  unemployment spells  are  unemployment  spells  if unemployment less  frequent and longer.  are more frequent and  has strong
. If underemployment  is  shorter.  seasonal
large,  moral hazard  component.
problems may be  . Potential to
pronounced.  serve the
underemployed.
Unemployment  Unemployment  Severance  pay  UISAs  Public works
insurance  assistance
The size of the  Abundant informal  sector  Similar to Ul.  Potential to serve the  Potential to serve
informal sector  employment  opportunities  informal  sector  the informal sector increase the costs of  workers.  workers - many
monitoring of the  unemployed come
continuing eligibility of  from the informal
benefit recipients.  sector and are
ineligible  for
contribution based
public programs. Inter-household  Crowding out likely  Crowding out  Crowding-out  likely.  Crowding-out likely.  Regional
transfers  (reduction of  private  somewhat less  likely  unevenness  of the transfers may be welfare  than under  size of transfers
reducing).  unemployment  suggests that some
insurance,  because  regions are more in
transfers  to poor offer  need of
more limited insurance.  supplementary
public programs
such as  public
works than others.
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Non-market  *  Benefits are likely to  Similar to  Some evidence that  Particularly
insurance and self-  reduce  incentives to self-  unemployment  severance  pay fosters  valuable to  the
protection  protect (for example, to  insurance.  self-employment.  poor in rural  areas, take informal jobs)  and to  who are  especially
self-insure (for example,  vulnerable  and not
to save for precautionary  eligible to public
reasons).  programs  requiring
Ul fosters self-  contributions.
employment in  Brazil
(Cunningham,  2000).
The existence  of  Suitable  if country is prone  Similar to  Suitable if shocks  are  Suitable  in
shocks  to sectoral or regional, and  unemployment  modest and frequent.  countries with not too large  aggregate,  insurance.  frequent  natural
shocks.  disasters.
Cultural and  Less appropriate  in a country  . Some societies  Less vulnerable  to  . Less  vulnerable to  The tradition  of
political factors  prone to corruption and  may stigmatize  political risk than  political risk than most  collective  support political risk.  beneficiaries.  most other programs.  other programs.  in rural
*  Less appropriate  in  *  The program can  communities
a country prone to  upgrade already  benefits the
corruption and  existing programs and  program.
_ olitical risk.  Iinstitutions.
Source:  Derived from  the discussion  in Chapter 5.
1166.  IMPROVING INCOME SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  FOR THE UNEMPLOYED  IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The  purpose  of this  chapter  is to  provide  guidelines  for  developing  and  transition
countries about choosing among various  income support systems for the unemployed,  as well
as about  some of their design features.  The discussion draws from previous chapters  and, in
particular,  from the  two  above-established  sets  of criteria.  To  repeat,  one  set  consists  of
performance  criteria and is based on the effects of alternative  systems reviewed in Chapter 4.
These  effects  reflect  "stylized"  properties  of  the  various  programs,  established  under
conditions typically prevailing  in developed countries.  Once particular features of individual
countries are taken into account, these programs may yield substantially different results.  We
therefore  also rely on a second set of criteria,  the ones  discussed  in Chapter 5 - design  and
implementation  criteria.  This  set judges  alternative  programs  by  how  they  fit  countries'
"initial  conditions"  such  as labor market  institutions,  capacity  to administer  a program,  and
the types of shocks typically faced by a country.
In  continuation,  we  first  discuss  the  strengths,  weaknesses,  and  country  specific
circumstances  which  are  particularly  conducive  to  good  performance  of alternative  income
support programs for the unemployed,  and summarize evaluations for all programs.  We then
discuss some important  design features of unemployment  insurance,  and present  options  for
how  to  improve  income  support  for  informal  sector  workers.  We  conclude  with  general
principles to be followed when improving income support for the unemployed.
6.1. Choosing the right system
Under  what  circumstances  is  it  desirable  to  introduce  unemployment  insurance  or
some  other  income  support  system  for  unemployed  workers?  Below  we  offer  some
guidelines,  focusing  on unemployment  insurance,  unemployment  assistance,  unemployment
insurance savings accounts,  and public works programs.
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Strengths  Weaknesses  Key country specific  features
conducive  to introduction and
successful  performance
Unemployment  . Provides good  protection  (wide  . Creates  reemployment  disincentives  . Strong administrative  capacity to insurance  pooling)  . Increases  the equilibrium unemployment  monitor continuing  eligibility . Performs  well under  rate  . Modest informal sector (lower costs of idiosyncratic,  sectoral,  and regional  . Contributes to the  persistence  of  monitoring,  less sensitive reemployment shocks  unemployment  probability to job search) . Acts as an automatic stabilizer  . Susceptible to political  risk  . Low political  risk
and thus moderates  the severity of  . Does not  cover informal sector  workers  . Decentralized  or encompassing  wage contractions  bargaining structure - wage moderation
effects
. Low total tax wedge
. Low share of underemployed  workers
. Low  incidence  of private transfers
(unemployment  insurance may be
welfare-reducing  if it breaks down social
fabric that  maintains  private transfers) Unemployment  In  comparison  to unemployment  . The failure to  exclude persons  without  Similar as under unemployment  insurance, assistance  insurance:  prior work experience  (and hence without  additional capacity needed for means- . allows for the participation  of  payments  of program  contributions)  may  testing
workers with little prior work  undermine the program's  fiscal
experience  and informal  sector  sustainability
workers  . In comparison to  unemployment
. more progressive  insurance:
(other strengths similar)  . offers lower protection  for high
income workers than unemployment
insurance
. imposes larger administrative  costs
. Reduces the labor  supply of family
members
. May  stigmatize participants
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Strengths  Weaknesses  Key  country specific  features conducive  to
introduction and successful  performance
Unemployment  . Improved  labor market  . Only intertemporal  risk pooling of  . Modest, non-persistent  shocks (if this  is  not insurance  incentives  an individual (no cross-section  the case, a combination  with cross-section
savings  . Good protection,  if combined  pooling)  pooling via public  insurance  desirable) accounts  with public insurance  . Allowing individuals to borrow  . Self-policing (of reemployment incentives) (UISAs)  . Potential to attract  informal  from his or her UISA (i) generates  imposed by the UISA is a bigger advantage xUSAs) wsector  workers  incentives  to withdraw from a  given the weak monitoring capacity of
. Being payable  also in cases  of  formal sector and find a job in the  developing  countries
voluntary separations, the system  informal one, thereby avoiding the  . The conversion  of mandatory forced-savings encourages  labor reallocation and  repayment of the debt, and (ii)  type of schemes existing  in  developing cuts on the litigation  costs  reduces the gains in terms of  countries to the UISA system would facilitate . Low political  risk  reemployment  incentives  its introduction
Remark: Largely unexplored  and  . Requires  relatively well  . The introduction  of personal accounts  would insufficiently tested system  functioning  financial  sector  reduce non-payments  of employers  of social
. Larger administrative  costs  security contributions
P-ublic  works  a  r ffective in reaching  the poor  X  High proportion of material  costs  Public works  can attract inform.al  sector . Good targeting properties  . Possible stigmatization  of  workers,  an important consideration given that . Substantial capacity to  participants  the informal  sector is large and pervasive redistribute  income  from the rich  . Difficult to raise finding during  . Ability to attract workers with low forgone
to the poor  crises  earnings
. Potential to attract informal  . Because of the program's  . Undeveloped  insurance and financial  markets sector workers  redistributive character,  it is  difficult  prevent market and self-insurance,  and self- . Allow flexible and fast response  to gain political support, so some  protection
. Administratively less demanding  leakage to the non-poor may be  . The existence of large mono-crop  areas make
necessary  large segments of the population vulnerable to
Possible problems with the  cyclical and structural  shocks, and similar
maintenance of infrastructure  built  exposure  is  caused by geographic  and climatic
through  public works  shocks
. Require less complex  administration, and may
be quickly set up in areas affected  by various
shocks.
. Can benefit from traditions and values which ________________________________  __________________________________  emphasize  cooperation  and  collective  support
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Strengths  Weaknesses  Key country specific  features conducive  to
introduction and successful  performance
Severance  pay  . Does not require  sophisticated  . Does not cover  informal sector
administration  workers
. Reduces employment rates
. Hinders access to jobs by marginal
groups.
. Reduces labor market dynamics
. Creates  significant  litigation costs
Source:  Based on evaluations provided in Chapters 4 and 5.
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The above  evaluation of the unemployment  insurance  system  suggests the following
strengths  of the  program  (they are  summarized,  together with weaknesses  and  key country
specific  features conducive to the successful  performance of the program, in table 6. 1):
*  Above  all,  thanks  to the  pooling  of resources  across  a wide  base,  it provides  good
protection  by enabling a high degree  of consumption smoothing  for all categories  of
workers  who are covered under the system.
*  It performs well under idiosyncratic,  sectoral, and regional shocks.
*  By  automatically  injecting  additional  resources  - and reducing  taxes  - in times  of
recessions,  unemployment  insurance  acts  as  an  automatic  stabilizer  and  thus
moderates  the magnitude of the downturn.
The  above  strengths  have  to  be  weighed  against  the  following  main  weaknesses  of the
program:
*  The program creates reemployment  disincentives  and wage pressures,  which increase
the equilibrium unemployment rate of the economy.
*  By  interacting  with  adverse  shocks,  the  program  contributes  to  the  persistence  of
unemployment.
*  Because the program  is non-transparent,  it may create  large unfunded  liabilities,  and
since the funds are held by the government,  it is susceptible to political risk.
*  The protection  is limited to formal sector workers only.
Moreover,  some  of  the  conditions  conducive  for  good  performance  of  formal
insurance  programs  are  generally  missing  in  the  case  of unemployment  insurance,  which
dictates  some of the  design  features  of the  program.  In general,  conducive  conditions  for
insurance include the presence of large,  rare, idiosyncratic shocks,  and the absence  of moral
hazard.  In contrast, unemployment  insurance  usually operate  in environments  with (i) large
variations  in  the  probability  of  risk  - for  some  groups,  the  likelihood  of  becoming
unemployed  is very high, and for some others, very low; (ii) extreme asymmetric information
and hence  moral  hazard  problem; and (iii) highly covariant  risk.  Beside the need  for public
provision of unemployment  insurance  (see above) these considerations  point to some of the
desirable  features  of unemployment  insurance.  In  particular,  because  frequent  shocks  are
better insured  through  self-insurance,  public insurance  should not crowd out self-  insurance
completely.  It follows that formal  programs  of unemployment  insurance  should  impose,  in
insurance  parlance,  a  non-trivial  level  of deductibles  and  co-payment,  for  example  by
limiting the duration of unemployment  benefits and by imposing  a declining  level of benefits
in time.  The same conclusion is arrived at from moral hazard considerations.
Moreover, there  is a host of country specific  considerations that influence the choice
of the program.  Let us mention  some key institutional  and labor market  features  which are
conducive to its introduction and successful performance:
*  Strong  administrative  capacity  to  monitor  initial  and  particularly  continuing
eligibility.  The stricter the monitoring of the behavior of the recipients,  the lesser the
disincentives  created by the provision of insurance.
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more  abundant  are opportunities  for undeclared  paid  work,  and thus  the higher  the
costs of monitoring.
*  Environment not conducive to political risk (see above).
*  Decentralized  or encompassing  wage bargaining structure.  Unemployment  insurance
in conjunction  with  fragmented  and  uncoordinated  collective  bargaining  is likely  to
generate  strong  pressures  on  wages.  In  contrast,  decentralized  and  encompassing
wage bargaining structure are conducive to wage moderation.
*  Low  total  tax  wedge.  The  higher the  total  tax  wedge,  the  stronger  the  impact  of
benefits on the equilibrium unemployment  rate.
*  Low  share  of underemployed  workers.  The  existence  of benefits  may  attract  the
underemployed  into insured unemployment  and thus reduce  their incentives  for self-
protection.
*  Low  incidence  of private  transfers.  If the  introduction  of public  insurance  breaks
down the habit of self-help among local communities ("extended families"), replacing
private transfers by social insurance may be welfare-reducing.
If the above circumstances  are not fulfilled, the system does not perform  all that well:
it  creates  larger  inefficiencies  and/or  lower  welfare  gains.  For  example,  reemployment
incentives  depend  crucially  on  the  monitoring  capacity  of  a  country.  This  capacity
determines  how  strictly  the  conditions  of  initial  eligibility  and,  perhaps  even  more
importantly,  of continuing  eligibility  are  imposed.  As  the  experience  with  Argentinean
unemployment  insurance  suggests  (see  above),  the  capacity  for  screening  the  initial
eligibility  has not been a problem  (the existing  capacity of other social  protection programs
has been used) - but the country has still to acquire  effective capacity  to monitor continuing
eligibility.  And as pointed out above, OECD (2000) reports that effective monitoring  and the
use  of  sanctions  can  make  a  difference  - they  strongly  reduce  the  average  duration  of
unemployment  benefit  payments  and  increase  transition  rates  to  employment.  Deficient
monitoring  thus not only creates  leakages and thus adds to overall costs  (and thus may have
also indirect effects on unemployment),  but it also undermines  the legitimacy of the program,
as the system defacto ignores its own rules.
How  do  such  "child  diseases"  affect  the  decision  to  introduce  unemployment
insurance?  For example,  prompted  by  increased  exposure  to  foreign  markets  and  fearing
future international  crises,  some developing  countries  (Thailand and the Philippines  among
them)  are  contemplating  introducing  unemployment  insurance.  According  to  some
assessments,  its immediate introduction  to a country like the Philippines would be premature,
but the system should be seriously considered  in the medium  term, once some preconditions
are fulfilled (see box 6.1).
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In  a recent  paper  commissioned  by  the  ILO,  Yoo  (2001)  examines  the  applicability  of unemployment
insurance to the Philippines.  For the following reasons, he recommends  against its  immediate introduction:
•  the  lack  of consensus  either nationally  or by  social  partners  that unemployment  insurance  is  a  top
policy priority;
. concerns on the part of employers and employees about its affordability;  and
*  concems  about the financial stability of a system, given the low level of industrialization  and per capita
income in the Philippines.
Yoo proposes  the introduction  of unemployment  insurance in the medium-tern,  and cites a number of pre-
conditions  (in  fact, he  proposes  a more comprehensive  insurance  which  would also  provide  some active
measures,  as it does in South Korea). His main points include:
*  an immediate social protection priority of developing social assistance programs  for the poor;
*  an immediate  economic priority on creating the conditions for sound and continuous  growth;
•  national  dialogue among the  social partners to  determine  the best unemployment  benefits system  for
the future; and
*  capacity  building  both in terms  of (i)  employment  and  training  systems,  and (ii)  record-keeping  and
fee-collection within the social  security administration.
Source:  Betchennan (2001).
Similar  is  the  assessment  of Gill  and  Ilahi  (2000)  for  Latin  American  countries.
Noting  that  many  countries  lack  the  capacity  to  run  an  efficient  unemployment  insurance
system, they argue that although introducing unemployment  insurance  should be a long-term
goal  of these countries,  it is either infeasible  or  too costly  a strategy  for the medium  term.
They propose  that the government  should augment  other instruments  such as  self-insurance
to overcome the lack of market insurance in the medium term.
In  box  6.2,  we  look  at  the  introduction  of  unemployment  insurance,  this  time
emphasizing  welfare  and efficiency  properties.  Undoubtedly,  many workers  would  benefit
from such an introduction - but  in a  low income country,  the likely beneficiaries  tend  to be
concentrated  among already better off segments of the population, and its introduction  would
likely  bring  efficiency  losses,  with  further  negative  distributive  consequences.  Note,
however,  that  the  magnitudes  of both  the benefits  and  costs  of introducing  the  program
depend strongly on specific circumstances of individual  countries, the fact that we emphasize
throughout the report.
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On  the  benefit  side,  the  introduction  of unemployment  insurance  provides  welfare  gains  in  terms  of
smoothened  consumption  patterns.  This increase of security is certainly  valued:  for example,  Bird (1995)
estimates that individuals  are willing to pay  5-9 percent of their disposable income for insurance that would
smoothen their incomes  (estimates for the U.S. and Germany).
These positive, direct effects  on welfare have  to be qualified  in  several ways.  First, because the program is
limited to the formal sector,  the beneficiaries  are  limited to a subset of workers who,  by and large,  belong
to  better-off  segments  of the  population.  Indeed,  as  shown  above,  the  likely  effect  of unemployment
insurance  on  the reduction  of income  inequality  is small.  Second,  unemployment  insurance  brings  little
reduction of poverty,  as the likely beneficiaries  - particularly in a low-income country - are concentrated in
the  non-poor  segments  of the  population.  And  third,  the  net  effect  of benefits  on  individuals'  welfare
depends,  among others,  on the displacement  of private  transfers  by the public program;  replacing  private
transfers by social insurance may be welfare-reducing.
The  welfare  benefits  of introducing  unemployment  insurance  have  to  be  weighed  against  the  likely
efficiency costs, above all:
•  disincentives  for leaving unemployment  and higher equilibrium  unemployment  in general,  and
. more persistent unemployment.
Note  that  these  efficiency  effects  also  have  negative  distributive  consequences.  Any  increase  of
unemployment  due to the  introduction  of the program  would  most likely  affect  the  worse-off workers  in
the  society:  marginal  workers  in  the formal  sector  (such  as  young  workers  and workers  on  fixed-term
contracts) and informal sector workers, hindering their access to jobs.
To  summarize:  in  light  of the  above,  how  suitable  candidates  are  developing
countries  for  the  introduction  of unemployment  insurance?  Typically,  the  administrative
capacity  of developing  countries  (even  in upper-middle  income  group,  as  is the case  with
Argentina)  lags behind the capacity of developed countries.  This means that the system may
not perform well from an efficiency viewpoint, particularly if low quality of administration is
coupled with unfavorable  labor market conditions  (such  as high total tax wedge and  a wage
mechanism not conducive  to containing  pressures).  High informality  contributes to negative
effects  both  from an efficiency  and distribution  viewpoint,  and high political  risk (which  is
often  the  case)  from  a  politicaleconomy  viewpoint.  The  case  for  the  introduction  of
unemployment  insurance  in  developing  countries  is  thus  less  compelling  than  it  is  in
developed  countries.  Transition  countries,  having relatively better administrative  capacity,  a
more  limited  informal  sector,  and  lower  private  transfers,  were  undoubtedly  right  to
introduce  this  system,  but  as  box  6.3  argues,  adoption  of the  traditional  Western-style
program may not have been the best choice.
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transition economies?
For the following two reasons, the likely answer is "no:"
*  Evidence  shows  that  the  new  unemployment  insurance  systems  have  created  disincentives  for
reemployment.  (Given  the  experience  of developed  economies,  other  possible  negative  effects
include the  increase  of overall  unemployment,  particularly  in countries  with  strong unions,  higher
share of long-term unemployed,  lower job creation capacity,  and slower labor reallocation.)
*  These systems have had, at best, only mildly progressive  effects on income redistribution.
To  improve  incentives,  make  benefits  more  progressive,  reduce  fiscal  costs,  and  simplify  the
administration,  flat  benefits  - such  as  those  introduced  in  Estonia  and  later  also  in  Poland - would
probably be a better option.
Source:  Vodopivec et al (2001).
As  shown  above,  the  case  for  introducing  unemployment  insurance  system  in
developing countries is less compelling than it is in developed ones. How appealing  are, then,
alternative  systems?  Below  we  discuss  two  of them:  unemployment  assistance  and
unemployment insurance  savings accounts.
(b) Unemployment  assistance:  how attractive iis means-tested  targeting?
The  distinguishing  feature  of unemployment  assistance  is  that  it  screens  potential
benefit  recipients  with  a  means  test,  instead  of granting  the  benefit  to  all  workers  with
sufficient employment histories and paid contributions  as under the unemployment  insurance
system.  Does  such  targeting  of the  benefits  to  the  most  "needy"  improve  incentives  and
produce savings, thus making the system more desirable than is unemployment insurance?
Other things equal, the elimination of potential claimants by means testing is bound to
produce  savings.  But  the  experience  of Australia  and  New  Zealand  - two  of very  few
countries  that  have  a  self-standing  unemployment  assistance  program  - apparently
contradicts  this  claim.  Measured  by  the  average  cost  of  unemployment  benefits  per
percentage  point of unemployment,  the costs in both countries  exceed the comparable  costs
of unemployment  insurance systems  in  12 OECD countries (see Vroman, 2001).  As box 6.4
explains for Australia, this counterintuitive result is produced  by two  factors.  Above all, the
number of benefit recipients compared  to the nuimber of unemployed is very high - in recent
years,  the forner even exceeds the latter,  one  of the reasons  being that about  20 percent of
recipients  are full-time workers with  low wages.  Note also that workers without substantial
prior  work  history  are  eligible  for  benefits,  that  is,  that  the potential  pool  of applicants  is
larger than under unemployment insurance.  Moreover, because  the Australian  system offers
a  high  income  guarantee,  it  generates  a  relatively  high  replacement  rate.  As  result,  the
unemployment  assistance  system  fails  to  produce  savings  - but  undoubtedly,  the  system
effectively  reaches  all those whose  income  is below  some the stipulated  income  guarantee,
and smoothens  consumption.  One other feature of the Australian system is worth noting:  it
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three bottom deciles of the income distribution.32
While  the  above  findings  show  that  the  unemployment  assistance  system  does  not
necessarily  produce  savings,  they also  suggest  that  the costs  of the  system  depend  on  the
level of income guarantee  - as well as  on the effectiveness  of monitoring benefit eligibility.
Indeed,  the  experience  of two  other  countries  which  also  have  unemployment  assistance
programs  - Hong  Kong  and  Estonia  - confirms  that  the  generosity  of  unemployment
assistance  system (in terms of the costs per percentage  point of unemployment)  can be much
lower,  significantly  below  the  average  generosity  of benefit  systems  in  OECD  countries
(Vroman,  2001).  Moreover,  Vroman  suggests  that  the  Australian  system  has  serious
problems with  labor  supply  incentives  created  by  high effective  marginal  tax  rates, which
also adds to the costs of the system.
As  argued  by  Atkinson  (1995),  although  income-  or  means-testing  may  seem
attractive,  there  are  several  elements  that  have  to  be  seriously  considered.  First,
administrative  costs associated  with  identifying  and  monitoring  individuals  or families  over
their  termns  of  recipiency  can  be  costly.  Second,  there  are  serious  problems  with  the
program's  take-up.  Experience  in  Western  countries  suggests  that  a  third  or  more  of
potential  claimants  never  receive  the  benefits  (reasons  include  information  problems,
administrative  complexities,  and  stigmatization  of  recipients).  And  third,  incentives
problems  with  programs  that  condition  benefits  with  low  current  income  tend  to  be
particularly important.
Box  6.4:  Costs under the Australian unemployment  assistance system
Using  "costs  per  percentage  point  of unemployment"  as  a  metric,  the Australian  unemployment  assistance
system  does not outperform  unemployment  insurance  systems  in OECD  countries (the  metric  is defined  as the
percentage  of unemployment  benefits  in  total  wages,  divided  by  the  prevailing  unemployment  rate).  The
average  cost for  12 OECD  countries  was 0.25 in  1992  (ranging  from 0.697  in Sweden  to 0.032  in  Greece);  the
average costs of the Australian  system in the  1990s were about 0.28.
Why are  the costs  under the  Australian  system  so high?  First, the  basic  income guarantee  (25  percent of the
average wage)  is high,  producing replacement  rates that  typically fall  into the 0.60-0.90  range.  Because  of the
high  income  guarantee,  most of the  unemployed  are  benefit claimants  despite  the  income  test.  In fact,  since
1995,  the number  of recipients  has exceeded  the number of unemployed.  Second,  employed  workers  are also
eligible to unemployment assistance, and about 20 percent of claimants are employed.
Moreover,  it seems  that the  administrative costs under unemployment  assistance  are higher than  those  under
unemployment  insurance.  Additional  costs  under  unemployment  assistance  are  associated  with  the  costs  of
monitoring  income  (initial  income  assessments  for new  claims  and  income  monitoring  for  ongoing  claims).
These costs typically exceed  the costs of initial eligibility  determination  under unemployment  insurance,  which
are incurred once per claim.  The costs of monitoring availability  for work and job search are similar in the two
systems.
Source: Vroman (2001).
32  Comparative  data  for  13  OECD  countries  in  1995  show the overall  share  of transfers  going to the bottom
three deciles  ranged  from 20.8  percent  in  Italy to Australia's  58.0 percent with  the second  highest percentage
being 53.5 percent in France.  Conversely the top three deciles in Australia received  7.4 percent of transfers,  the
lowest percentage  across the same  13  countries (see Vroman, 2001).
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experience  and  informal  sector workers,  together with a more effective targeting,  is  a strong
point  of unemploymnent  assistance  (see  table  6.1).  But  in  comparison  to  unemployment
insurance programs, the program does not necessarily generate  savings, it offers a lower level
of protection  for  high  income  workers,  and  irnposes  larger  administrative  costs.  It  also
reduces  labor supply of family members and may stigmatize  recipients.  In addition, it suffers
from  similar  weaknesses  as  unemployment  insurance  (above  all,  it  creates  reemployment
disincentives,  increases  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate,  and  contributes  to  the
persistence of unemployment).
In  the  light  of above,  what  are  the  implications  for  the  use  of this  program  in
developing  and  transition  countries?  First,  under the  typical  circumstances  in  developing
countries, one potential advantage of unemployment  assistance - the fact that eligibility  does
not require prior contributions - in fact renders the program non-viable.  With large segments
of the  labor  force  either  underemployed  and  unemployed,  providing  an  income  support
program which fails to exclude persons without prior work in the formal sector (that is, In the
light of  above,  what  are  the  implications  for  the  use  of this  program  in  developing  and
transition  countries?  First,  under  the  typical  circumstances  in  developing  countries,  one
potential  advantage  of unemployment  assistance  - the  fact that  eligibility  does  not  require
prior  contributions  - in  fact  renders  the  program  non-viable.  With  large  segments  of the
labor  force  either  underemployed  and unemployed,  providing  an  income  support  program
which  fails to exclude persons  without prior work in the  formal  sector  (that is, persons  who
have  not  paid program  contributions)  would  be  untenable  on  a regular  basis:  it would  be
fiscally  unsustainable.  Unemployment  assistance  programs  in developing  countries  would
therefore  have to condition benefit eligibility  on the prior payment of program contributions,
as  is  done  under  unemployment  insurance.  Second,  due  to  administrative  constraints
typically faced  by low-income  countries,  few, if any,  may be able  to  carry  out the  required
level of monitoring  (see Chapter  5). Third, because of abundant infornal  sector employment
opportunities,  the problem of employment  disincentives  for other members of the household
would  be  more  pronounced  than  in  developed  countries.  Ineffective  monitoring  would
produce  large  leakages  - on  the  other hand,  effective  monitoring  would  not  only  impose
large  administrative  costs,  but  also  create  large  forgone  earnings.  To  conclude,  the
applicability  of unemployment  assistance  program  seems to  be  limited  to  countries  with
relatively  developed  administrative  capacity,  a  small  informal  sector,  and  large  fiscal
pressures,  perhaps  as  a  transition  system  to unemployment  insurance  (possible  candidates
being transition countries).
(c) The promise of unemployment  insurance savings accounts
Spurred  by  adverse  incentives  created  by  traditional  income  support  systems,  new
approaches  to  improve  these  systems  have  been  embarked  upon.  The  system  of
unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts  (UISAs)  is  the  most  radical  one.  Among  its
strengths, one should mention:
127*  By  internalizing  the  costs  of unemployment  benefits,  the  system  avoids  the  moral
hazard  inherent in the traditional  unemployment  insurance program. This is arguably
the most important advantage of the system.
*  Being  payable  also  in  cases  of voluntary  separations,  the  system  encourages  labor
reallocation and cuts down on the litigation costs incurred  under severance  pay.
*  In comparison to public insurance,  the program reduces  political risk.
*  Particularly  if backed  by  government  subsidies,  the  program  has  the  potential  of
attracting informal sector workers.
The above strengths of the UISA system have to be weighed against its shortcomings:
*  By  its  very  design,  the  program  - in  its  pure  form  - does  not  "pool  risk  among
individuals,  and  thus may  be  less efficient  than  those that  do  so explicitly  (such  as
formal  unemployment  insurance)  or  implicitly  (such  as  income  support  programs
financed from general tax revenues),"  as stated by de Ferranti et al (2000, p. 89). This
is the system's most serious  shortcoming.  For example,  young workers  may not be
able to accumulate  enough  savings at the time of separation to be able to self-finance
their unemployment.
*  The version of the program which allows individuals to borrow from his or her UISA
may suffer  from  a moral  hazard problems of its own:  it may generate  incentives to
withdraw  from  the  formal  sector  and  find  a  job  in  the  informal  sector,  thereby
avoiding the repayment of the debt upon reemployment  in the formal  sector.
*  Requires a relatively well functioning financial  sector.
In  comparison  to  alternative  programs,  the  program  imposes  larger  administrative
costs (this is partly related to new services,  such as account updates).
Note that  under certain  circumstances,  the absence  of pooling across  individuals  may
not be  critical.  Under modest and frequent  shocks,  as the analytical  framework  of Gill  and
Ilahi  (2000)  suggests,  self-insurance  through  savings  may  provide  adequate  smoothing  of
consumption.  Moreover,  being  aware  of the  limitations  of the  absence  of cross-section
pooling,  some  proposals  combine  UISAs with public  insurance  so as to better address large
and persistent  shocks (Feldstein  and Altman,  1998;  Guasch,  1999).  For example,  under the
proposal  of Feldstein  and Altman,  unemployed  workers  are  able draw  benefits  monthly  as
under the traditional  unemploymnent  insurance,  and the government  lends money to accounts
where the  balance  falls below zero.  Under  such as  a proposal,  the consumption  smoothing
properties of the UISA  system would be no worse than under the traditional  unemployment
insurance  system,  because  individuals with negative balances  would still receive benefits,  as
rules of withdrawal  would  be the  same as under the  unemployment  insurance  system  - yet
the UISA system would reduce labor market disincentives  for those workers who would end
their  working  careers  with  positive  UISA  balances  (note  that  this version  of the  program
reduces  the gains in terms of reemployment  incentives, but increases its insurance function).
According to some proposals, the efficiency properties of an integrated private-public
system can be further improved  by combining  several risks under one program.  Orszag  et al
(1999) and  Yun (2001) propose an integrated unemployment insurance  system, which would
128combine  unemployment  insurance  not  only  with  the  pension  system,  but also  with  other
programs such as health, disability,  and life insurance.  Such a program  would thus integrate
intertemporal pooling of various risks of the individual with cross-section pooling.  By doing
so,  the  system  is  expected  to  offer  not  only  a  superior  provision  of insurance,  but  also  a
significant reduction of disincentives  as compared to the traditional  unemployment insurance
system (see box 6.5).
Box  6.5:  Advantages  of "The Integrated Unemployment  Insurance System"
Recent  proposals to improve  both the welfare  and efficiency  effects of income support systems  for the
unemployed  include  also  the  "Integrated  Unemployment  Insurance  System."  Under  this  system,
unemployment  insurance  is provided  via integrating unemployment  insurance  with the  pension system.
Benefits are financed  via a combination of withdrawals  from an  individual savings account - on which
a worker accumulates  his/her contributions  for unemployment  as well  as  for old-age pensions  - and,
under certain  circumstances,  also from a public unemployment  insurance (which operates  on a  pay-as-
you-go  basis).  Such  a program  thus  combines  inter-temporal  pooling  of risk of an  individual  with
wide-base  pooling  under  the  traditional  unemployment  insurance  system,  and  therefore  offers  a
combination of self-insurance  through  savings and public  insurance.  In  addition, by  pooling the self-
insurance  components  and  thus  combining  several  risks  under  one  program,  the  integrated  system
reduces  the amount of savings  necessary  for providing  the  same insurance  under separate  programs
(indeed, there are also proposals to include other social insurance  systems, such as disability  and health-
care,  under the  same roof, which  is under  certain conditions  again  welfare improving - see Orszag et
al,  1999).
By  doing  so,  the  system  is  expected  to  offer  not  only  superior  provision  of insurance  and  thus
consumption  smoothing,  but  also to  significantly  reduce  disincentives  as compared  to  the  traditional
unemployment  insurance  system.  In  addition,  the  government  could  subsidize  low  wage  workers,
which  would improve  the  distributive properties  of the  system.  Moreover,  because  of the  direct  link
between  contributions  and  benefits,  the system  has  the potential  to  attract  infornal  sector  workers.
While  details of the system still need to be determined, theoretical  modeling suggests that the more risk
averse  is the  individual  and  the  lower  is  the job-search  elasticity  (that  is,  the  less  sensitive  is the
reemployment  probability to job  search),  the higher is the  level  of optimal  borrowing  from the public
part of the system (Yun, 2001).
There  are  also  some  "design  and implementation"  considerations  that by  and  large
speak  in  favor  of  the  introduction  of this  system  in  middle-  and  upper-middle-income
developing countries  and transition countries:
*  Weak monitoring  capacity  of these  countries  exacerbates  the moral  hazard  problem
inherent  in  the  traditional  unemployment  insurance  program  and  encourages  other
misuses of the system.  Hence the self-policing  nature of the UISA system represents
a bigger advantage.
*  In  developing  countries  there  exist  various  income  support  programs,  and  their
conversion  into an UISA-type  program  could  greatly facilitate  its  introduction.  For
example,  in  the  Philippines  there  are  several  mandatory  forced-savings  schemes,
which  could,  together with  severance pay,  be merged and transformed  into an UISA
system (see Esguerra et al, 2001).
129*  Under  the  traditional  unemployment  insurance  system,  employers  in  developing
countries  sometimes  fail  to  pay  program  contributions.  By  introducing  personal
accounts,  workers themselves  monitor such payments.  In addition,  the same feature
makes the UISA system less susceptible to the political risk.
*  Moreover,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  administrative  complexities  of  introducing
UISAs  do  not  stand  out  as  prohibitive;  for  example,  old-age  insurance  systems
introduced in many Latin American countries require similar information  systems. 33
In  sum,  the  UISA  system  - and  its  variant  Integrated  Unemployment  Insurance
System - may be promising options,  particularly for countries where  initial conditions  seem
to  be especially suitable (this relates to East Asia and Latin America, where the existence  of
severance  pay  programs  may  ease  the  transition-to  an  UISA  system).  There  is  a need,
however, for further investigation - and piloting - of the program.  Too little is known about
the  working  of the  UISA  system  to  know  for  which  groups  of workers,  and  under  what
conditions, the above favorable  evaluation of the system actually holds true.34 And important
design  parameters  of the  system  (regarding contribution  rates  and rules  for withdrawal,  for
example) also need to be examined (see Chapter 7).
(d) Public works
As with other programs, we present below the key strengths and weaknesses of public
works, and  discuss its applicability to developing  and transition  countries.  We also  discuss
the design features of the program.
The program has several  strengths:
*  It is effective  in reaching the poor, and has good targeting properties and a substantial
capacity to redistribute income from the rich to the poor.
*  It can attract informal  sector workers.
*  It allows flexible and fast response to shocks.
*  Is administratively  less demanding  than other public income support programs  for the
unemployed.
There  are  also  several  weaknesses  of the program,  mostly  affecting  its  capacity  to
reduce poverty:
*  High non-wage  costs reduce  the  effectiveness  of public works  in reaching  the poor.
For example,  Ravallion  (1999a)  estimates  that for  $1 of additional  eamings  of the
Smetters  (2000)  assesses  the risk of having  high administrative  costs of private  pension accounts  in the  U.S.
as  low to  medium - and a similar assessment  is valid also  for UISA accounts,  and  for other countries  as well.
To keep the costs of private accounts  low, Smetters  proposes  that investment  funds  are approved  and regulated
by  the  government,  and  subject  to  standard  auditing  controls  to  reduce  fraud.  He  also proposes  limits  on
investment  charges  as  well  as  on  free  movements  of money  between  funds.  In  such  a  case,  most  of the
administrative  costs  would  come  from  collecting  contributions  from  individual  workers,  that  is,  at few  extra
costs in comparison to the public system.
34  There  has been just one  serious attempt  at analyzing  the  working  of the  UISA:  Kugler's  (2000) study  on
Columbia (see Chapter 4 for the summary of her results).
130poor, $5 of public transfers are needed,  partly because of the leakage  of the spending
on the non-poor.
*  The countercyclical  pattern of funding shIows that it is difficult to raise funding during
crises, when the support is needed most (Wodon, 2000).
*  Because  of its  highly  redistributive  character,  it may  be  difficult  to  gain  political
support,  so some leakage to the non-poor may be necessary.
*  There  may be  problems  with  the  maintenance  of the  infrastructure  built  by  public
works.
*  Participants may be stigmatized.
Many  conditions  prevailing in developing  countries  make public  works especially
suitable for these countries:
*  The  informal  sector  is  large  and  pervasive.  Informal  sector  workers  do  not  have
access  to public income  support programs  which require social security contributions,
and thus remain vulnerable to even small income shocks.
*  Due  to  a  strong  seasonal  farn  workload,  particularly  in  mono-crop  areas,  public
works  can  be  cheaply  deployed  in  non-farm  activities  in  non-peak  periods.  The
program  thus  provides  an  opportunity  to  productively  engage  temporary  "surplus"
labor while minimizing forgone earnings and maximizing poverty reduction  effects.
*  The  existence  of  large  mono-crop  areas  make  large  segments  of the  population
vulnerable  to  cyclical  and  structural  shocks.  Similar  exposure  is  caused  by
geographic  and climatic  shocks.  In  the:  absence  of market  insurance,  public  works
can provide effective  insurance in such cases (see box 6.6 on vulnerability  of coconut
farmers in the Philippines).
*  In  comparison  to  other  programs,  public  works  do  not  require  complex
administration,  and may be quickly set up in areas affected with various shocks.
*  Obtaining  support  for  public  works  can  benefit  from  traditions  and  values  which
emphasize cooperation  and collective support, particularly in rural areas.
The experience  reviewed  above  also shows  that public  works  in transition countries
do not  increase  employability  and may stigmatize  participants,  so the program  seems  to be
less desirable for these countries.
In designing  public works  programs,  several  general  principles  should  therefore  be
followed.  First, forgone  earnings should  be minimized  by attracting  workers  who  have low
alternative  earnings  opportunities  (Ravallion,  1999a).  Second,  displacement  effects  should
be  avoided,  among  others, by the careful  selection  of areas  of activities.  Third,  while  the
program  should  in  principle  be open  to  anyone,  wages  should  be  set low enough  so as to
trigger a self-selection  mechanism through which only those in need participate.  Low wages
also  encourage  participants  to search for  a regular job.  And  fourth,  to maximize  the "bang
for  the  buck,"  projects  that require  heavy  non-labor  costs  should  be  avoided,  particularly
during  crises  (Maloney,  2000).  In  general,  as  noted  by  Ravallion  (I 999a),  public  works
programs  should  be  more  labor  intensive  than  required  by  pure  maximization  of present
value of the assets created.  He  suggests that, in  order to  enhance  their poverty  impact, the
design  of the  program  should  stress  cost-recovery  form the  non-poor,  labor  intensity,  and
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program are presented in box 6.7.
Box  6.6: Helping mono-crop  coconut farmers weathering El Nifo  droughts
A recent disastrous drought brought severe  hardship to Filipino  coconut farmers - suppliers of 60 percent of
the world's production  of coconut oil - and exposed their extreme vulnerability  to risk.  The risks facing the
sector  are both  cyclical (caused  by drought) and structural  (caused  by emerging substitutes to coconut oil).
Despite  the  risks,  inter-cropping  is  rarely  practiced  and  over  half  of  coconut  farms  are  mono-crop
plantations.
Coconut  farmers  have  little access  to market  insurance,  and  their  ability to  self-insure  and self-protect  is
limited.  There  are few opportunities  for generating  non-farm  income that  do not co-vary with  activity in
the coconut farms.  As a consequence,  inter-family  transfers and other community-based  modes of informal
insurance and  collective  savings provide  inadequate  insurance.  Moreover,  farmers  face  severe barriers  for
production  diversification,  including:  (i) the limited  size of the local  market  for non-food  products, (ii)  the
high transaction  costs  of selling non-coconut products  to urban markets (losses due to spoilage and difficult
access to urban centers),  and (iii) the lack of capital for starting new ventures.
Without  discounting  the  possible  use of other policy  instruments  (such  as commodity  price  stabilization
programs),  an obvious program to reduce the  exposure to risks of coconut growers is labor-intensive  public
works.  The  program  would  not  only  smooth  income  streams  of the  very  poor  workers  during  the  lean
seasons, but also put in place the infrastructure  needed  to improve the linkages to product and labor markets
in urban  areas.  This  can  go a long  way  towards  reducing  the  barriers  to income  and risk  diversification
(such as  inter-cropping).  Households  and  community organizations  with  more diversified  income  sources
will also  acquire  an  enhanced  ability  to tap  bank credit  for their  investment needs.  The fact that adverse
shocks  to the  coconut  sector  do not necessarily  coincide  with those  in the rest of the economy  may  also
increase  the funding possibilities  of such a program.
Source: Esguerra et al (2001).
Ravallion (1998)  also argues that a public guarantee program with the above  features
should  become  a  permanent  program.  That  would  enable  the  program  to  address  both
covariant  risks  during crises  as  well  as  idiosyncratic  risks during  non-crisis  times.  Making
the program permanent would also reduce political pressures to increase wages.
Box  6.7:  Key design  elements  of a successful  workfare: Argentina's Trabajar program
Trabajar allocates  funds across provinces  based  on the distribution  of the unemployed  poor.  Proposals to
use  the  funds  are  made  by  municipalities  and  non-government  organizations.  These  proposals  are
approved  at the regional  level,  based on a system of points related to poverty  in the area and the merits of
the proposed project.  The government  pays for the costs of unskilled  labor and the sponsoring units  pay
for the equipment,  materials,  and the skilled labor.  The wages for unskilled labor is set at two-thirds of the
average  wage  for  the  poorest  decile  in  the  capital  city.  In  principle  there  are  no  restrictions  on  the
eligibility  of beneficiaries  to participate  in the program,  but in practice there is rationing.  The financing of
the Trabajar  program  as a matching  grant scheme  not  only induces  local  governments  to commit  to the
project,  but  it also  induces  local  governments  to  make  use  of more  labor.  The  use  of labor  intensive
approaches  is thus enhanced  through  incentives  to local  governments  rather  than  through instructions  to
contractors  and engineers.
Source:  de Ferranti  et al (2000).
132(e)  Complementarity of programs and policies
There  are reasons to expect that - rather than relying  on just one  program - countries will
rely on several programs  simultaneously,  and be flexibility in their use:
*  Different programs have  different  objectives.  While  the  primary  goal  of  some
programs is compensation  for the loss of earnings, other programs and policies  may
emphasize  human  resource  development  (training,  severance  pay).  In  some  stages,
the  labor  reallocation  goal  may  deserve  special  attention  (transition  economies).
Complementary  programs  should  also  be  flexible  and  adaptable  to  changing
circumstances so as to provide help when needed.
*  Workers in the informal sector are ineligible  for certain programs.  Workers  in the
formal sector may be covered by public programs  such as unemployment  insurance or
severance  pay - but workers  in the  informal  sector are ineligible  for these.  So it  is
important that the government also provides programs where anybody can participate
- for example, public works and training programs.
*  Different programs  follow different eligibility rules (different participation  criteria).
In contrast to programs where participation  is limited, some  others are open to anyone
- and individuals  themselves  decide whether to  participate  or not. Self-selection  can
be a very powerful targeting mechanism (Ravallion,  1999a).
Among  complementary  programs,  those  usually  labeled  as  "active  labor  market
programs"  (training,  employment  subsidies,  job-search  assistance,  promotion  of  self-
employment,  youth  programs)  should  be  specifically  singled  out.  Depending  on  the
country's  fiscal  position,  objectives,  and  conditions,  they  may  be  used  to  promote
employment  opportunities  of the  unemployed.  While  the  discussion  of these  policies  is
beyond  the  scope  of this report,  two aspects  where  "active"  and "passive" policies  interact
are worth mentioning.  First, these two types of policies should be carefully coordinated.  For
example,  if participation  in an active  program  qualifies  individuals  for benefit  receipt  upon
completion,  this may  create perverse  incentives  for enrollment  in such programs,  as well as
weaken incentives for reemployment.
Second,  active  labor  market  programs  may  be  used  as  a  screening  device  for
participants  of income  support  programs.  As  discussed  above,  some  of unemployment
benefit recipients  may not  be searching for jobs.  One  way to test recipients'  willingness to
work  is through  requiring  a  proof of job  search  (for  example,  regular  job  offers).  But
especially when unemployment is high, this kincd  of test does not serve the purpose and may
impose  undue  costs  on  claimants  - and  employers.  Placement  in  active  labor  market
programs provides a suitable alternative.  Those who are not genuinely  looking for a job may
rather  lose  the  benefit  than  participate  in  a program.  Calmfors  (1994)  reports  that  more
intense counseling  of the  unemployed  led to 5-10  percent  decline  in the  registration  of the
target population.
Complementarity  issues arise also from the fact that the locus of distress is often the
household, rather than the individual.  To discourage counterproductive  coping mechanisms
such as taking children out of school  and reducecl healthcare, income support programs could
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example,  schooling  and  health  subsidies.  A  successful  example  is  Mexico's  Progresa
program,  which gives  grants to poor families  provided  that their  children attend  school  and
visit  health  centers  regularly.  As de  Ferranti  et al  (2000)  note, however,  the  ability to use
such programs beyond that of just a crisis-related  intervention and as an instrument of social
insurance  may be limited.
Important  complementarities  exist  also  between  income  support  programs  and
government  policies,  particularly  labor  market  and  financial  policies.  A  well  functioning
labor market  can  substantially  increase  chances  for  self-protection  (by reducing  the  risk of
unemployment),  as well as for self-insurance (by contributing  to short unemployment spells).
Moreover,  as  emphasized  by  Gill  and  Ilahi  (2000),  to ensure  balanced,  market-augmented
social  risk  management,  the  government  should  not  only  pay  attention  to  income  support
programs,  but  it should  also  foster the development  of insurance  and  financial  markets,  as
they can greatly improve self-protection  and self-insurance  mechanisms.
(f) Summary evaluation  of programs
We  have  seen  that  alternative  income  support  programs  for the  unemployed  have
their strengths,  but also  weaknesses.  Below we  summarize the  evaluation of the  programs,
having  in  mind  their  applicability  to  developing  and  transition  economies  (see  also  the
summary in table 6. 1):
*  Unemployment insurance, thanks  to  its wide  risk-pooling,  enables  a high  degree  of
consumption smoothing for all categories of workers and performs  well under various
types of risks;  it also acts as  an automatic  stabilizer.  On the negative  side,  it creates
reemployment  disincentives  and  wage  pressures  and  thus  increases  the equilibrium
unemployment  rate;  in addition,  it contributes  to the  persistence  of unemployment
and  is  prone  to  political  risk.  Because  successful  performance  relies  on  strong
administrative  capacity  to  monitor  program  eligibility,  conducive  labor  market
conditions, modest size of the informal sector, and environment of low political  risk -
the conditions which are typically  lacking in developing  and transition countries,  the
case  for  the  introduction  of  unemployment  insurance  in  these  countries  is  less
compelling than it is in developed  countries.  Its existence  may also reduce incentives
for self-protection  and break  down  the  habit of self-help  among  local  communities,
which  may  be  welfare-reducing.  Introducing  of unemployment  insurance  is  thus
viewed as a longer-term  goal for many of these countries.
*  Unemployment assistance, while  enabling  more  effective  targeting,  may  not bring
savings  in comparison  to unemployment  insurance  - and in fact  may prove  fiscally
unsustainable,  due  to  the  increased  pool  of  potential  applicants  created  by  the
program's  failure  to  base  eligibility  on  contribution  payments  deriving  from  prior
work  history.  In  addition,  in  comparison  to  unemployment  insurance,  it  offers  a
lower  level  of protection  for  high  income  workers,  imposes  larger  administrative
costs, and may suffer from similar employment disincentives.  Its applicability is thus
limited,  perhaps to countries  with relatively developed  administrative  capacity  and a
small informal  sector - a rare breed among developing and transition countries.
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promising  option  for developing  and transition countries.  By internalizing  the costs
of unemployment  benefits,  the  program  avoids  the  moral  hazard  inherent  in  the
traditional  unemployment  insurance  program  and  thus  improves  reemployment
incentives  - given  the  weak  monitoring  capacity  of  developing  countries,  an
important advantage.  In  its integrated  version  with public insurance - thus avoiding
its main  weakness  of the absence  of risk-pooling  among individuals  - the  program
promises to  yield both superior protection  and improved  incentives,  and has also the
potential  to  attract informal  sector workers.  Admittedly,  by allowing individuals  to
borrow from his or her UISA account, this version of the program creates problems of
its  own - it  creates  incentives  to  withdraw  from a  formal  sector so  as to avoid  the
repayment  of the debt,  and  reduces  the  gains  in terms  of reemployment  incentives.
Because the system has been largely untested, a further investigation of its effects and
design parameters, including piloting of the program,  is needed.
*  Public works program  is effective  in reaching the poor, has good targeting properties
and a substantial  capacity to redistribute  income  from the rich to the poor,  is able to
attract informal  sector workers and provide  flexible and  fast response to shocks,  ands
is  administratively  less  demanding  than  other  public  income  support  programs.
Despite  its weaknesses  - high non-wage  costs,  the likely  countercyclical  pattern  of
funding,  and, in some countries,  stigmatization  of participants - it is found as suitable
for developing countries, particularly as a complementary program.
*  Severance pay  offers  few  advantages.  Because  it  adversely  affects  efficiency,
produces  high litigation costs and offers  limited risk-pooling  ability, severance  pay is
recognized  as  one of the least appropriate  options (a similar assessment  is arrived  at
by de Ferranti et al, 2000).
6.2. Some issues in the unemployment  insurarnce design
Based  on  the  results  of  previous  chapters  we  offer  here  also  some  guidelines
regarding improving two key parameters of unemployment insurance  programs: the level and
duration  of benefits.  As  for the level of benefits, the evidence  is not  so clear-cut,  although
the  support  for  a  declining  pattern  in  time  may  be  stronger.  As  for  the  duration  of the
entitlement,  we  argue  that  allowing  for  diff'erent  entitlement  durations  contributes  to
equalizing the probability of finding a job within the entitlement period, and is thus justified
from a fairness point of view.
Should unemployment benefits decrease in time?  In  a world  free of reemployment
disincentives  created  by  unemployment  benefits,  welfare  maximization  dictates  constant
(flat)  benefits,  so  as to  smooth  consumption.  Once  we  introduce  moral  hazard,  however,
insights from the optimal unemployment  insurance  literature  suggest that benefits should be
"front loaded,"  that is, that the replacement  rate should be a declining function of time spent
in  unemployment  (Shavell  and Weiss,  1979,  Hopenhayn  and Nicolini,1997).  This  makes
intuitive sense:  in order to provide optimal incentives for reemployment,  failure to find a job
should  be punished by reducing  the unemployment  benefit.  Recent results of this stream of
literature also show that a strongly decreasing tirne structure of unemployment  benefits could
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Nicolini,  1997).  The reemployment tax imposes a penalty for opportunistic  behavior while at
the  same time allows  for a higher income  replacement rate  later in the  spell, thus providing
better consumption smoothing.
There  are  also  other  considerations  beside  the  moral  hazard  that  lead  to  declining
unemployment benefits.  Cremer et al (1996)  show that such  a policy can also follow from an
adverse  selection problem  arising  from  the  inability  of the benefit  administration  office  to
distinguish between workers who wait for a job that fits their preferences or productivity,  and
workers  who  are engaged  in informal jobs and refuse to take any job offers.  Wright (1986)
shows  that  in an economy  where  less  than half workers  are  unemployed,  the  median voter
will  choose  a  declining  benefit  schedule.  Moreover,  by  increasing  the  escape  rate  from
unemployment,  declining  benefits  reduce  the  incidence  of long-term  unemployed  and  thus
contribute to a smoother response  to shocks by an economy (Blanchard and Woflers,  1999).
Recently,  however,  Cahuc  and  Lehmann  (2000)  showed  that  - when  endogenous
wage determination  through collective  bargaining is introduced in moral hazard models - the
case for declining  benefits is reduced.  Such general equilibrium modeling shows that - given
the  tax  rate  of wages  used  for  financing  unemployment  benefits  - moving  from  a  flat to
declining  profile  of benefits,  while  indeed  increasing  the  intensity  of job  search  of the
unemployed,  could  have  two  undesirable  effects.  First, the  effects  on the  reduction  of the
equilibrium  unemployment rate are  much more modest than in the case of exogenous  wage
formation  and  it  could  even  lead  to  higher  equilibrium  unemployment  (the  last  is  not  a
general  result,  as  it  holds  only  for  introducing  mildly  declining  profiles  instead  of a  flat
profile).  Second,  the  welfare  of the  long-term  unemployed  suffers  and the  society  moves
away from the Rawlsian justice criterion.
There  are  two  other  criticisms  of the  declining  pattern  of benefits.  First,  Meyer
(1995)  notes  that  it  overlooks  the  increased  incentives  of  the  unemployed  to  enter
unemployment  (this criticism assumes that when changing the time structure of benefits,  the
initial replacement  rate  is raised).  Second,  the finding of Gruber  (1999) that the capacity  of
the  long-term  unemployed  to  self-insure  is particularly  low provides  an  argument  against
lowering  unemployment  benefits  over time from  the  point of view of adequacy.  (Gruber's
findings  also  speak  in  favor  of  a  waiting  period  before  one  can  claim  unemployment
benefits.)
Should the potential length of the entitlement period be  equal for all? 'There  are
grounds  to argue that allowing  for  different  entitlement  durations  contributes  to equalizing
the probability of finding  a job within the entitlement  period.  For example, Mickewright  and
Nagy  (1994)  show  that  the  expected  length  in  unemployment  varies  tremendously  among
different groups of unemployed  (for a male who finished  college, aged 21-25, a non-manual
worker  who  lives  in  the  capital  who  lost  his job and  entered  unemployment  directly  from
previous unemployment,  the expected length of unemployment  is 9 months, and for a person
with primary  education,  aged 45-50,  a manual  worker living outside the capital the expected
length of unemployment is more than 3 times higher).
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potential  entitlement duration  on the  basis of the work experience  of claimants.  This seems
to be a suitable variable  to take as a basis for differentiation:  not only is it correlated  with the
probability  of exit from unemployment,  but it also allows  the system  to obey the insurance
principle,  as experience  obviously determines  contribution  period.  Micklewright  and Nagy
(1994) also  show that age - and therefore  also experience  - is one of the main determinants
of exit probability:  according to their estimates,  a  10 percent increase  in age leads to a fall  in
the hazard of exit from unemployment to employment by 8 percent.
6. 3.  How to improve  income  protection of the informal sector?
As  emphasized  throughout  the report,  informal  sector  workers  are often  not  able to
adequately  self-protect  and  self-insure  against  income  shocks  - and  their  chances  of
participation  in public income  support programs  are often  very low.  Below  we explore  in
more  detail  the  reasons  for  the  low  coverage  of social  security  programs  in  developing
countries, and  summarize  recent  innovative  approaches  to the protection  of informal  sector
workers.
What  are  the  reasons  for  low  statutory  social  security  coverage  in  developing
countries  and the  exclusion  of informal  sector  workers  in particular?  The low coverage  is
largely  attributable  to  the  inappropriateness  of statutory  programs  as is for  the  informal
sector - qualifying  conditions and contribution  requirements  of statutory  programs  are often
inconsistent  with  the  predominant  nature  of  informal  enterprises  (one-person  or  small
workforces),  employment  (non-wage  and  often  irregular),  and  earnings  (low  and  often
irregular),  effectively  precluding  their  participation.  Furthermore,  the  benefits  from
participation  in these  programs  are  also often  incompatible  with the  social protection  needs
of informal  sector workers (van Ginneken,  1999).
Several  other  factors  also  hinder  the  extension  of social  protection  coverage  to
informal  sector  workers.  For  example,  in  many  countries,  the  long-standing  bias  against
informal  sector activity by the  state has resulted  in the neglect of the  social protection needs
of informal  sector workers.  But even if due recognition  is accorded to the informal sector by
the  state,  extending  coverage  poses  many  practical  challenges  of its  own  considering  the
inherent  diversity,  complexity,  and obscurity of informal  sector  activities.  These  attributes
make it difficult to ascertain  the nature  of risks and the  demand for social  protection in the
informal  sector (information asymmetry problem), hampering efforts to develop suitable risk
management  measures.  For example,  given that the  informal  labor market  largely operates
unmonitored,  information  on the extent,  frequency  and duration of unemployment faced  by
workers  is for  the most  part unavailable.  Because  informal  sector  workers  largely  operate
outside  the  purview  of  regulatory  authorities,  monitoring  and  enforcing  social  security
requirements  can also prove  challenging.  Clearly,  these  issues have strong implications  for
administrative  capacity  and costs.  In many developing  countries, the administrative  burden
and costs of extending coverage to the informal  sector may, as a result, be prohibitively high.
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various  public  and private  social  security  provisions.  In  addition,  in  many  countries,  the
bureaucratic  red tape  associated  with joining public provisions often  discourages employers
and workers  from doing  so.  And lastly,  distrust of the  state  by those  in the  informal  sector
stemming  from  the  adversarial  relationship  they  share  has  also  hurt  efforts  to  extend
coverage, lest participation  in social  security programs expose them to the heavy hand of the
state for not complying with other regulations  (van Ginneken,  1999).
Generally,  the  only  forms of publicly-provided  income  support provisions  available
to  informal  sector  workers  and  their  households  are  public  works  and  social  assistance
programs,  both of which  are  non-contributory  and,  through  differing  mechanisms,  target
benefits to individuals who are in economic need.  Absent these, informal sector workers and
their households  have  been  largely  left  to their own  devices.  For the  vast  majority,  being
subsistence  earners,  saving  to insure  against risk  is near  impossible  as  current basic  needs
take  immediate  priority.  Obviously,  the  poorest  of  the  poor,  the  ones  that  need  social
protection  the most,  are the most vulnerable  - even the slightest disruption to income flows
can cause a severe, even permanent,  deterioration in their economic circumstances.
Sans  external  assistance,  the  informal  sector  has  shown  great  ingenuity,  developing
informal,  community-based  measures  to prevent,  mitigate, and  cope  with various risks on a
limited  scope.35 One  such mechanism  has  been the  pooling of available  resources  by the
community  to  assist  members  in  economic  need.  In  recent  times,  these  traditional  group
arrangements  have  been  supplemented  or  supplanted  by  private,  often  larger  scale
arrangements such as cooperatives, mutual benefit and rotating credit societies, many of them
with  outside  assistance  such  as  from  non-governmental  organizations.  Furthermore,
increasingly,  non-governmental  organizations  have  also  introduced  other programs  to assist
workers improve their livelihoods and strengthen their risk management  strategies.  The most
widespread  of  such  interventions  has  been  in  the  provision  of  micro-credit  for  the
establishment,  continuance,  or expansion  of employment-  and income-generating  activities.
Technical  assistance  and  training for micro-enterprise  development  and  self-employment  as
well  as  the  infusion  of  new,  innovative  technologies  and  techniques  have  been  less
36 common
The germination  of these community-based  arrangements  have  helped  strengthened
the  capacity  of the  poor  to  address  their  risks  - various  insurance  instruments  have  been
introduced  to pool risks faced by low-income  households  and reduce  their exposure  to risk-
induced  losses.  Health  insurance to cover  the cost of limited health care  has been the most
prevalent.  But,  more and  more,  micro-insurance  products and  services  are  being  designed
and implemented to cover contingencies  such as death,  disability, maternity, as well as loss
35  These  arrangements  however,  are  extremely  fragile,  and  are  particularly  susceptible  when  a  large-scale
adverse event such as an epidemic or natural catastrophe  occurs.
36  Usually  provided  through  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs),  training  has  mostly  been  ad  hoc,
provided  on-the-job  (for  example,  apprenticeships).  Micro-finance  institutions  have  also  been  known  to
provide some technical assistance and training to their credit clients.
138of productive  assets, housing,  or property due  to natural  catastrophes  or otherwise  (see  box
6.8).  In  addition,  measures  are  being  taken  to  reduce  risk,  for  instance,  through
improvements  in  working  and  workplace  conditions,  disease  prevention,  and  awareness
raising.  The  various  community-based  interventions  have  succeeded  where  formal
provisions  have  failed,  mainly  because  they  have  been  designed  cognizant  of  the
circumstances  and  social  protection  needs  of their  intended  clients.  However,  to  a  large
extent, these  interventions  have  been  ad hoc  and  narrowly  targeted.  Furthermore,  critical
questions  regarding  program  sustainability,  cost-effectiveness,  feasibility,  and  replicability
remain unanswered.
Box 6.8: The SEWA integrated social security system, India
The Self Employed  Women's  Association  (SEWA), based  in Ahmedabad,  India,  is a trade union organization
comprised  primarily  of poor, self-employed  women  workers.  Main  activities  include  providing  assistance  in
the form of credit, technical  assistance, and training  for income-generating  activities.  A more recent foray by
the  organization  has  been  in  social  security.  The  integrated  social  security  system  was  introduced  in
response  to the  need expressed  by members  broadly  for  protection  against the adverse  impacts  on household
incomes  caused  by  sickness,  death,  and  destruction  to  property  and  assets  caused  by  natural  catastrophes.
Consultations  and member participation  was integral  in the  design  and implementation of the program.  The
scheme  is insurance-based  and voluntary  in  nature.  It  is  principally  administered  by  SEWA  Bank with  the
involvement  of national  insurance  institutions.  Premiums  are  financed  in  equal  shares  by  beneficiary
contributions  (facilitated  through  flexible  payment  arrangements),  grants,  and  subsidies  from  insurance
agencies.  In the  late  1  990s, about  32,000 members  (14 percent  of the total  membership)  were  insured under
this program.
In agreement with the social  protection needs of the membership,  the integrated social  security scheme  covers
sickness,  natural or accidental  death and disability,  matermity,  and loss of or damage to housing and productive
assets.  The  health  insurance  component,  in  particular,  was  favorably  received  --  members  showed  a
willingness  to pay as  the service placed  a strong emphasis on quality  and was  sensitive to their health  needs.
However, program effectiveness  and attractiveness  were undermined by the program's  exclusion of household
members other than the insured SEWA member, and of certain diseases and treatments.  The insurance benefit
amount of Rs.  1000 was  inadequate  in 50 percent of the cases.  In addition, most clients were from  the urban
center  of Ahmedabad,  and  efforts  to  expand  the  clientele  base  to  include  those  in  rural  areas  have  been
hampered  by the over-centralization  of administrative procedures.  Administrative  difficulties  related to claims
processing have also been reported.  Notwithstanding,  SEWA  is actively  pursuing strategies to strengthen  the
administrative  capacity,  long-term  financial  sustainability,  and  quality  and  effectiveness  of the  integrated
scheme.  Measures  include  decentralizing  operations,  expanding  coverage  and  benefits,  and  restructuring
premiums.
Sources:  Jain (1997) and Lund and Srinivas (2000).
In conclusion,  one needs to examine how existing statutory social security provisions
can  be  extended  to encompass  informal  sector workers  - and  how  new institutions  better
serving  the  needs  of informal  workers  can  be introduced.  Clearly,  extending  coverage  of
existing  programs  is  only  possible  if they  are  adapted  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of
informal  sector  workers  and  their  social  protection  needs.  For  example,  qualifying
conditions  for  social  insurance  schemes  need  to  be  relaxed  to  allow  for  the  unique
characteristics  of firms,  occupations,  and employment  in  the informal  sector.  In addition,
innovative  solutions  involving  new arrangements  and mechanisms  need  to  be sought.  For
139example,  Arango  and  Maloney  (2000)  argue  that  income  support  programs  need  to  be
delinked from jobs in order to reach informal  sector workers.  Indeed,  by making a clear link
between  contributions  and  benefits,  the  UISA  system  could  function  in  this  role,  but  its
successful  penetration  might  require  temporary  government  subsidies  (for  example,  by
matching  the  contributions  made  by  the  poor).  Other proposals  include  involving  non-
governmental  organizations  in  collecting  contributions,  delivering  benefits,  and monitoring
beneficiaries  (Sethuraman,  1997).  These  organizations  often  organize  workers  into
associations,  making  it easier  for the  state  to  provide  coverage.  Mobilization  of informal
sector  workers  by  NGOs  has  been  successfully  done  in  many  developing  countries  (for
example,  by SEWA in India).
6.4 Concluding remarks
In  this  chapter  we  offered  guidelines  for  countries  about  introducing  or  improving
their income  support  systems  for the  unemployed,  and  provided  a  summary  evaluation  of
alternative  programs.  Although  knowledge  about  the  working  of these  systems  and  other
mechanisms  of social  risk management  has increased,  our guidelines  are still rather general.
As  emphasized  throughout  the  report,  when choosing  among  income  support  programs  for
the unemployed,  individual countries will therefore have to evaluate alternative  programs for
themselves,  by both taking into account programs'  numerous effects and features,  as well as
examining  how the  programs  fit their  specific  circumstances.  The  complexity  of this  task
will  be  greatly  reduced  if  policymakers  determine  their  priorities  in  terms  of  target
beneficiaries,  as  well  as  the  importance  which  they  attach  specific  aspects  of program
performance.  By doing so, they will be able to  weigh different aspects of performance  of
the programs  against each other, and thus to arrive at a country-specific  ranking of options.
To  conclude, let us reiterate  three  general principles  which  should be  followed when
building income  support for the unemployed:
*  Adopt holistic view.  Income  support  systems  must be  seen in  the wider  context  of
other  formal  and  informal  mechanisms  of  social  risk  management.  Relatedly,
particular  attention  should  be  devoted  to  the  development  of financial  and  labor
markets,  both  being of great  importance  for the ability of individuals to  self-protect
and self-insure  .
*  Strike the right balance.  Primarily  this  means  striking  a  balance  between  publicly
provided programs  and private  self-insurance  and self-protection  mechanisms,  and  a
balance  between  public  cash  benefit  and  in-kind  benefit  programs,  notably  public
investment  in basic education  and health.  The latter ones  can significantly  improve
the long-term chances for self-protection.
*  Be prepared  for the risk. Safety  net  programs  are  investments  (Ravallion,  1999a).
The recent  economic  crisis  in East Asia and recurrent  crises  in  Latin America  show
the  advantages of having  income support  programs  in  place  before  a crisis hits.  If
that is not the  case, program quality  suffers  (it takes  time to get programs  approved,
and to build information and monitoring mechanisms).
37 For example,  by subsidizing the cost of participation  of low-income households,  South  Korea significantly
expanded health  insurance coverage to this group.
1407.  KEY ISSUES  FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The above  review of the performance  of income support systems shows that most of
the  research  focuses  on  OECD  countries.  Moreover,  the research  has  concentrated  on the
effects of unemployment  insurance  and  severance  pay  (the  latter being part of employment
protection  legislation).  Much  less  is known about  developing  and transition countries  - yet
there are compelling reasons to study the experience  in these countries, too.  Not only is there
a rich experience  with different  support programs from which a great deal can be learned, but
also, labor  market conditions  and other relevant  circumstances  differ profoundly  from those
in developed  economies.  Crucial  differences  include the presence  of a large informal  sector,
the importance  of informal  risk sharing  arrangements,  and poor administrative  capacities  of
developing  countries.  These features  have importance  implications  for the performance  and
thus the possibility of replicating OECD-style  income support programs for the unemployed.
Organized research on income  support systems in developing  countries is carried  out
by several  international  agencies  and  research centers.  Let us mention  a  few:  The InFocus
Programme  on  Socio-Economic  Security  at  the  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)
focuses  on  evaluating  current  transformations  in  unemployment  benefit  systems  globally,
understanding  the  implications  of the  changing  character  of labor market  participation  and
increasing  informalization,  as well  investigating  ways to  enhancing  the  income  security of
excluded or special  groups  (for example, women).  One of the recent outputs that,  similar to
this report, provides an overview of income support systems for the unemployed, is Standing
(2000).  OECD  and the  Center for Economic  Policy  Research  (CEPR),  U.K.,  have  done  a
large  amount  of work  on  unemployrnent  benefits  systems  either  in  specialized  research
programs  or  under  the  broad  umbrella of labor  economics  research;  they both  also  have
programs which focus on transition economies.38 And of course, research on income support
programs  is also supported by the World Bank,  both in its research  department  and outside it
(one  excellent  recent  project  was  implemented  by  the  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean
region, resulting in a major report  "Securing our Future  in a Global  Economy" - de Ferranti
et al, 2000 - and several high-quality background papers).
Given this background,  we identify below several  fruitful  areas of future research,  for
which the World Bank is well suited to carry out.
*  Feasibility,  incentive  effects,  and  design  of  unemployment  insurance  savings
accounts.  The UISA system is a new and promising program, which has aroused a lot
of interest  among  the  academicians  and  practitioners,  yet  very  little  hard  evidence
exists on its functioning.
*  Incentive effects of unemployment  insurance in developing countries.
>  For non-transition  economies,  little is known  on the intensity of the  moral hazard
problem;  if administrative  capacity and hence  monitoring of job search is low, one
can  expect  that the  moral  hazard  problem  would  be pronounced.  On  the  other
hand, low job creation of some economies and the ensuing  low probability of exit
38  Among other research  institutions dealing with unemployment  benefit systems  and labor economics  research
in general,  which  focus on  developed  economies  and  the  U.S.  in particular,  one  should  mention  the National
Bureau for Economic  Research (NBER)  and the W.  E. Upjohn Institute for Employment  Research, USA.
141form unemployment  to employment renders monitoring  ineffective.  It is important
to determine the size of these effects in the context of developing  countries.
>  For  transition  economies,  one  should  exploit  frequent  changes  in  their
unemployment  insurance  systems  which offer opportunities  to examine the effects
of these  "quasi-experiments"  on  escape  rates  from  unemployment.  Of particular
interest  are  these  countries'  recent  attempts  to  impose  stricter  monitoring  of job
search and other conditions for keeping unemployment  benefits.
*  Post-unemployment  earnings and job-matching  effects of income  support  programs,
and  unemployment  insurance  in  particular.  Disincentives  for  exit  from
unemployment  to employment created by unemployment  insurance would be viewed
in  a  different  light  if benefits  from  unemployment  insurance  showed  up  as  better
matches  between the  worker and his new employer;  if so, this would result in higher
post-unemployment  wages.  The evidence  so far is inconclusive.
*  Effects  of  different  labor  market  policies  and  income  support  programs  on
equilibrium  unemployment  and  labor market flows.  While there is an abundance  of
such  studies  for  developed  economies,  these  effects  have  not  been  researched  for
developing countries.
*  Consumption smoothing effects of income support programs in developing countries.
While  there  is  large  amount  of literature  on  other  distributive  effects  of various
income  support  programs  (for  example,  on  the  reduction  of poverty  and  income
redistribution  effects),  there  is little  evidence  on consumption  smoothing.  (There  is
rich  literature  on the  consumption  smoothing  effects  of unemployment  insurance  in
developed countries.)
*  Evaluation  of  the  merits  and  shortcomings  of  unemployment  assistance  as  an
alternative  to the  traditional  unemployment  insurance  system.  Among  the possible
merits,  the  research  would  examine  the  ability  of means-testing  to  contain  overall
costs, as well as to reduce the moral hazard associated  with unemployment  insurance.
Among  the shortcomings,  the research  needs  to  look carefully  into how  adequate  is
consumption  smoothing  under unemployment  assistance,  how big are  the  additional
costs  of administering  the  system,  and  what  other  negative  incentive  effects  the
system produces.
*  Political  economy  and  income  support  systems.  While  there  exists  fragmented
evidence  on  the  ability  of different  income  support  systems  for the  unemployed  to
resist political risk and conditions conducive to sustained budgetary  support, the gaps
in  knowledge  are  still  sizeable.  Frequent  changes  in  income  support  programs  in
transition economies,  for example, could  provide the leverage  needed  to identify the
conditions  conducive  to  changes,  and  draw  conclusions  on  the  susceptibility  of
different programs to political risk.
*  The  interaction  of various  income  support  systems  and  which  systems  work  well
together.  Usually,  different  programs  are  analyzed  in  isolation,  but there  may  be
important synergies among various programs,  for example,  from the viewpoint of the
likelihood that different programs are approved,  or from an  efficiency viewpoint.
142In what follows, we further describe the research on unemployment  insurance savings
accounts.  It  seems  that  the  international  development  of this  idea  has  reached  a  pivotal
moment,  which puts this  area  high  on the  priority  list.  The  following  research  issues  are
identified:
1.  How  feasible  is  the  UISA  system?  Unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts
eliminate pooling  across individuals.  If a significant proportion of workers cannot by
themselves accumulate  sufficient resources to draw  upon during their unemployment
spells,  then such a  system  is irrelevant  - it does  not do away  with the moral hazard
problem.  Providing a  look  at the  feasibility  problem,  Feldstein  and  Altman  (1998)
simulate  the  working of the  UISA  system  for the  U.S.  and  conclude  that  the  UISA
system is a viable alternative;  it remains to be seen if this conclusion is also valid for
other, particularly  developing countries.
2.  What is the impact of existing UISA  systems  in Latin America on job-search  and
other  labor  market  incentives?  As  discussed  above,  theory  predicts  that  by
internalizing  the  costs  of  unemployment  benefits,  the  UISA  system  avoids  the
reduction  of the  job-search  effort  inherent  in  traditional  unemployment  insurance
systems.  For  which  groups  of  individuals,  if  at  all,  do  we  observe  such  an
improvement  in  job-search  incentives  in  the  countries  that  have  introduced  such
systems?  (Note that the fact of no improvement  over the incentives  of the traditional
unemployment  insurance  may signal that UISAs  are not a  feasible  system.  Namely,
workers  who  expect to end their working  life  with negative  balances  face the  same
incentives as under the traditional  unemployment  system.)  Moreover,  do we observe
incentive  incompatibility  - for example,  withdrawals  from  the labor  force  - if the
savings  account  is  not  set  up  for  multiple  uses?  Do  we  observe  an  increased
propensity  to  quit,  indicating  a  high  liquidity  preference?  Clearly,  real-world
experience can be of valuable guidance in creating  a viable UISA system.
3.  What  are  the  distributive  effects  of  the  UISA  system?  The  main  objective  of
income support systems for unemployed  workers  is to compensate  workers for a loss
of income  when  they  become  unemployed.  A  natural  and  legitimate  question,
therefore,  is to examine  to  what extent existing  UISA  systems  succeed  in providing
adequate  income support,  as well as what effects  these  income support  systems have
on personal  savings and  private  transfers.  In particular,  what  are the  effects  of the
UISA system on:
*  Consumption  smoothing  - does  the  UISA  system  help prevent  the reduction  of
consumption  following  the  individual's  loss  of  income  upon  becoming
unemployed?
*  Personal  savings - does the existence of the UISA system  induce  individuals to
increase personal savings?
*  Private  transfers  - does  the  existence  of  the  UISA  system  reduce  private
transfers?
4.  What  redistributive  effects  arise  from  replacing  the  unemployment  insurance
system with the UISA  system?  A separate issue  is the distributive consequences  of
the  substitution  of the  traditional  unernployment  insurance  system  by  the  UISA
system.  In  principle,  the  latter  can  provide  the  same  income  protection  as  the
143traditional  unemployment  insurance  system,  but  the  switch  is  likely  to  have
redistributive  consequences,  because  the  benefits  are  financed  in  a  different  way.
According  to  Feldstein  and  Altman  (1998),  the  distributive  effects  for  the U.S.  are
likely to be small, but it is important to learn how large these effects are in the context
of developing  countries.
5.  What is  the optimal design  the UISA  system?  Important issues  to be  determined
are:
*  What are  the rules  for contribution?  (for example,  does contribution  depend  on the
current balance?)
*  What  are the  rules  for withdrawal?  (for example,  what  is the  level  of replacement
ratios? who qualifies? for how long?)
*  What are the limits on the account balance?
*  What are the rules that determine the contribution of a worker to the savings account?
*  What rate of interest should be applied to the funds?
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The report reviews the performance of various income support systems for the unemployed  #
and provides guidelines for developing and transition countries.  It  finds that:
*  Unemployment insurance enabiles a  high degree  of consumption smoothing,
performs well under various types of shocks, and  acts as an  automatic stabilizer.
But it also creates reemployment  disincentives and wage pressures which  increase
the equilibrium  unemployment  rate,  and it contributes  to the persistence of
unemployment.  Because its successful  performance  requires strong administrative
capacity, modest size of the informal  sector,  and low political risk -the  conditions
which are typically lacking in  developing and transition countries - its introduction
in  these countries is  less compelling than  it is in developed countries.
*  Unemployment  assistance,  while enabling more effective targeting,  may  not bring
savings in comparison  to unemployment  insurance - and in  fact may  prove
fiscalry unsustainable due to the increased pool of potential applicants.
*  Unemployment insurance savings accounts internalize the costs of unemployment
benefits and thus avoid the moral  hazard  inherent in traditional unemployment
insurance- given the weak monitoring capacity of developing countries, an
important advantage. In  its integrated version with public insurance the program
could offer both superior protection and improved incentives,  but for the
price of reduced  gains in combating moral hazard problem  and disincentive
problems  of its own.
*  Public works program is  effective in  reaching the poor,  can attract informal sector
workers,  and  provides flexible and fast response to shocks.  Despite its high non-
wage costs  and possible stigmatization of participants, it is  found  suitable for
developing  countries, particularly  as a  complementarv  program.
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